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Abstract 
A majority of the world’s agricultural production takes place on small farms (less 
than 2 hectares). India has one of the smallest average farm sizes with over 68 per 
cent of its farms being marginal in size (below 1 hectare). Small farm production is 
constrained by challenges of accessing lumpy inputs of management and asset 
specific machinery, markets, credit, extension services and technology. Collective 
actions in the form of cooperatives in many parts of the world have played a vital role 
in overcoming these challenges and enabling agricultural growth. However, 
cooperatives in India have suffered from low participation, over-dependence on state 
assistance, poor management, political interference in their functioning and poor 
benefits to intended target groups. In recent years Producer Organisational Formats 
(POFs) such as Producer Companies (PCs), Joint Liability Groups (JLGs) and 
Farmers Federations (FFs) have emerged in an attempt to address some of these 
challenges faced by small producers. Although policy makers recognize this new 
cooperativism to have the potential to address small producer disadvantages, progress 
has been little in supporting or promoting POFs in India due to limited understanding 
of their functioning, impact and potential. This knowledge gap motivated this 
research. Using a conceptual framework grounded in institutional and collective 
action theories, this thesis examines (a) how POFs are structured on organisational, 
social and economic terms and (b) how resources are allocated and incentives aligned 
within these institutions. The thesis finds that the examined POFs are small, region-
specific collective actions, organised with the help of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) supported by the state. POFs relied on networks of social 
relationships, trust, norms and sometimes religious ideology to prevent collective 
action problems that hindered effective organisation. In economic terms, POFs 
helped improve market access and increased marketable agricultural surplus at the 
household level; yet, this surplus was not sufficient for households with marginal 
sized land to solely depend on farming as a livelihood activity. As for resource 
allocation and incentive alignment within POFs, the even distribution of collective 
goods to all members was a strong material incentive for participation. Social capital 
in the form of networks, norms and trust among members also incentivised 
participation. In sum the study finds that POFs have the potential to improve access 
to markets, credit, inputs and research and extension services, the lack of which has 
 6
hindered small and marginal producer viability. In some cases social disadvantages of 
access arising from gender and caste were addressed through these organisations. 
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Chapter I: Introduction  
A majority of the world’s agricultural production takes place on small farms (less 
than 2 hectares in size) with over 500 million small farms cultivated by two billion of 
the world’s population (Hazell et al, 2010). Despite recurring predictions that small 
farms will soon disappear through consolidation, they have persisted, and in many 
cases have increased in number (ibid). The size of farms and their productivity have 
been the topic for debate in studies of rural development and economics for a long 
time. Countering the assumption that small farms are unviable, economists in the 
1960’s and 70’s have argued that crop productivity per unit of land declined with the 
increase in farm size (Bardhan, 1973; Mazumdar, 1965; A. Sen, 1962), leading  to the 
emergence of the ‘small farm paradigm’ which entails  an inverse relationship 
between farm-size and productivity. These studies conclude that small farms have an 
advantage over large farms in per unit productivity due to higher labour utilization 
(i.e. using family labour) and higher utilization of inputs (i.e. intensive farming)1. 
From the late 1970’s onwards, this inverse farm-size productivity paradigm was 
challenged. Some research has showed that there is no clear relationship between 
land size and productivity (Benjamin, 1995; Bhalla & Roy, 1988;  Eastwood, Lipton, 
& Newell, 2010; Feder, 1985), while other studies (Chand et al, 2011; Gaurav and 
Mishra, 2011, Gandhi and Koshy, 2006) have indicated that per capita returns are still 
higher on small farms, yet unobserved heterogeneities from climatic variations, 
fertility conditions, access to resources and quality of management greatly influences 
productivity. Johnson and Ruttan (1994) have clarified the advantages and 
disadvantages of small farms with respect to two forms of economy of scale relations 
- the internal and external economies of scale. They state that internal economies of 
scale are size relations associated with the actual production processes, such as labour 
input, monitoring and local knowledge. These inputs are scale neutral, and in the 
pressure of high monitoring costs (to large farms) small farms are not at a 
                                         
1 Prominent studies on the topic admitted that the inverse relationship was a result of imperfect land and labour markets (Bardhan, 
1973; A. Sen, 1966). Imperfections in the labour market meant that surplus labour at the household level was available as 
opportunity costs (off-farm wages minus search and travel costs) were higher than on-farm wages. Imperfect land markets mean that 
lease markets to help access more land for farming had adverse lease conditions for farmers and that they had to effectively utilise 
their current endowment.  This was considered a socially optimal outcome considering land scarcity and labour surplus on small 
farms (S.Singh, 2011).  
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disadvantage, and in many cases may have an advantage. The external economies of 
scale, on the other hand, consider factors such as access to markets, credit and 
extension services, technology and lumpy inputs like management and asset specific 
machinery. In these cases, small family farms are at a disadvantage due to problems 
of capital market imperfections (low access to credit), access to resources and low 
market power.  
In India, agriculture is the single largest economic sector providing employment to 
more than 50 per cent of the country’s workforce (GOI, 2011). Landholding sizes2 
are also among the smallest in the world with an average farm size of 1.10 hectares 
(Chand et al. 2011). The Agricultural Census of India (2009) 3 data reveals that over 
67 per cent of landholdings are marginal (less than 1 hectare) in size. The Tendulkar 
Committee (2011-12) which was set up by the Government of India to constitute a 
methodology for estimation of poverty states that the threshold landholding required 
for households to create a surplus to stay above the poverty line is 0.8 hectares (2 
acres)4. This calls into question the viability of a majority of farming households in 
India. The census also shows that this group cultivated only 22.4 per cent of 
operational landholdings. Small farms (with sizes between 1-2 hectares of land) make 
up 17 percent of landholdings cultivating 22.8 per cent of operational landholdings in 
India5. Organisations coordinating collective action to address issues of external 
economies of scale are therefore important to bring about production growth, reduced 
environmental externalities6, agricultural research and extension, and improve small 
and marginal farmers’ access to resources such as credit and inputs (MOF, 2007). 
In many countries, small producers undertook collective action to remedy the 
disadvantages of external economies of scale relationships (Devaux et al., 2009; 
                                         
This is the size of land owned or possessed by a particular household for farming activities 
3 http://agcensus.nic.in/document/agcensus2010/completereport.pdf 
4 This is based on the calculation that per capita income at the household from agriculture is not sufficient for the family to rely on 
agriculture alone. This was calculated by subtracting gross value of input and labour used in agricultural production from the gross 
value of agriculture (crops + livestock) and dividing it by the number of members in a household (Chand et al., 2011). 
5 The big concern is that the number of small and marginal farms have been growing. According to the National Bank for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (NABARD), 10 million small and marginal farmers were added to the agricultural sector in India every five 
years5 (Bakshi, 2012).  
6 Intensive farming to maximise returns has led to the degradation of natural resources on a large scale. According to the National 
Bureau of Soil Survey and Land Use Planning (NBSS & LUP), 146.82 million hectares of land (44% of geographical area) in India is 
affected by land degradation. The breakup of the nature of degradation:  water erosion 93.68 million ha., wind erosion 9.48 million 
ha., water logging/flooding 14.30 million ha., salinity/alkalinity 5.94 million ha., soil acidity 16.04 million ha. and other problems of 
conditions 7.38 million ha.   
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Kherallahet al., 2002; Stockbridge et al., 2003). Collective actions are voluntary 
actions taken by a group of individuals to achieve a common goal, and cooperatives 
are the most common form of collective action in the agricultural sector. 
Cooperatives, according to the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), are 
“autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common 
economic, social and cultural needs and aspiration through a jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise” 7. In countries like Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan that were founded upon small farms8, cooperatives were set up, and factors 
that put small farms at a disadvantage were neutralised through state provisioned 
extension services, key inputs, irrigation and market intervention operations (Huang, 
2006; Kajita, 1965; Lin, 2006). In many African countries and in India, cooperatives 
were less successful. They often had limited impact due to poor organisation and 
management, political interference in their functioning, financial irregularities and 
corruption within their organisations (Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1997; Attwood, 1982, 1987; 
Baviskar, 1987; Holloway et al., 2000; Lalvani, 2008).  According to the Press 
Information Bureau of the Government of India:  
 
The cooperatives have been operating in various areas of the economy such as credit, production, processing, 
marketing, input distribution, housing, dairying and textiles. In some of the areas of their activities like 
dairying, urban banking and housing, sugar and handlooms, the cooperatives have achieved success to an 
extent but there are larger areas where they have not been so successful. The failure of cooperatives in the 
country is mainly attributable to: dormant membership and lack of active participation of members in the 
management of cooperatives. Mounting over dues in cooperative credit institution, lack of mobilisation of 
internal resources and over-dependence on Government assistance, lack of professional management, 
bureaucratic control and interference in the management, political interference and over-politicisation have 
proved harmful to their growth. Predominance of vested interests resulting in non-percolation of benefits to a 
common member, particularly to the class of persons for whom such cooperatives were basically formed, has 
also retarded the development of cooperatives9. 
 
Along with cooperatives, community-centred programmes based on collective action 
such as Self Help Groups (SHGs) providing microcredit, extension services and 
managing natural resources through watershed management programs have also met 
with limited success (Ghosh, 2013; Marothia, 2002). The challenges faced by these 
initiatives have been similar to the ones faced by the cooperatives in India. Poor 
member participation, bureaucratic interference in management and lack of resource 
                                         
7 http://ica.coop/  
8 The average size of landholdings in Japan and Korea in the 21st century were 1.2 acres and 1 acre respectively (S. Fan & Chan-
Kang, 2003) and less than 1 acres in Taiwan (Lam, 2006). 
http://pib.nic.in/feature/fe0299/f1202992.html)
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mobilisation have been identified as inhibiting factors (Abraham & Platteau, 2001; 
Ghosh, 2013; Jodha, 2002; Kornginnaya, 2013; Mader, 2013; Marothia, 2002). Some 
scholars have also pointed at hierarchical social structures based on strong caste 
identities in India as an additional factor for limiting the impact of these initiatives 
and collective action in general (Bandyopadhyay & von Eschen, 1988; Bardhan, 
1993, 1996; Platteau, 2000; Wade, 1994).  Clearly, the challenges of organisations 
coordinating collective action such as cooperatives and community-centred 
programmes in India have been structural (e.g. poor governance, poor management, 
political and bureaucratic interference, social structures) lack of incentives (e.g. 
dormant membership and lack of active participation) and poor resource allocation 
(e.g. non-percolation of benefits to members, especially to target groups it aims to 
empower).  
Collective action is a complex phenomenon, and studies have shown that initiatives 
that are successful in one context may not succeed  in a similar context elsewhere 
(Ostrom, 1998a). Scholars, therefore, emphasise the need to study collective action 
and the organisations coordinating it within the context of how they are initiated and 
governed, how various factors influence the interaction between involved actors and 
how these joint actions are incentivised (Agrawal, 2001a; Marwell & Oliver, 1993; 
Ostrom, 2000a, 2003). Although the understanding of factors influencing the success 
or failure of collective action is still limited due to the specificity of context (Ostrom, 
2003), empirical research on the management of Common Pool Resources (CPR)  in 
India (e.g. Agrawal, 2001; Wade, 1988) and around the world (e.g. Baland & 
Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Poteete & Ostrom, 2008) has provided indicators of 
organisational, social and economic factors and conditions that could foster or inhibit 
collective action. In this way, any study of collective action needs to be 
conceptualised and understood within the context of its purpose of organisation, 
social influences, benefits it brings its members and specific outcomes and impacts 
(Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004).  
India is a country of large variations in economic and social development, and these 
variations cut across regions and are greatly influenced by its geography, economic 
history and institutions (Tomlinson, 1993). One marked regional difference is the 
performance of the South Indian states to the rest of the country. In terms of per 
capita income growth, income distribution and instances of poverty reduction, the 
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South Indian states have fared much better than the North Indian states (A. Banerjee 
& Iyer, 2005; Jayaraj & Subramanian, 2005; Narayana & Mahadevan, 2011; A 
Subramanian, 2008). Jayaraj and Subramanian (2005), using an index of generalised 
deprivation10, conclude that only 6 per cent of the districts in South India were 
considered highly deprived of basic amenities compared to 72 per cent of the districts 
in the northern regions of the country. Paradoxically, the South Indian states were 
also where the impact of agrarian distress in the past decade resulted in cases of 
farmer suicides. Between 1995 and 2012, there were 282,400 reported cases of 
suicides by farmers due to agrarian distress, and 39.2 per cent of these cases were 
from Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka11. According to scholars 
including Mohan Rao (2004), Reddy and Mishra (2009), the reasons for these 
suicides were indebtedness, crop failure and lower commodity prices in the years that 
followed the liberalisation of the Indian economy in 1991. Hence, the variation of 
context across India in which agricultural production takes place needs to be 
considered when studying collective action.  
Despite challenges in community-based collective action and cooperatives, academic 
and government plans and reports (GOI, 2005, 2008, 2013; MoF, 2007; Agarwal, 
2010; Birthal et al., 2005; Patibandla & Sastry, 2004; Singh, 2008; Sudha & Gulati, 
2008), along with  studies on the agrarian economy at a global level (Hazell, 2005; 
Hazell et al., 2010; Markelova et al., 2009; Poulton et al., 2010) have highlighted the 
importance and necessity to develop collective producer organisations to address 
small producer disadvantages. In the past decade, the agricultural sector in India has 
witnessed the emergence of different forms of producer organisations. Producer 
Organisational Formats or POFs such as Producer Companies, Joint Liability Groups 
and Farmers Federations have been mentioned in academic literature (Rupnawar & 
Kharat, 2014; S. Singh, 2008; Trebbin & Hassler, 2012) and government reports 
(Government of India, 2013a, 2013b) to have the scope to improve credit, input and 
technology access, improve bargaining power in commodity markets and reduce 
social discrimination based on caste and gender (MoF, 2007; Reddy & Mishra, 2009; 
Sharma, 2011) among small and marginal agriucltural producers. The 11th five year 
                                         
10The index considers six basic facilities of public transport, tap water, health care, electricity, metaled roads and clean cooking fuel 
to define the relative levels of deprivation in various districts in India. 
11 Source: National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. Compiled from the “Accidental Deaths 
and Suicides in India” report of various years.  
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plan of the Government of India (2007-2012) included a policy focus to support 
producer organisations in the agriculture sector. The 12th plan (2013-17), however, 
admitted that little progress was made in supporting or promoting this new 
cooperativism due to limited understanding of their functioning, impact and potential. 
Due to this, support measures such as subsidies to promote producer organisations 
were not executed, and schemes to promote them widely in the agricultural sector 
were absent (GOI, 2013; pp. 21).  
The importance of new cooperativism in the agricultural sector and the limited 
understanding of how they are stuctured, how resources and services are allocated 
(credit, inputs, information and technonogy, market access) and how participation has 
been incentivised has been the main motivating factor  this research on Producer 
Organisational Formats in India. Understanding factors that influence collective 
action is crucial to helping producer organisations address challenges that have 
plagued collective initiatives such as cooperatives and community-centred 
programmes. How successful coordination can help address issues of external 
economies that put small and marginal producers at a disadvantage and its limitations 
also needs to be explored. At a policy level, increased understanding of how 
collective actions are structured and coordinated may help better support and promote 
such initiatives more widely in the agricultural sector in India.  
Producer Companies, Joint Liability Groups and Farmers Federations were the three 
Producer Organisational Formats (POFs) assessed in this study.  Similarities found 
among these POFs include the fact that they were voluntarily organised, small and 
marginal producer collective actions attempting to address the problems of market 
access and external economies of scale affecting small and marginal production. 
Many of these producer organisations were supported by Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGO) which helped in the coordination of collective action.  They 
differed from each other in terms of the goods or the combination of goods (credit, 
inputs, marketing, extension services) they accessed and provided to their members. 
One crucial difference identified among these POFs was that some were credit-
providing producer organisations while others were not. In credit-providing POFs, 
the major focus was on providing agricultural loans/credit to their members, while 
the other formats mainly provided other inputs such as seeds, fertilisers and 
pesticides, marketing services and extension services. Therefore, this study chose to 
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compare these credit and non-credit producer organisational formats in order to 
recognize what this difference might play in influencing collective action in POFs.  
Due to large disparities in economic and social development across regions, as well 
as an increased manifestation of agrarian distress, it was important to have a regional 
focus. The states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka in South India were chosen for this 
study as all three types of POFs (Producer Companies, Joint Liability Groups and 
Farmers Federations) were present in the region. Karnataka and Tamil Nadu also had 
similar cropping patterns which aided in the comparison12.   
As this thesis examines the phenomenon of collective action coordinated by specific 
producer organisations, a purposive sampling was used to identify cases for the study. 
The two main criteria for the purposive sampling were: a) whether they were 
theoretically organisations coordinating collective actions and b) the type of 
collective goods they provided (i.e. credit and non-credit POFs). Despite a large 
number of Joint Liability Groups initiated by the National Bank for Agricultural and 
Rural Development (NABARD) and a number of producer companies registered, 
many of these producer organisations did not undertake collective action. A 
theoretical definition of collective action was therefore essential for the selection of 
cases in this study in order to allow for a comparison between the cases. Heckathron 
(1993) provides a useful definition of collective action which includes three 
conditions for the classification of collective action: a) goods should be jointly 
produced and accessed by members of the group, b) the accessed collective good 
needs to be made available to all participants of the group and c) there must be a cost 
involved in the production or access of the collective good. As the goods provided 
also differed, cases were also purposively sampled to compare credit-providing and 
non-credit collective actions.  
Four cases were chosen for this study with the aim of gathering rich information and 
engaging in an in-depth comparative study. Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society 
(SFWS), Shri Kshethra Dharmastala Rural Development Project (SKDRDP) in 
Karnataka were the two credit-providing organisations coordinating collective 
actions, while Savayava Krushikara Sangha (SKS) from Karnataka and Aharam 
                                         
12 Kerala is unique as the majority of the crops grown there are commercial crops and plantation crops (rubber, spices, coconut, 
coffee, cashew nut, tea among others). This was a crucial factor in not choosing Kerala as a region of study.  
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Producer Company (APC) from Tamil Nadu the other two were non-credit 
organisations.   
1.1 Research Question 
 The central research questions this study sought to answer were: 
1. How are SFWS, SKDRDP, APC and SKS in the states of Karnataka and 
Tamil Nadu structured in organisational, social and economic terms?  
2. How are resources allocated and incentives aligned in these Producer 
Organisational Formats?  
Traditional forms of cooperatives and community-centred programmes coordinating 
collective actions in India have been hindered by organisational, social and economic 
characteristics of groups. Therefore, this study has attempted to determine the 
influence that these features play on the success of producer organisations in 
improving economic conditions for small and marginal farmers. In practice, this 
study specifically reviewed the organisational features of various Producer 
Organisational Formats to identify factors that influence how they are coordinated 
and governed, identify the influence of the social features of caste, class and gender 
in groups to determine characteristics that may enable or hinder cooperation in POFs, 
and compare credit and non-credit POFs to see how the type of collective goods 
might influence how collective action is structured. Crucially, the study also assessed 
how goods and services were allocated to various participants of the groups in order 
to bring about changes in the viability of small and marginal production, as well as 
identified what major forms of incentives were offered that encouraged member 
participation.   
1.2 Theoretical and empirical contribution of the thesis  
Collective action is a complex phenomenon with a large number of factors affecting 
its performances. Although many studies try to bring understanding as to how 
cooperation is coordinated, especially in the management of Common Pool 
Resources (CPR), theoretical understanding of the features that influence collective 
action is limited (Ostrom, 1998). Although collective action theory helps in 
understanding the influence that specific characteristics play in studying cooperation, 
it has been noted that there is little focus on the external environment or the context 
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in which cooperation efforts are situated (Agrawal, 2002). Although both CPR-based 
initiatives and for-profit producer organisations practice collective action, their 
context, purpose and aim, along with their incentive structures are different;  this 
plays a major role in influencing how different stakeholders act. Therefore, the nature 
of incentives and the context in which for-profit producer organisations coordinate 
collective action requires specification. In order to address this, the study specified an 
analytical framework that combined institutional theory and collective action theory 
to understand how producer organisations are structured on organisational, social and 
economic terms. Institutional theory helped situate the study of this collective action 
in the context of institutional conditions (social, economic, political and legal) under 
which agricultural activities take place. These conditions form the context in which 
agricultural production takes place and determines the challenges the agricultural 
sector faces. This theoretical framework thus aided the analysis of how for-profit 
producer organisations are structured, how resources are allocated and how 
incentives become aligned in the context of agricultural production in India.  
Empirical studies about collective action in for-profit initiatives often look at how 
contract farming has been enabled through groups (S.Singh 2002), and how producer 
organisations can link producers to the market (Trebbin & Franz, 2010; Trebbin, 
2014). They deal with the basic contractual relationship between different 
stakeholders, and the linkages they form with markets. An understanding of how 
groups are formed, structured and incentivised, however, is absent. The dynamics 
that various factors play in influencing collective action in organisational and social 
terms are largely examined in studies relating to common pool resources 
management. However, they fundamentally differ from for-profit initiatives in the 
type of goods they collectively access, thus altering the participants’ economic goals, 
incentives and how they behave in groups. In this study, I look at the dynamics of 
collective action in non-CPR and for-profit collective actions. Rather than looking at 
the contractual relationships and market linkages alone, this study looks at how a) 
producer organisations coordinate and govern collective action (i.e. organisational 
features), b) collective action problems that have hindered collective action initiatives 
are solved or prevented ) (i.e. social features, c)  access problems and challenges 
faced by small and marginal producers to increase returns to farming are addressed 
(i.e. economic features), d) credit providing producer organisations are structured 
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differently from non-credit producer organisations and e) resources are allocated and 
incentives aligned in different POFs.  
1.3 Methodology and research design 
This study of Producer Organisational Formats as collective action initiatives in the 
agricultural sector in India is a qualitative study that uses multiple-case studies to 
explore the main research questions (stated above). The main purpose of this section 
is to describe the design and approaches undertaken in this comparative case study. 
The first part discusses and justifies the qualitative approach which this study 
employed for answering the research questions, and it examines the methods and 
procedures that formed the structure of the research design. The second part of this 
chapter describes how the research was carried out, and how data was collected 
through fieldwork, including an explanation of the selection procedures and the type 
of case studies employed in this thesis. The last part details how the collected data 
was organised and analysed to answer the research question.  
1.3.1 The strategy of inquiry 
Qualitative research is a broad term that refers to studies that investigate social and 
human phenomena in its natural setting (Creswell, 2009). In other words, 
“…qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make 
sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, pp. 3). Qualitative research utilises methods and tools, 
such as participant observation, direct observations, case studies, unstructured or 
semi-structured interviews with key informants, respondents and focus groups, oral 
histories and narratives, to create descriptive accounts and narratives in 
understanding a phenomenon (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004; Parkinson & Drislane, 
2011).  
Earlier works of collective action in common pool resources and their governance 
have been single or few case studies, and as case studies accumulate, other empirical 
research such as meta-analysis and large-N field studies to identify generalizable 
patterns have emerged (Poteete & Ostrom, 2008). However, a challenge associated 
with these studies has been that even with collaboration it has proven difficult to 
accumulate enough comparable data to support large-N analyses at a national or 
cross-national level (ibid). This is largely because the nature and type of collective 
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action initiatives in CPR management differ drastically depending on the nature of 
collective goods (forestry, grazing lands, water resources, fisheries) and other 
structural features influencing how collective action is organised. Therefore, 
qualitative case studies remain the preferred method of studying collective action in 
CPR management. This study of the four POFs mentioned above was an explorative 
study which examined how they are structured to address production challenges 
affecting small and marginal farmers. Quantitative production data was also used in 
this study to assess the economic outputs of collective action that accrued for small 
and marginal producers. Furthermore, this study used a comparative case study 
approach using multiple case studies.  In the following part, the type of case study 
analysis and how the case studies were selected is discussed.  
1.3.2 Case study analysis and sampling  
A case study analysis is “an empirical inquiry that attempts to investigate a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003; pp. 
13). In a case study analysis, an observed unit of study (person, group, country) is 
identified (as a phenomenon) and then explored, described or explained in the context 
of the research. Case studies are often used in research where a holistic perspective is 
needed in the presence of multiple sources of data (Patton & Applebaum, 2003) or to 
further develop theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). A case study method was chosen in this 
study to gather in-depth data and acquire a holistic perspective of the context and 
conditions under which different organisations coordinate collective action, allocate 
collective goods and incentivise participation among small and marginal agricultural 
producers. More specifically, a comparative case study analysis was used in this 
thesis. Comparative case studies are used for an in-depth analysis of a small number 
of cases (D. Collier, 1993; Druckman, 2005; Lijphart, 1971, 1975). A small number 
of cases are usually selected because a) the topic of study is a complex phenomenon 
with a potentially large number of variables  (Druckman, 2005), b) it permits the 
intensive and systematic examination of cases (D. Collier, 1993; Lijphart, 1971) and 
c) it helps shed light on the possible similarities and differences between cases and 
helps with the comparison (D. Collier, 1993). In this study, the complexity of the 
phenomenon of collective action and the context-dependent and subjective 
characteristics of organisations coordinating collective action determined the choice 
of a comparative case study approach.  
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In comparative case study analysis, the selection of cases is crucial in order for cases 
to be comparable. Faure (1994) suggests the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD), 
where a small number of cases that are similar in certain characteristics help in the 
selection of cases for a comparative case study. The logic behind this selection is 
based on Mills' (2002) ‘method of difference logic’, which states that when cases are 
more similar, it becomes possible to identify factors responsible for their differences. 
Therefore, purposively sampled case studies were crucial for this study. Purposive 
sampling is a sampling technique where samples are chosen from a population that is 
interesting to study based on strong theoretical and practical reasons. Agrawal (2001) 
states that there is no general theory of purposive sampling when identifying 
collective action cases. However, he suggests that the two important criteria 
important for sampling case studies involving collective action are a) awareness of 
variables that are theoretically relevant and b) particular knowledge of the cases to be 
researched. By reviewing influential literature in the field of collective action and 
rural development, this study identified organisational, social and economic factors 
that could potentially influence the coordination of collective action. This helped 
identify comparable variables between the cases. As different regions in India vary 
with respect to geography, economic history and institutions, Karnataka and Tamil 
Nadu were the two states chosen for this study due to their similarities in their 
development indicators and agricultural sectors. As discussed in the first part of this 
chapter, the cases that were identified for this study were based on Heckathron's 
(1993) definition of collective action that included the conditions that goods should 
be jointly produced and accessed by members, the accessed collective good(s) should 
be made available to all participants of the group, and there must be a cost involved 
in the production or access of the collective good(s). An additional condition of case 
selection was that two were credit-providing organisations, while the other two were 
non-credit organisations coordinating collective actions. This helped in selecting 
cases that were most similar. Table 1.1 (see below) provides the methodological 
summary of this study. The following part discusses how the data was collected, 
managed and analysed.  
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Table 1.1: Methodological summary  
Particulars   
Area of Study   Tamil Nadu 
 Karnataka  
 
Producer Organisational Formats 
Studied  
 Farmers federation (1) 
 Producer company (1) 
 Joint liability groups (2) 
 
Methodology   Case study analysis  
 
Tools   Interviews  
 Participant Observation 
 Direct Observation 
 Secondary Data 
 Survey (for quantitative data)  
 Assessment of Profit  
 
Data   Production and marketing data from 
different formats (household level)  
 Data of the organisation  
 Informants  
o Group leaders 
o Support organisations  
o State representatives  
o Civil society spokespersons  
 Respondents  
o Stakeholders of the producer 
organisational formats  
 Other Documents  
1.3.3 Operationalization of research   
Data was collected from different POFs located in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu 
between the 9th of January 2012 and the 1st of May 2012 (the timeline of the 
fieldwork is provided in Appendix II). This study was conducted in three phases 
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(Figure 1.1, see below). In the first phase, the theoretical framework was developed 
using institutional theory and collective action theory to identify the theoretical 
factors that influence collective action. In the second phase, different POFs for the 
study were identified. Informants of the study were individuals who possessed 
knowledge about the researched phenomenon and were willing to share their 
knowledge with the researcher. They helped in identifying various cases and 
providing specific information about various cases coordinating collective action. 
Interview data was collected from informants using semi-structured interviews. Data 
regarding the functioning of the groups and the dynamics of group-based activities 
were collected from farmer members of the different initiatives using a survey. They 
were the respondents of the study or individuals who were responding to specific 
questions or survey.   
Figure 1.1 Different Phases of the Study
 
Additionally, direct observation and participant observation were utilised to collect 
information from the field. The case studies were sequentially analysed, and the same 
framework was used to collect data from all the cases. For subsequent clarifications, 
informants in the four initiatives were contacted by phone with follow-up questions. 
In the third phase of the study, data was compiled and organised for case study 
analysis. The data was coded using a code list based on the theoretical framework 
Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Theoretical 
Framework and 
Primary Research 
Tools 
Case Study I  
Case Study IV 
Case Study III 
Case Study II 
Conclusion  
Case Report 
Coding Data  
Organising and 
Compiling Data  
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which helped compile the case reports used in this study. The following part 
describes the different research tools, the methods of verification, triangulation of 
data and the ethical considerations engaged in this study. It also discusses the various 
challenges that were faced during data collection, and how these challenges were 
overcome. 
1.3.4 Development of a framework and data collection tools 
The theoretical framework of this study was developed using institutional theory and 
collective action theory. These theories helped identify organisational, social and 
economic features that might influence the formation and organisation of collective 
action from influential studies in the field. Based on this, the interview-guide 
(Appendix IV) and survey (Appendix V) were designed to collect data from 
informants and respondents. The informants of this study included academics, 
officials from NABARD, coordinators of the producer organisations, NGO officials, 
a businessperson, different farmer members and field-level officials running day-to-
day operations of the different initiatives (Appendix III lists the informants who were 
interviewed for this study). These informants were interviewed using semi-structured 
interviews which allowed for an in-depth discussion of their opinions and insights 
regarding the various topics. The main topics of these interviews were: a) the main 
characteristics of the initiatives, b) goals of the producer organisations, c) how these 
organisations are structured and governed and d) perceived changes and challenges of 
collective action. A digital recorder was used for most of the interviews, and, when 
not in use, detailed notes were taken. The interviews were transcribed and then 
emailed to informants if they had access to email.  Data was also collected from 
primary producer members of the producer organisations using a survey and semi-
structured interviews. The survey used in the study was divided into five sections: a) 
basic information about the participant, b) information about the initiative, c) 
organisational aspects of the initiative, d) social characteristics of the initiative and d) 
economic features of the group and household-level production data (Appendix V). 
Focus group discussions among different group members were also conducted at the 
village level.  Useful information about the group and village level power dynamics 
were acquired through these focus groups. 
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All interviews, focus group discussions and survey data for the study were collected 
by the author of this study. The surveys and schedules of visits to villages could not 
be planned ahead of time since there was no way to determine the availavility to 
members to be surveyed, and sometimes only one member of the household (usually 
the male members) had information about group activities and production 
information. Therefore, the timing of the collection of data was crucial. Hence, the 
surveys were conducted mostly in the evenings when farmers returned from their 
fields.  
Furthermore, data for each case was collected from multiple sources. The main 
informants for each case were the leaders and administrators of the POFs, officials of 
the NGOs supporting them and the field staff who coordinated the various activities 
of the organisations; the respondents of the study were the member farmers who were 
surveyed during the fieldwork. Table 1.3 summarises the survey and production data 
collected from different initiatives studied in this thesis.  
Table 1.3: Summary of survey and production data collected from different 
initiatives 
Organisation  Number of 
Respondents 
Aharam Producer Company 22 
Savayava Krushikara Sangha Farmers Federation 44 
Shri Kshethra Dharmastala Rural Development Project 
JLG 
42 
Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society JLG 30 
 
Conducting the survey and visiting different farms also helped with acquiring 
observational data in the field, such as observing changes in farming techniques, 
labour sharing activities and other forms of group activities such as meetings and 
information sharing within groups. Furthermore, participant observation was enacted 
in price-fixing meetings (Savayava Krushikara Sangha), executive committee 
meetings, savings group meetings (Aharam Producer Company, Savayava Krushikara 
Sangha), labour sharing initiatives (Shri Kshethra Dharmastala Rural Development 
Project) and general body meetings (Savayava Krushikara Sangha). Translators were 
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used during the collection of survey data and participant observation in Karnataka 
which helped to gather valuable information on the functioning of groups and 
decision-making structures of the organisations. A field journal was also kept to 
record important information which was observed in the field. Moreover, the 
documents that the various organisations kept provided an additional source of data 
for studying these different initiatives. The documents that were suitable sources of 
data include:  internal studies conducted by the group, annual reports of the 
organisations or the NGOs supporting it and information brochures organisations 
kept regarding their activities.  
Production data was collected through the suvey of primary producers to understand 
the economic changes brought about through collective action. It was assumed that 
the primary changes that were brought about were through better price realisation 
(price increase response), reduction of marketing costs (marketing cost reduction 
response), improvement in yields (yield response) and better production practices 
(production effeciency response). In order to determine the level of these changes 
costs and prices ‘before’ and ‘after’ implementation of collective action needed to 
assessed. Table 1.4 shows the measures for the changes in price, production cost, 
marketing costs and changes in yields that were used to determine the change in 
profits for each of the cases and the soruces of data. Most initiatives kept records of 
the changes in cost of production resulting from extension services and price 
response. They collected this data through farmer field schools.  Data regarding 
identification of marketing costs and increased yields needed to be collected 
individually from respondants. This data was used to calculate the changes in profit 
brought about by different initiatives at the household level. Appendix VII details the 
analysis of the profit function used to compute change in profit from collective action 
participation.  
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Table 1.4: Controls for measuring change in profit 
Particulars Before After Sources of data 
Price 
increase 
response 
- Price of produce 
through village level 
intermediaries  
- Market price 
- Premium prices 
through contracts  
and increased price 
realisation 
- Premium price 
data at the 
organisational 
level 
Production 
efficiency  
- Cost of cultivation in 
the absence of 
extension services  
or quality inputs 
- Higher interest rate 
- Cost of cultivation 
reduction through 
extension services, 
information and 
better inputs 
- Farmer field 
school data at 
the 
organisational 
level and 
household level  
 
Marketing 
cost 
reduction 
response   
- Transportation costs, 
loss through poor 
weighing 
- Benefits of farm 
gate purchase and 
costs saved 
- Organisational 
level for 
initiatives 
having farmgate 
purchase  
 
Yield 
response  
- Low yields due to 
poor information 
and poor extension 
and technology 
adoption 
- Yield increase due 
to better inputs, 
extension and 
technology 
- Household level 
and 
organisational 
level 
 
Despite most organisations mandating members to keep production records, some 
respondents did not have household level records. In order to collect production cost 
data, the study sometimes had to depend on the recall of the respondents. This may 
have led to some recall bias in the data. In such cases data collected at the household 
was verified using farmers field school data at the organisational level. The 
household level data was collected in 2012 and the before and after data intreval 
ranged between 3-5 years depending on the age of the initiative. Considering this 
intreval was not large the cost and price data was not adjusted to inflation.  
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1.3.5 Data management, ethical considerations and analysis  
In case study research, the verification of information is crucial to increase the 
accuracy and reliability of the analysis. Thus, the organisation of data is imperative 
prior to the verification of data. As data was compiled from multiple sources, it had 
to be organised in a retrievable manner. Interviews and field notes were transcribed, 
organised and classified with the help of codes.  Codes are data organisational tools 
used to compile and verify data, and in this analysis were topics under which 
different information gathered in the field were classified. Influential works on 
collective action (Agrawal, 2001a; Ostrom, 1998a) highlight the need for effective 
coding of data as the number of variables influencing collective actions are large. In 
this study, for the organisation of data, axial coding was used which is a hierarchical 
coding method where codes and sub-codes are created, and data is coded accordingly 
with different sub-codes classified under codes (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  Collective 
action theory and institutional theory guided the creation of codes in the study, and 
the organisation of POFs was examined from the vantage point of both these theories. 
The first code list was theory based, and this formed the basic structure of the survey 
questionnaire (Appendix V). Based on the field notes and preliminary review of data, 
the second code list was drawn out with primary codes and sub-codes (Appendix VI). 
This revised code list was used to compile and organise the data from interview 
transcripts, field notes, manuscripts from various organisations and secondary data 
from newspapers and internet sources. Coding along with organising the data for easy 
retrivability and crossreferencing also allowed for trinagulation. 
Data source triangulation entails the use of different sources of data to verify a 
phenomenon, fact or observation (Denzin, 1970). The multiple sources of data 
collected in the field were coded and triangulated to verify facts and observations. 
Figure 1.2 depicts the triangulation method used for the different sources of data 
collected. 
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Figure 1.2 Triangulation of data  
In all other cases, the information gathered from informants was also verified through 
respondents. Direct observation and participant observation was also helpful in the 
verification of information gathered from informants.  
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Various ethical considerations/checks were undertaken during fieldwork and during 
the compilation and presentation of the data in this study. Table 1.5 lists the various 
ethical issues and considerations followed during fieldwork. As the author collected 
all information used in the study, these considerations were uniformly applied in all 
locations. 
Table 1.5 Ethical issues and considerations taken in the study  
Ethical Issues Rights Violated  Considerations taken  
Participants Anonymity  Right to privacy   Data privately kept 
 Anonymity of respondents and 
informants 
 Anonymity of locations 
(village names) 
 
Involving participants in 
research without their 
knowledge 
Right to be 
informed 
Right to privacy  
 Researcher made his 
background and purpose clear 
to informants and respondents  
POF Cases 
Informant 
Interviews 
Participant Obs. 
Direct Obs.  
Survey and 
Respondents 
Theory  
Production Data 
Documents 
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Use of deception Right to be 
informed  
 Permission was explicitly 
asked before interviews or 
observations 
 
Use of coercion  Right to choose   Participation in the survey was 
voluntary  
 Respondents’ right not to 
answer questions was 
respected 
 
Causing embarrassment, 
hindrance or offence  
Right to respect   Explicit approval to use 
information was sought 
 Names and locations of 
respondents kept anonymous 
unless explicitly agreed upon.  
Source: Adopted from Smith & Quelch, (1992; pp. 12) 

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Two Joint Liability Groups, a Producer Company and a Farmers’ Federation were 
assessed in the study. Using the data that was gathered during fieldwork, in each case 
the structural features that determined the collective action were explored using 
propositions developed through the assessment of existing forms of collective action 
initiatives; the specific organisational, social and economic features were identified 
and assessed to determine their influence in enabling collective action. This 
assessment has helped provide insights into the scope, potential and challenges that 
collective actions face in bringing growth and development into the Indian 
agricultural sector.  
1.4 Chapter overview of the thesis  
The thesis is divided into six chapters. The second chapter describes the analytical 
framework employed in the study to help analyse how Producer Organisational 
Formats are structured in organisational, social and economic terms. The two theories 
used to develop this framework are collective action theory and institutional theory, 
which are further discussed in chapter two. Collective action theory attempts to 
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theorise the conditions, circumstances and factors that influence how collective 
action is initiated and coordinated. Although it helps guide an assessment of how 
cooperation is structured and coordinated, yet it is limited in its ability to understand 
the context in which producer organisations are situated in as well as the 
determinants that influence incentives in the organisations. Agricultural production 
takes place under unique production conditions characterised by seasonality, 
geographical dispersion, climatic and market risks. These conditions along with 
various social, economic, political and legal institutions characterise the context in 
which collective action takes place. Institutional theory in this study is used to 
understand the social context characterised by caste, class, and gender, the 
institutional environment or the political, social and legal ground rules that influence 
production, exchange and distribution and institutional arrangements or rules and 
regulations in particular situations governing individual or group activities. In the 
analytical framework developed for this thesis, institutional theory thus compliments 
collective action theory in studying how producer organisational formats coordinate 
cooperation among members in the context of the agricultural sector.  Moreover, 
institutional theory, which defines institutions as rules, schemas, norms and 
procedures that reduce uncertainty and increase an individual’s utility in economy 
and society, helps to understand the nature and functions of institutions and its effects 
and influences on human action.  
The third chapter describes the context in which agricultural production takes place in 
India. This context helps to understand the social and economic conditions in which 
producer organisations coordinate collective action and also highlight the relevance 
and scope of these initiatives. Utilising institutional theory, the chapter describes the 
institutional embeddedness of agricultural production, the institutional environment 
that influences production and the various institutional arrangements prevalent in the 
agricultural sector that is meant to help and support farmers. Institutional 
embeddedness helps establish the influence of the social context characterised by 
caste, class and gender that determines exclusion or access to land, inputs and 
markets in agricultural production.  The institutional environment in agriculture is 
characterised by property rights, transaction costs and information flow mechanisms 
and is also crucially dependent on the influence of these social dynamics.  
Agricultural markets, credit institutions and institutions disseminating research and 
extension services are the various institutional arrangements supporting production in 
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the agricultural sector. Access to these institutions and the services provided by them 
is therefore vital for the development of the sector. This analysis of the context thus 
helps in understanding the challenges faced by small and marginal producers in the 
agricultural sector, the objectives and purpose of producer organisations explored in 
this study and the nature of production and distribution issues faced by small and 
marginal farmers that producer organisations try to address.   
The fourth and fifth chapter of this study comprise the comparative case studies of 
the Producer Organisational Formats (POFs). Using the theoretical framework 
developed in chapter two, this assessment explores how these producer organisations 
are structured in organisational, social and economic terms, and how resources are 
allocated and incentives aligned. These empirically-based chapters consider the 
influence of the context and challenges of small and marginal production and 
describes how various initiatives attempt to address these context-dependent 
challenges through collective action. Chapter four assesses the two Joint Liability 
Group cases, namely Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project and 
Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society in the state of Karnataka, to understand how they 
are structured to access credit, inputs and extension services by their members. These 
two cases have the distinction of being producer organisations that provide 
institutional credit to their members and therefore were analysed together in 
comparison.  
Chapter five compares the other two cases of Aharam Producer Company (APC) and 
Savayava Krushikara Sangha, two non-credit producer organisations in the states of 
Tamil Nadu and Karnataka respectively.  This chapter shows how the two producer 
organisations are structured on organisational, social and economic terms, and how 
they successfully integrate their supply chains and form forward contracts to improve 
price realisation for their produce. By comparing four case studies, chapters four and 
five assess how these credit-providing and non-credit producer organisations were 
structured, how resources were allocated and what incentives were offered. They also 
assess how some of the challenges small and marginal agricultural producers faced in 
the agricultural sector in the states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu were addressed.  
This comparison helps to shed light on how the organisational, social and economic 
features differed from one another in different contexts, and how they influenced the 
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distribution of collective goods and nature of incentives in POFs coordinating 
collective action.   
The last chapter of the thesis sums up the main arguments made in the thesis and 
highlights the main findings of this study. Here the main factors that influence how 
POFs are structured in organisational, social and economic terms are discussed, and 
the changes these initiatives bring to small and marginal agricultural production in 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are considered. The importance of incentives and how 
collective goods are distributed among members is also pointed out. The implications 
for future research are also discussed highlighting how the analytical framework can 
be improved to address the historical influence on the emergence of producer 
organisations. In the last section, implications for policy development are addressed 
to highlight the relevance of POFs, and the need for policy support in order to 
implement them more widely due to the potential they have in addressing issues of 
gender disadvantages and social hindrances to markets, inputs and service access by 
small and marginal producers, as well as the potential economic implications they 
might have on small and marginal producer-dominated agriculture. 
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Chapter II: Theoretical Framework  
2.1 Introduction  
The different Producer Organisational Formats identified and studied in this thesis 
are producer organisations that coordinate collective action. The main aim of these 
organisations is to address challenges of access to credit, inputs, information and 
extension services and markets that effect small and marginal farmers in the 
community. The effectiveness of these Producer Organisational Formats (POFs) in 
enabling access and help in agricultural production hinges on how POFs are 
structured on organisational, social and economic terms, and this forms the central 
research question of the thesis. Collective action is a complex phenomenon, and 
although there are numerous studies exploring how cooperation is designed and 
coordinated, theoretical understanding of factors influencing the success or failure of 
collective action is limited (Ostrom, 1998a). Due to this complexity, generalizable 
explanations of why some groups fail to coordinate an initial cooperation break while 
others succeed in similar scenarios is hard to arrive at (Ostrom 1998a; Ostrom 2003). 
However, theoretically informed studies, especially in the area of common pool 
resources, have been able to identify scenarios under which successful collective 
action takes place (Agrawal, 2001c; Marwell & Oliver, 1993; Ostrom, 1998a).  
A limitation of the literature on collective action is that there is no adequate focus on 
the external environment or the context in which they are situated (Agrawal, 2002). 
Agriculture production in any economy is influenced by the production conditions 
(e.g. seasonality, geographical dispersion, climatic and market risks) and institutions 
conditions (e.g. social, economic, political and legal) under which agricultural 
activities take place. These conditions form the context in which agricultural 
production takes place, determines the challenges the agricultural sector faces and 
greatly influences how producer organisations are structured. This chapter aims to 
justify and create an analytical framework that will help understand how producer 
organisations are structured on organisational, social and economic terms, how 
resources are allocated within the groups and how incentives to collaborate are 
aligned in these groups coordinating collective action. Due to the limitations that 
collective action theory faces in shedding light on the context, this chapter thus 
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justifies a framework that combines institutional theory and collective action theory 
to answer the research questions which address the context-dependent issues that 
POFs face.   
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section evaluates the 
developmental role and the production conditions of the agricultural sector. This 
section highlights the nature of the agricultural sector and the risks and uncertainties 
that are pervasive in the sector urging the necessity for institutions to address these 
challenges. The second section looks at the main precepts of institutional theory and 
how it can help describe and define the social, economic, political and legal context 
in which agricultural production takes place. In the third section, the main arguments 
of collective action theory and the fundamental organisational, social and economic 
features that influence their structure are discussed.  The last section of this chapter 
addresses the nature of resource allocation and the incentive structures that influence 
the formation and sustenance of collective action. The analytical framework 
developed in this chapter, moreover, combines institutional theory and collective 
action theory to help explore the structure of different Producer Organisational 
Formats and the potential changes they can bring to small and marginal producer 
agriculture.  
2.2 The unique conditions and the developmental role of 
agriculture 
The conditions under which agricultural production takes place are often complex. In 
farming, decisions about what to grow, how to grow it, what inputs to use, when to 
plough, sow, irrigate and harvest are crucial to the production process (Timmer 
1988). Factors such as seasonality, geographical dispersion and the risks and 
uncertainties of agriculture make it highly relevant to know not just the right inputs, 
but also how and when to use them (ibid). Likewise, climatic variations in 
temperature and rainfall of different seasons determine production decisions in 
agriculture. As seasons change during the course of the growing season, activities 
such as ploughing, planting and harvesting need to be coordinated accordingly 
(Mellor & Mudahar, 1991). Information about right practices and the availability of 
inputs such as labour, seeds, fertilizers and irrigation need to be made available at the 
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right time for effective yield outcomes. This seasonal aspect complicates the planning 
and decision-making processes in farming (ibid).  
Geographical dispersion of farming regions is an important factor in agricultural 
production with important economic consequences. Roads to connect farms to 
markets, irrigation to mitigate climatic risk, storage facilities for short term and long 
term stowing of produce and markets for purchasing inputs, exchange and 
distribution of goods are crucial features in agricultural production determined by 
geography (Mishra & Chand, 1995; P. Timmer, 2002). The absence of poor access to 
these facilities will affect agricultural production. The major risks and uncertainty 
associated with agricultural production are due to climate and markets (weather and 
prices). Failed monsoon, floods and frost can wipe out seasonal crops, while returns 
from bumper crops can be dampened sometimes by poor market prices (Timmer, 
1988). Accurate market signals and information about prices are important factors in 
making good farming decisions (Schultz, 1953). Moreover, in vast countries like 
India, different agro-climatic zones determine the type of crops that can be grown and 
the varying levels of risks involved in cultivation (O’Brien et al., 2004). Hence, 
infrastructure such as dams and other irrigation facilities are important to mitigate 
environmental risks that may disrupt production.  Furthermore, the various 
contributions that the agricultural sector makes to the economy are crucial for the 
development of countries such as India. These contributions are a) food for domestic 
consumption b) rural income and demand for industrial goods c) release of labour to 
support industrial growth d) supply domestic savings to the economy and e) earn 
foreign exchange trough trade (Johnston & Mellor, 1961). The labour supply, 
domestic savings and foreign exchange are contributions that are transferred from 
agriculture to other sectors such as the industrial sector for its development (Kuznets, 
1964), while food, income and demand for industrial goods or market linkages are 
integral to rural development and poverty alleviation.  
Figure 2.1 depicts the three primary effects of agricultural growth on the rural sector. 
Food security in an economy is essential in  addressing the poverty trap, where 
malnourishment lowers labour productivity, which in turn lowers labour output, again 
leading to poor access to food (Fogel, 1991). Rural incomes through higher wages or 
better price of outputs increase the access of individuals to health care and education 
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Food Security Market Linkages 
Production Expenditure 
Rural Incomes 
Downstream Upstream Markets 
Primary effects of 
facilities contributing to human capital (Bliss & Stern, 1978; J.G. Williamson, 1993) 
and also helps to create a demand for industrial goods. 
Figure 2.1 Primary effects of agriculture on economic growth 
The market linkage effect of agriculture occurs when linkages with the non-farm 
activities aid in overall economic growth (P. Hazell & Haggblade, 1993). The farm – 
non-farm linkages are of two types: expenditure linkages and production linkages. 
The expenditure linkages are the consumption of goods and services (industrial and 
local) produced outside the farm by rural households. The production linkages are 
further classified into forward or downstream linkages and backward or upstream 
linkages (Davis et al., 2002). Backward linkages connect the farm to the non-farm 
sector for the access of inputs (fertilizers, pesticides and seed), credit from the 
financial sector, labour etc., while the forward linkages connect the non-farm sector 
to the farm where agriculture outputs such as food and fibre are used in the rest of the 
economy. Owing to these effects and linkages, the farm sector growth has a strong 
multiplier effect significantly greater than 1, this means  that a one per cent growth in 
agriculture contributes to overall growth by more than one per cent (World Bank, 
2004; Fan et al., 2004; Hazell & Haggblade, 1993; Mellor & Lele, 1973).  
Alongside these factors of seasonality, geography and risks there are other factors 
that influence agricultural production that are institutional in nature. Institutions of 
property rights, social factors such as caste (in the case of India) class and gender and 
information and its access also affect agricultural production (Thorat, 2009). The next 
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section of this chapter deals with the basic precepts of institutional theory to 
understand the nature and dynamic of institutions and arrive at a framework that will 
allow the assessment of POFs in their institutional context.  
2.3 New Institutional Economic and the understanding 
of institutions 
Institutions are human devices that comprise of behavioural rules, schemas, norms 
and regulations designed to cope with uncertainty and to increase individual utility in 
society (Schultz 1968). The fundamental role of institutions is to reduce uncertainty 
in complex social, political and economic environments (Toye, 1995). Institutions 
that exist in society are both formal and informal in nature. New Institutional 
Economics is an approach to studying institutions pioneered by scholars such as 
Coase (1960), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Williamson (1975) and North (1981). 
Williamson coined the term New Institutional Economics (NIE) to differentiate it 
from Old Institutional Economists (OIE) or American Institutionalists13, spearheaded 
by scholars such as John R Commons and Thorstein Veblen among others14 
(Hodgson, 2003; pp 164). Commons (1925) and Veblen (1961) emphasised the 
importance of understanding the interaction of social institutions (norms, customs, 
habits) and economic institutions (markets, unions, corporates) in the functioning of 
the economy15.  
Nabli and Nugent (1989) state that the purpose of New Institutional Economics was 
to explain the main determinants of institutions and how they evolved and to evaluate 
how they influenced economic performance, distribution and efficiency. A key factor 
determining economic performance, distribution and efficiency was the transaction 
costs (Coase, 1960; North, 1981; Williamson, 1975)  or the cost of negotiating, 
securing and completing a transaction in a market economy (Coase, 1988). NIE 
maintained that institutions evolved to minimise transaction costs, and they were 
                                         
13 The term ‘Old Institutionalist’ is used by Langlois (1989) and  Hodgson (1998), and the term ‘American Institutionalists’ appears 
in the works of  Hodgson (2000, 2004). 
14 Other old institutionalist scholars include Wesley Mitchells, John Maurice Clark and Clarence Ayres.  
15 In essence, OIE viewed institutions “not simply as constraints on the behaviours of the pre-formed and unchanging individual, but 
also as shaping the individuals themselves” (Chang, 2002; pp 552-53). Although understanding the role of institutions in economic 
development and their evolution overtime was the main focus of OIE, its topical approach to economic problems lacked theoretical 
cohesiveness (Graboswski, 1988; Gruchy, 1990).  This meant that old institutionalism lacked  systematic explanatory power 
(Hodgson, 1988, 2003), its findings was based on naïve empiricism (Myrdal, 1958) and that it was only “description without theory” 
(Schumpeter, 1930).  
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important in the functioning of markets in an economy (Bardhan, 1989). NIE helped 
bring back the study of institutions into mainstream economics by clearly 
highlighting their relevance in economic relations16. However, since the 1980s, 
scholars within economics and other disciplines such as psychology, history, 
sociology and anthropology have contributed substantially to institutional theory by 
challenging some assumptions made by NIE and expanding its scope for 
interdisciplinary research (Hodgson, 2000)17.  
Most critiques do not undermine the contribution that NIE makes, especially 
heuristically, as it rejects restrictive assumptions made by neoclassical economists 
and the emphasis on markets (Harriss et al, 1995; Hodgson, 2001, 2004). This has 
opened up new avenues of research and an understanding of institutions that was 
previously undermined. One of the major criticisms earlier works of NIE faced was 
that adequate importance was not given to informal institutions and their influence on 
economic performance, distribution and efficiency (Nee, 2005).  North (1993) 18 
defined institutions as being made up of formal rules (laws, contracts, markets, firms) 
and informal constraints (norms, conventions, value systems, religion). Informal 
constraints according to him were not as important as formal institutions as they did 
not have the ability to enforce (North, 1991).  
Markets are structures with functions more than just the act of exchange 
(Huylenbroeck et al, 2009). According to Nee (2005), institutions are more than 
formal rules and informal constraints as informal and formal elements are 
interrelated, and customs, shared beliefs, conventions and norms had the power to 
enable or disrupt distribution and efficiency in an economy. Social theorists such as 
                                         
16 Neo-classical economics’ assumption that no institutions were necessary in exchange since they were driven by utility 
considerations disregarded the complex of institutions that enabled contracts in market transactions (Bardhan, 1989). According to 
neoclassical economics, prices in the markets are determined by demand and supply, and based on the subjective preferences of 
consumers and producers (Brennan & Moehler, 2010). The prices that are determined and the choices individuals make are 
coordinated across all markets resulting in a ‘general equilibrium’ in an economy. General equilibrium16 theoretically illustrated the 
conditions under which market prices shaped decisions of consumers and firms, where all consumers maximised their utility and all 
firms maximised their profit (Arrow, 1951; Debreu, 1951). This maximization led to a condition of ‘Pareto-optimality’, or a 
condition where allocation of resources were efficient and individuals could not increase their utility without making the conditions 
of another individual worse (Bates, 1995). NIE did not attempt to replace or overturn the basic precepts of neoclassical economics, 
but tried to redress elements that made it an institution-free theory (North, 1995). 
17 This has also led to the emergence of other schools of institutionalism, such as historic institutionalism, institutionalism in 
economic sociology, and organisational institutionalism (Rueschemeyer, 2009).  
18 "Douglass C. North - Prize Lecture: Economic Performance through Time".Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2013. Web. 8 Aug 
2013. <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html> 

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Granovetter (1985), Fukuyama (2002), and Swedberg (2005) state that markets are 
also social structures comprised of an extended range of social interactions between 
individuals, communities and societies, and the social context characterised by 
norms, conventions and value systems are crucial to their functioning. NIE scholars 
have over the years engaged with these critiques and have incorporated suggestions 
into the framework of their analysis which  has made NIE suitable to understand the 
context in which Producer Organisational Formats have emerged and how they are 
coordinated in India. In the next part of this section, Williamson’s (2000) four-level 
analysis of institutions is assessed to justify its use in developing the analytical 
framework in this study.  
2.3.1 The four-level analysis of institutions  
New institutional economists (NIE) generally agree that institutions are systems of 
rules to offset uncertainty and risks by providing a social structure that allows 
individuals to gain control over their environment (Menard, 1995; North, 1990). The 
context in which this system of rules exists is evolving and changing at the micro and 
macro levels (Lieberherr, 2009). Williamson’s (2000) four-level analysis of 
institutions attempts to understand the characteristics of institutions, the context in 
which they exist, and the frequency at which they change. The four levels of this 
framework include: a) an embeddedness level which comprises informal institutions 
such as customs rules, norms etc. that change very slowly (100-100 years),  b) the 
institutional environment comprising of formal rules or ‘rules of the game’ such as 
property rights which have a lower frequency of change (10-100 years), c) the 
institutional arrangement or ‘how the game is played’, which comprises of 
governance structures with institutions that have short frequencies of change (1-10 
years) and d) the resource allocation, employment and incentive alignment stage 
which relates to how institutional arrangements perform with the frequency of change 
as continuous. Figure 2.2 depicts the four levels of analysis as being nested within the 
higher levels imposing constraints on the levels below (signified by the inward 
arrows) and the lower levels’ signal (signified by the outward arrows) to the levels 
above which signifies the two-way relationship between different levels.  
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Figure 2.2 Nested four-level analyses of institutions  
Source: Adapted from Williamson (2000) and Kyeyamwa (2007) 
Williamson’s model formally accommodated the assessment of social dimensions 
which were emphasised by economists such as Granovetter and Swedberg, factors of 
resource allocation, employment and incentive alignment emphasised by neo-
classical economists were also integrated into the NIE framework to emphasize  the 
role that the institutional environment and institutional arrangements play (Nee, 
2005; Nordtveit, 2009). Moreover, the model acknowledged the role and influence of 
social factors that were embedded in the institutional environment and institutional 
arrangements. This has guided research exploring economic relations and premises of 
exchange in different forms of social settings (Lieberherr, 2009), understanding 
institutions in the context of human behaviour, beliefs and past practices (Chhotray & 
Stoker, 2009). It also expanded the scope of NIE research to look at the role of social 
influences and informal institutions on the institutional environment and in 
institutional arrangements. Many studies, however, do not use the model in its 
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entirety and explore specific relationships between specified levels. In Taube and 
Schramm's (2005) work on the role of formal and informal norms in corrupt 
contracting in Chinese ‘Guanxi’ networks and in López and Santos' (2014) work on 
cultural dimension of corruption we see the interaction between social influences and 
institutional arrangements such as contracts and bureaucracy. Huylenbroeck et al., 
(2004) in their study of the institutionally complex agri-food sector uses the 
framework to look agricultural policy and implementation, supply chain organisation 
and distribution of rural resources across levels one to three.  
Agricultural production is unique in the manner that factors of seasonality, geography 
and various other risks influence agricultural production. Along with this, agricultural 
production and marketing  is also influenced by asset specificity19 of factors of 
production and political and regulatory environment that often treats agriculture as a 
special sector (Cook et al., 2008). Understanding the role of institutions in 
agricultural production and marketing, therefore, is crucial to assessing the dynamic 
of the agricultural sector.   
Due to the scope of the framework to look at the multiple facets of social constraints, 
formal rules and incentive structures, some studies in agriculture production and 
marketing and collective action in the management of natural resources have used the 
four-level analysis framework, or combined it with other theories, to understand the 
wider context in which institutions exist and how different levels influence each 
other. Kyeyamwa's (2007) study on livestock markets in Uganda employs this 
framework to understand how formal rules and informal norms (in the institutional 
environment stage) influence how these markets function. Milagrosa (2006) 
combines the four-level analysis framework with the structure-conduct performance 
paradigm to assess contract types and governance structures in the marketing of 
vegetables among indigenous communities in Northern Philippines. These studies use 
the framework to understand how markets as institutional arrangements function 
through contracts and alignment of governance structures. In the management of 
                                         
19 Asset specificity refers to the limited transferability of investments or capital from one purpose or economic activity to another19.  
Williamson (1983) identifies four specific asset specificities as: a) site specificity influencing spatial relations like market distance 
and therefore costs,  b) physical asset specificity which pertains to assets having specific functions and are not transferable to other 
functions (e.g. combined harvesters in grain production, chilling plants in milk supply chains, etc.), c) dedicated asset specificity 
which consists of dedicated assets specific to a task by contract or agreement (often in relation to suppliers) and d) human asset 
specificity which are specific knowledge and skills that cannot be applied anywhere other than in agriculture or related activities.  
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common pool resources, Dombrowsky (2007) applies the institutional environment 
and institutional arrangement levels of the four-level analysis to understand 
international water management issues. Behera and Engel (2006) also use this 
framework to understand rent- seeking and the transfer of rights in joint forest 
management in India. These studies, in contrast to studies of agricultural markets, 
focus on how the absence of property rights affect and influence the transfer of rights, 
rent seeking and transaction costs. From these studies we see that the four-level 
analysis framework is useful in understanding the institutional context and its 
influence across different levels to give a holistic picture.  
In this study of Producer Organisational Formats in the agricultural sector in South 
India, understanding the institutional context in which agricultural production, 
distribution and marketing takes place is crucial to explore how POFs are structured 
in organisational, social and economic terms. POFs are institutional arrangements or 
governance structures coordinating collective action which are influenced by its 
institutional embeddedness and institutional environment, and in turn influences 
resource allocation and incentive alignment within groups. The next part of this 
section specifies the different stages of the framework in relation to the agricultural 
sector. The limitations of this framework are also identified and addressed to 
effectively answer the research question.   
2.3.2 Institutional embeddedness 
The first level in the four-level analysis of institutions is the embeddedness level. The 
concept of ‘embeddedness’ describes individuals or institutions as enmeshed in a 
social network or structure (ibid). Markets are understood to be structures with 
functions more than just the act of exchange (Huylenbroeck et al, 2009). According 
to social theorists such as  Granovetter (1985) and Swedberg (2005), markets are 
social structures comprised of an extended range of social interactions between 
individuals, communities and societies. Mark Granovetter (1985) emphasises how the 
economic role of actors is “embedded” in their social context. He states,  
Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a 
script written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. 
Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social 
relations (pp. 487). 
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The concept of ‘embeddedness’ describes how particular individuals or firms are 
enmeshed in a social network or structure and the role of interpersonal ties and 
networks that are important to understanding economic relations (ibid). Previously, 
by defining institutions as formal rules and informal constraints, informal institutions 
of norms, customs and cultural influences were not considered to be as important as 
formal institutions (North, 1991). The focus on the role of informal elements in 
determining economic action, hence, brought sociological analysis into the spectrum 
of understanding economic institutions.  
Informal institutions of rules, bonds and constraints play an important role in any 
economic environment characterised by information asymmetry, enforcement 
problems and repeated interaction (de Laiglesia, 2006). Often these informal rules, 
social bonds and constraints have in themselves systems of reward and punishment 
built into a network or social exchange to prevent opportunism and malfeasance 
(Homans, 1974). In common- pool resource management literature, there are 
numerous studies that show how informal institutions such as norms and conventions 
are able to ensure access and allocation of resources in the absence of property rights 
(Abraham & Platteau, 2001; Agrawal, 2001b; Ostrom, 1990, 2009; K. Singh, 1994).  
In relation to agricultural marketing, Lu et al. (2008) shows how  trust between 
farmers and buyers helped reduce transaction costs among small farmers participating 
in vegetable marketing in China. At the same time, social institutions such as gender, 
caste and class often play exclusionary and discriminatory roles in agricultural 
production (Agarwal, 2010; Thorat, 2009). Udry (1996) states that female-led 
farming households in many developing countries underperform due to transaction 
costs in accessing inputs and marketing agricultural produce. These institutions may 
constrain access to resources for production and markets to certain groups by 
increasing their transaction costs or excluding them altogether. This indicates that 
social institutions have the potential to reduce transaction costs and enforce informal 
contracts, and, at the same time, increase transactions costs and exclude individuals 
from effectively taking part in economic activities. This makes the understanding of 
the social embeddedness of institutions crucial to studying producer organisations 
especially in socially-stratified societies like India. Institutional embeddedness in 
effect means that the institutional environment at the macro-level and various 
institutional arrangements at the micro- and individual levels are influenced by this 
social context.  
 44 
2.3.3 Institutional Environment 
Institutional environment, according to Davis and North (1971), is “the set of 
fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for 
production, exchange and distribution” (pp.6-7). In Williamson’s model, the 
institutional environment comprises formal rules (legal system, property rights, 
judiciary, bureaucracy etc.) and forms the second level of the four-level analysis 
framework. The institutional environment is often shaped and determined at the 
national and sub-national levels. In NIE, transaction cost is the most crucial feature 
influencing the functioning of markets, and in the absence of transaction costs there is 
no need for the enforcement of property rights as transaction relations would be 
efficient (Marinescu, 2012). However, when the transaction cost is positive, legal 
systems such as property rights become important. Property rights give individuals 
the ownership over physical assets and the right to determine how the asset is used in 
circumstances not covered by existing contracts, customs, or the law (Baker & 
Hubbard, 2001, pp.189). Ownership affects the investment incentives of agents and 
also reduces transaction costs. These rights possessed by individuals are also traded 
with commodities in the market (Coase, 1992). Transaction costs, therefore, also 
comprise the cost of land, labour and capital required to transfer property rights from 
one individual to another (North & Wallis, 1994).  
Closely linked to transaction cost is the imperfect information theory of institutions 
pioneered by economists such as George Stigler, George Akerlof and Joseph Stiglitz. 
Individuals often act on incomplete information or in situations where information 
feedback is insufficient, thus leading to poor choices and higher transaction costs 
(Bardhan, 1989). Stigler (1961, 1967) states that information in markets about buyers 
and the quality of goods and services are not always transmitted effectively and there 
are often costs (e.g. search and opportunity costs) associated in accessing them. This 
potentially increases transaction costs and this imperfect information could lead to 
adverse selection and moral hazards (especially in credit and labour markets) 
affecting the functioning and performance of markets (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; 
Stiglitz, 1985). Akerlof (1970) in his assessment of market failures states that the role 
of reputation, trust and guarantees play an important role in addressing informational 
constraints in the markets. The imperfect information theory highlights the 
importance of informal institutions in reducing informational constraints, and this is 
underspecified in the Williamson model.  
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Property rights and information are crucial in determining the characteristics of the 
agricultural sector. A key behavioural assumption that legitimises the need for 
property rights is opportunism and bounded rationality (Prasanna, 2003;  Williamson, 
1975). Opportunism or “self-interest seeking with guile” occurs due to people’s 
propensity to lie or cheat in the markets (Williamson, 1975; pp. 6). Therefore, there is 
a need to enforce contracts to limit the extent of opportunism in economic activities. 
Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality thesis states that human agency is “intendedly 
rational but limitedly so” (Simon, 1957; pp xiv). In other words, human ability in 
accessing and processing information is limited and this bounded rationality is 
determined by an individual’s neuro-physical ability to receive store, retrieve and 
process information (Simon, 1983, 1991). Therefore when information is costly or 
harder to access, mental capacity of individuals to make rational choices is limited 
(North, 1995).  
Theoretically, the three-fold benefits or effects of property rights in agriculture are a) 
security effect where tenure security means farmers can farm the same piece of land 
for a long period  and therefore invest in it, b) gains from realisability or trade effect 
where, in the absence of rights to sell the land, cultivators will not be able to recoup 
the investments they have already made on the land at a later stage and c) credit 
supply effect where property rights enable the possessor to mortgage land to access 
credit  (Besley 1995). Ownership of assets therefore affects the investment incentives 
of agents, access to resources such as credit and also reduces transaction costs. 
According to Bardhan (1989), missing markets (for credit and insurance due to credit 
supply effect) and informational constraints (due to uncertainties and environmental 
risks in agricultural production) give rise to informal agrarian institutional 
arrangements. Sharecropping interlocked contracts between labour, credit and land, 
among others, are examples of these. Despite their informal nature (illegality, 
unregistered business activities), informal institutions  effectively serve a real 
economic function, and their abolition may be detrimental to individuals left out of 
markets (Mylène Kherallah & Kirsten, 2002). 
Land is the single most important factor of production in agriculture. Factors 
influencing land ownership, distribution and size characterise the institutional 
environment in which agricultural production takes place. In other words, access to 
land lays the basis for production, exchange and distribution in the agricultural sector. 
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In the third chapter of this thesis, the distribution, ownership and size of agricultural 
landholdings in India will be discussed to understand the characteristics of this 
institutional environment. The influence of the institutional environment in shaping 
institutional arrangements is discussed in the next part of this section.   
2.3.4 Institutional Arrangements 
Institutional arrangements are rules, conditions and regulations designed for 
situations involving a subset of individuals or groups (Eaton et al., 2008; North, 
1990).  Menard (1997; pp 35) refers to these as instruments “to implement and 
operationalise the rules of the game as defined by the institutional environment”. 
Markets, hierarchies and hybrids, according to this definition, can be seen as 
institutional arrangements (Lieberherr, 2009).  They bring order into specific 
relationships by preventing potential conflicts that may be mutually damaging 
(Williamson, 2000). In this section, the role of institutional arrangements is specified 
with reference to the agricultural sector.  
Markets are differently defined in various fields of social sciences, and there is no 
one universally accepted definition of markets as they are seen as structures with 
functions more than just the act of exchange (Huylenbroeck et al., 2009). Markets 
have been conceptualised as ‘governance structures’ regulating transactions (Menard, 
1995), ‘social structures’ with an extended range of social interactions between 
individuals, communities and societies (Granovetter 1985; Swedberg 2005; 
Fukuyama 2002) and spaces where consensus over price and qualities are established 
(Hodgson 1999). According to Ostrom (1998), markets are places where different 
actors (buyers and sellers) encounter each other and perform transactions. She 
understands  markets as ‘action arenas’ or social spaces in which actors interact, 
exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another and also fight 
and compete. Markets, therefore, can be seen as institutional arrangements 
comprising of rules, regulations, norms, customs and relationships that help reduce 
transaction costs and enable exchange.  
Hierarchies are centrally and internally coordinated and/or vertically integrated 
institutional arrangements (Finger et al., 2005; Hodgson, 2006; Williamson, 2005) 
which are designed to address transaction costs using incentives (E. Brousseau & 
Glachant, 2008; O. E. Williamson, 2005). Firms, according to   New Institutional 
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Economics (NIE), are therefore hierarchies that organise and coordinate transactions 
(Coase, 1937). Institutional arrangements that are not markets or hierarchies by 
definition, but also serve the function of coordination of market activities and 
transactions, are referred to as hybrids (Menard, 2004, 2007). According to Menard 
(2004), the definition of hybrid is still vague because the vocabulary used to define 
hybrids “is not stabilised” (pp. 347). In institutional literature it has come to include 
clusters and networks (Hamilton & Feenstra, 1998), supply chain systems (Dorward 
et al., 2005), and non-standard contracts (Menard, 2004). In the study of institutions 
in the agricultural sector, institutional arrangements such as cooperatives and contract 
farming have been analysed as hybrids (Eaton et al., 2008b; FAO, 2013). 
Organisations for the delivery of public goods such as credit organisations, research 
and extensions services, public works departments and others that support markets 
and production are also referred to as hybrid organisations (Huylenbroeck et al., 
2009; Kickert, 2001).  
Agricultural markets in developing countries are often extremely complex and highly 
differentiated with pervasive power structures and different forms of exchange 
relationships, contracts and commodities20 being transacted (Jan & Harriss-White, 
2012; Sexton, 1990). In the agricultural sector, markets are far from perfectly 
competitive with incomplete information and insufficient feedback leading to high 
transaction costs (Pingali et al., 2005). Various types of organisations and hybrids 
‘coexist and persist’ within the markets performing a number of different functions to 
deal with risks and transaction costs (Dorward & Kydd, 2005; Jan & Harriss-White, 
2012).  Private markets, moreover, provide only limited access to goods and services 
                                         
20 Exchange relationships or different forms of exchange in agricultural markets vary from advance contracts and vertically 
integrated contracts to barter and verbal agreements depending on the region and commodity being transacted. In research on the 
commodity markets in Tamil Nadu by Harriss-White (1996, pg 330), firms under the title of ‘wholesalers’, ‘retailers’ and 
‘processors’ perform over 51 different activity combinations including storage, brokering, buying, selling, transportation and 
processing. Adding to the complexity is the high differentiation of commodities in agricultural markets. Different commodities and 
the varieties of the same commodity catering to specific consumers are also transacted in the markets through different marketing 
chains. In agricultural markets of south India, commodities like chewing tobacco have different channels of marketing depending on 
its variety, quality and cliental (Harriss-White. 1995 (a), pg. 578). Similarly, these markets have over 120 varieties of rice with 
‘limited substitutability’ being transacted to different groups of buyers (ibid). These highly differentiated product markets, 
furthermore, do not have established grades and standards to determine the price or quality of the produce. In economies like India 
where the number of small producers are large, the relatively fewer buyers in the markets can exert oligopsonistic control over 
transactions, and the social and economic position of the seller is crucial. The functioning of agricultural markets, moreover, are 
influenced by social features such as caste, class and gender as well as transaction costs arising from property endowment, property 
rights and information access (Thorat & Newman, 2007). Therefore, power and power relations are pervasive in markets. Examples 
of the powerless in the markets are the involuntarily unemployed, the borrower rationed in credit markets or the buyer or seller 
constrained by price or budget that cannot sell or buy goods (Bardhan, 1989). 
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for small and marginal producers due to high transaction costs and low profits 
(Markelova et al, 2009). This is especially true for credit and input markets that are 
imperfect and biased towards the poor and rural regions in developing countries 
(Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990).  
The role of the state is important in the access and distribution of goods such as 
credit, inputs and research and development (R&D) that the markets fail to provide. 
The high risks and low rate of returns often discourage private investment in these 
areas and, therefore, the state is often called upon to provide them (Dorward et al., 
2005). In agriculture, the slow turnover of capital and the prevalence of climatic and 
market risks and limited surpluses restricts the scope of internal financing in small 
and marginal production, making access to credit and insurance necessary (Bardhan, 
1989). Short term credit is often provided by parastatals such as rural and cooperative 
banks (Satyasai, 2008; Shetty, 2009). Research and extension services are another 
area where state intervention is necessary to improve production practices and yield 
in the agricultural sector. Here, again, the role of the state and parastatal organisations 
are important (Raina, 2003, 2011; Tossou & Zinnah, 2005). Research in India and in 
many other developing countries has shown that these hybrid institutional 
arrangements have a mixed record, and inefficiency in delivery, bureaucratization of 
their functioning and poor policy support hinder them from achieving their expected 
outcomes (Dorward et al., 1998; FAO, 2001; Kydd, et al., 2001; Macklin, 1992; 
Sulaiman, 2003; van den Ban & Hawkins, 1998). 
In the agricultural sector, missing markets and poor market access has led to the 
emergence of alternative institutional arrangements. The absence of land lease 
markets has given rise to informal tenant farming and sharecropping contracts 
(Binswanger et al., 1995; Haque, 2000; Mearns, 1999), and the poor access of 
institutional credit (from banks and micro finances lending bodies, credit 
cooperatives) has led to borrowing from informal credit (moneylenders and other 
unregulated lending) institutions (Basu, 1997; Eswaran & Kotwal, 1989; Satyasai, 
2008). These can also be seen as informal hybrid organisations in the agricultural 
sector and in a scenario of missing markets (land and credit) and informational 
constraints, they serve a real economic purpose and their abolition may not improve 
the conditions of agricultural producers (Bardhan, 1989).  
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In institutional literature, cooperatives (Menard, 2007) and contract farming 
initiatives (Clapp, 1994; Cook et al., 2008; Eaton et al., 2008; FAO, 2013) that 
organise collective action are categorised and analysed as hybrids. The role of these 
hybrid organisations is to enable vertical integration and coordination. Vertical 
integration is the “ownership and complete control over neighbouring stages of 
production or distribution” with the aim of reducing and controlling transaction costs 
within the boundaries of the firm (Perry, 1989: pg 186); coordination can be defined 
as a top-down, agency-led harmonisation of various activities of a particular 
organisation (Davies et al., 2004). In contract farming initiatives, the functions of 
producers, retailers, wholesalers are coordinated through contracts to ensure the 
supply of particular raw materials from farms to the final user (Bogetoft & Olesen, 
2004; Eaton & Shepherd, 2001; S. Singh, 2002; Swain, 2011) as well as  enable 
access to inputs and research and extension through cooperation (FAO, 2013; Glover, 
1987; Key & Runsten, 1999). 
Another element which is crucial for understanding how these hybrids function is the 
role of cooperation.  Cooperation is characterised by bottom-up, farmer-to-farmer 
collaboration and linkages that are central to the undertaking of group-based 
activities (Davies et al., 2004). In any study of institutions organising collective 
action, it is crucial to identify the main functions and aims of the initiative. In this 
study, understanding how Producer Organisational Formats coordinate various 
activities in the upstream and downstream markets (access inputs, credit, extension 
and marketing services) and how cooperation is enabled (commitment to work 
together) within these groups are central. This helps to answer the question of how 
POFs are structured, and aids in understanding the conditions under which resources 
are allocated and incentives are aligned within POFs.  
2.3.5 Resource allocation and incentive alignment in 
institutions  
The fourth level of Williamson’s model is the resource allocation and the incentive 
alignment level. At this level changes occur on a continuous pace as it involves the 
day-to-day operations of the economy (Lieberherr, 2009; Williamson, 2000). Here 
the performance of particular institutional arrangements is assessed, often in context 
of the outcomes in the first three levels and also with reference to the incentive 
structures they possess (Behera & Engel, 2006). Williamson (2000) states, this “is the 
 50 
level at which neoclassical analysis works. Optimality apparatus, often marginal 
analysis, is employed, and the firm, for these purposes, is typically described as a 
production function” (pp.600). By assessing the resource allocation and incentive 
alignment of institutional arrangements, their ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ are 
assessed (Lieberherr, 2009). In this context, efficiency can be defined as the 
perceived benefit provided by an institutional arrangement (Ostrom et al., 1994) and 
effectiveness as the outcome of efficiency, and often denotes the reduction of 
transaction costs in economic exchange (Greif, 2005; Lieberherr, 2009). In Producer 
Organisational Formats, the efficiency would be determined by how resources (e.g. 
inputs, credit, marketing services, research and extension) are accessed and 
distributed among members, and the changes they bring to surplus creation21.  
Producer Organisational Formats (POFs) are also hybrid institutional arrangements 
that perform both a coordinating as well as a cooperating role. The main purpose of 
these institutional arrangements is to coordinate transactions (agricultural markets), 
support production (research and development and extension services), provide 
services (credit, inputs) and also coordinate activities (POFs and other collective 
actions).  
In sum, Williamson’s Four-level framework, within the context of POFs, will help us 
to:  
- Understand the context in which agricultural production takes place 
characterised by its institutional embeddedness and institutional environment 
- Assess the challenges small and marginal producers face in agricultural 
production by determining the role and characteristics of institutional 
arrangements, such as markets, credit providing organisations, research and 
extension organisation 
- Understand the role producer organisations play in addressing institutional 
challenges and the level of changes they can bring to households involved in 
collective action  
                                         
As employment and prices and quantities associated with it relate to firm and not to hybrids such as producer organisations, the 
main criteria for assessment would be resource allocation and incentive alignment.
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The four-level framework however has the same limitations as the New Institutional 
Economics paradigm. As a positive theory, NIE has the potential to describe and 
explain how the world works in a value-free way, but as a normative theory its 
potential to explain how the world ought to be is severely limited22 (Ghosal & Moran, 
1996; Velasquez, 2008). In other words, although it sheds light on the reasons for the 
existence of hierarchies and hybrids, it tells very little about how they work or should 
work (Ghosal & Moran, 1996). On the same note, Platteau (2008) states that NIE is 
agnostic to institutional efficiency and does not clearly reveal how transaction costs 
are reduced and how hierarchies or hybrids are internally organised.  As a result, NIE 
approaches can reveal little about how relationships between individuals, hierarchies 
and hybrids are structured (nature or rules and regulations, and social controls 
coordinating or hindering interaction) and how this may affect their capabilities and 
dispositions (Ghosal & Moran, 1996; Hodgson, 2010). This further leaves out the 
crucial issue of institutional complementarity which helps in understanding how 
different hierarchies reinforce or weaken each other (Aoki, 2001; Boyer, 2005). 
Therefore, this framework alone cannot shed light on how producer organisational 
formats emerge and are organised, how they are governed and reduce transaction 
costs and how coordination problems within these hybrids are addressed.   
At the fourth level, assumptions regarding efficiency and effectiveness have also 
been considered problematic. NIE assumes that institutions are chosen for their 
ability to reduce transaction costs and bring about efficiency in an economic 
relationship (E. Brousseau & Glachant, 2008). However, it has been noted that 
institutions can exist without serving any function (ibid); they can survive due to 
“inefficient competitors, regulatory protection or legal barriers to exit” (Foss & 
Klein, 2008: pp  441), and institutions having served some purpose historically as a 
result of not changing can become inefficient, while continuing to exist (Platteau, 
2008). It is therefore crucial to establish and define efficiency in the context of the 
institution’s legitimacy and in relation to the aims and intent of the institution.  
In order to answer the research questions of how POFs are structured and 
incentivised and how resources are allocated within them, the issues of a) how 
                                         
22 Positive theories can also be normative, but they are limitedly so. Transaction cost analysis has the ability to inform business 
decision makers (Rubin, 1993) and also “offers strategy a set of normative rules for choosing among alternative governance 
arrangements” ((Masten, 1993; pp 119).  
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institutional arrangements work/should work, b) their internal organisation, c) 
institutional complementarity and d) how efficiency and effectiveness are understood 
needs to be addressed. Due to the limitations of institutional theory to do so, 
collective action theory is used in this thesis to specify the third and fourth level of 
the four-level framework. The next section highlights the basic precepts of collective 
action to arrive at a specification that will help explore the influence of the 
institutions and how producer organisations are structured on organisational, social 
and economic terms. By complementing the four-level analysis with collective action 
theory, the context in which producer organisations exist can be assessed along with 
how they are organised and governed as collective actions in the agricultural sector.  
2.4 Understanding institutional arrangements of 
collective action 
Collective action is a voluntary action taken by a group of individuals to achieve a 
common goal, acting directly on their own or through an organization (Meinzen-Dick 
and Di Gregorio 2004). The initiative for collective action begins when two or more 
people agree to address a collective intention through a joint commitment (Gilbert, 
2006). As argued in the previous section, organisations coordinating collective action 
can be seen as hybrid institutional arrangements that consolidate and coordinate 
collective intentions and joint commitments of a group to achieve common goals. In 
this way, POFs can be considered hybrid institutional arrangements in that they are 
designed to aid small and marginal agricultural producers by coordinating collective 
action. In this section, the phenomenon of collective action is studied to specify the 
third and fourth level of Williamson’s Four-level analytical framework to help 
analyse how POFs are structured on organisational, social and economic terms. 
The earliest systematic study of collective action in economics in the neoclassical 
tradition was done by Mancur Olson in his work, the “Logic of Collective Action” 
(1965). The controversial premise of Olson’s argument was the ‘zero contribution 
hypotheses,’ which stated that: 
Unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other 
special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will 
not act to achieve their common or group interest (pp.2). 
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Olson argued that when a particular good or service can be obtained by an individual 
without contributing to its production or access, they would ‘free-ride’. Olson’s 
assertion that collective action was unnatural, and that human beings were ‘self-
interested’ individuals who would not act collectively problematized the phenomenon 
of collective action for political and social theorists more than for economists (R. 
Hardin, 2013). Prior to this work, the tautological assumption was that people with 
common interests would naturally associate and work with each other to attain their 
common aim (Oliver, 1993). Since pre-historic times, individuals were thought to 
have pursued self-interest and collective action in activities such as defence, food 
acquisition and child-rearing, contradicting the self-interest paradigm (Ostrom, 
1998a). In the present day, individuals are thought to  systematically use collective 
action to provide public goods and manage common pool resources without any 
external authority imposing sanctions (Agrawal, 2001; Ostrom, 2010; Poteete & 
Ostrom, 2004).  These contradictory theorizations about self-interest and collective 
action  has led to numerous field researches and controlled laboratory experiments on 
collective action to reveal under what conditions collective actions succeed and when 
they fail (R. Hardin, 2013).  
Many studies on collective action point out that its potential to succeed hinges on 
how institutional arrangements coordinating them resolve ‘social dilemmas’ that may 
hinder group action (Udehn, 1993).  Social dilemmas are situations or conditions in 
which individuals make independent choices in interdependent situations (Dawes, 
1975). In other words when individual’s interest or actions are not in line with the 
interest of the group or its common goal, this leads to social dilemmas (Irwin & 
Simpson, 2013; Olson, 1965; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). Shirking or evading 
responsibility in group-based activities (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Brehm & Gates, 
1999; Tomohara & Ohno, 2013), free-rider problems or acquiring benefits of 
collective action without contributing to it (Grossman & Hart, 1980; Schneider & 
Pommerehne, 1981; Siegel, 2012) and moral hazard problems or undertaking an 
action knowing that its cost or consequence will be paid by someone else (Anesi, 
2009; Hölmstrom, 1982; Hölmstrom, 1979) are all different forms of social 
dilemmas. The existence of social dilemmas in collective action shows that 
individuals acting ‘rationally’ or in self-interest in the economic sense could result in 
outcomes that make them worse off collectively (Ostrom, 2010).  
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Collective action theory has been used to study group phenomena ranging from social 
movements (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Hechter, 1987; Tilly, 1978) and riots (Tullock, 
1971; Silver, 1974), to management of common pool resources (Agrawal & Ostrom, 
2001; Jodha, 2002; Krishna, 2002;  Uphoff, 2000; Wade, 1994) and agriculture 
(Huylenbroeck et al., 2009; Meinzen-Dick, DiGregorio, & McCarthy, 2004; Staatz, 
1987; Vanni, 2014). Additionally, it has also been used in studying economic 
associations, entrepreneurial groups and cooperative action (Francesconi & Heerink, 
2010; Ruef, 2010; Wollni & Zeller, 2007), along with CSR and global value chains 
(Lund-Thomsen & Nadvi, 2010) among other studies in various social science 
disciplines.  
Due to its context specific nature, attempts to develop a single theory explaining the 
dynamics of collective action, have long been considered futile and discarded by 
most scholars (Ostrom, 2003). With decades of empirical research underpinning it, 
studies have moved beyond Olson’s basic questions of whether collective action is 
rational to acquiring deeper understandings regarding conditions that influence 
collective action and the institutions that enable it (ibid). The larger concerns of 
studying collective action and institutions of collective action are with regards to how 
they are initiated and coordinated, in addition to the context specific factors affecting 
the interaction between involved actors and when and why people free-ride (Oliver 
1993). These concerns and questions have varying answers depending on the 
conditions and circumstances under which collective action takes place. Therefore, 
studying collective action requires: a) conceptualising collective action in the context 
of the research and b) developing an analytical framework  that would help carry out 
an empirical enquiry (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). With reference to this research on 
POFs, collective action theory will help understand the potential of the initiative 
(how they work or should work), how they are organised and how effective they are 
and complimenting the four-level framework. The following part of this section will 
first conceptualise collective action in relation to the agricultural sector, and then 
continue by specifying an analytical framework upon which data was collected to 
study Producer Organisational Formats in south India.  
2.4.1 Type of goods and conceptualisation of collective action  
As mentioned above, Producer Organisational Formats (POFs) are hybrid 
organisations of collective action with the purpose of achieving an economic goal of 
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increased viability for its members. Therefore the goal of collective action which is 
central to how these organisations are structured becomes important. The main aim of 
POFs is to provide goods to their members that would enable them to enhance 
production, create surpluses and improve livelihoods. A ‘good’ in economic terms is 
a consumable item (commodity or service) that an individual wants or needs that can 
increase her/his utility, and the opposite of an economic good is a ‘bad’ which 
decreases individual utility. Public economists first classified goods to ascertain their 
basic characteristics (private and public) and to determine how efficiently they could 
be distributed through state or market mechanisms.  
Samuelson (1954) was the first to categorise private consumption goods and public 
consumption goods based on “jointness of supply”, which denotes a condition where 
the consumption of a good by one individual does not reduce the availability of that 
good for another person (e.g. air, public radio, national defence). The good, therefore, 
can be considered a public good due to its non-rivalrous nature. Richard Musgrave 
(1961) uses “excludability” as the differentiating factor between types of goods. He 
reasoned that if an individual or a group can be excluded from the consumption of a 
good, it was a private good; and if they cannot be excluded from consuming it, then it 
was a public good.  The main reason for this classification of goods was to determine 
which goods could be effectively distributed by the markets (Ostrom, 2003). 
Figure 2.4 classifies goods according to the rivalrous and excludability characteristics 
discussed above. Samuelson argued that only rival goods (goods in the left column - 
Cells A and C in figure 2.3) could be allocated efficiently through markets, while 
Musgrave concluded that only excludable goods (goods in the top row - Cells A and 
B) were best allocated by the markets (ibid). The Samuelson-Musgrave debate helped 
clarify the conditionality of two sets of goods – pure private goods (Cell A) and pure 
public goods (Cell D)23. 
Goods classified as non-excludable and rival (Cell C) are known as ‘common pool 
resources’ (CPR) or commons. These goods are rivalrous because one person’s 
consumption subtracts from the total availability of the resource of another. Examples 
                                         
23A commonly quoted example of a pure public good is of a lighthouse or a public radio. The benefits of a lighthouse or a public 
radio are open to all and its consumption by one individual does not reduce its utility for another individual nor can individuals be 
excluded from using them. 
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of CPR goods are forests, grazing grounds and water resources such as ponds and 
lakes. The fourth group of goods are known as club goods, characterised as being 
excludable and non-rival (Cell B).  Cable television and club memberships are 
examples of club goods.  
Figure 2.4: Classification of collective action problems  
 Rival  Non-Rival 
 
Excludable 
CELL A: Private goods 
(Food, clothing, cars etc.) 
CELL B: Club Goods 
(Cinema, private parking, club 
memberships) 
 
Non-
Excludable 
CELL C: Commons 
(Fish stock, ground water, 
irrigation systems, forest 
resources etc.) 
CELL D: Public Goods 
(Free to air TV,  national defence, 
lighthouse) 
The classification of goods is essential in understanding the nature of collective 
action and how POFs are organised. The type of good a group of individuals chooses 
to jointly access greatly determines the social dilemma or collective action problems 
the group faces. The most common and widely studied forms of collective action 
initiatives have been in the management of CPR, where over-exploitation and under-
utility of resources are pervasive in the absence of established property rights 
(Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Mwangi & Markelova, 2009). With CPR, individuals 
cannot be excluded from using or prevented from overusing a rivalrous resource 
leading to the ‘tragedy of commons24’ where they are helplessly trapped in social 
dilemmas and cannot extricate themselves (Ostrom, 1998, 2010). In the absence of 
property rights, markets cannot effectively distribute these resources as in the case of 
private goods, and the need for external agents like the state, firms or other 
institutional arrangements of collective action become necessary (Ostrom, 1990). 
                                         
24Garrett Hardin (1968) in his article in Science, explains the ‘tragedy of commons’ with a hypothetical example of a village grazing 
ground, where the optimum number of cows that can graze there is 10. If the number of cows is less, there will be areas that will be 
overgrown and wasted. If there were 11 cows the grounds would be overgrazed and lead to lower benefits per cow. He sums up his 
example as a tragedy and the need for a fine balance:  
“Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - in a 
world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own interest in a society 
that believes in the freedom of the commons.” (Hardin, 1968). 

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These studies proved that in the absence of property rights which were deemed 
necessary in the transaction cost approach, norms and other informal mechanisms 
could regulate economic activities.  
Collective action enabled through producer organisations in this study, therefore, is 
conceptualised as hybrid organisational arrangements that provide multiple public, 
private and club goods and services to their members which are essential to improve 
production and distribution. Collective action carried out by producer organisations 
are defined using Heckathron's (1993) definition of collective action that includes 
three conditions that: a) goods should be jointly produced and accessed by members 
of the group, b) the accessed collective good needs to be made available to all 
participants of the group and c) there must be a cost involved in the production or 
access of the collective good.  
2.4.2 The structure of collective action  
Olson’s work is significant because it highlighted certain core characteristics that 
influenced collective action. Due to the persistence of collective action, problems and 
the propensity of individuals to free-ride, the emphasis and importance of 
institutional arrangements governing collective actions have emerged as important in 
many studies of collective action (V. K. Aggarwal & Dupont, 1999). A large number 
of studies have been done on institutions coordinating collective action in CPR 
management that has helped expand the theoretical understanding of how these 
institutions emerge and organise. Despite large number of studies being carried out, 
the variables and features that influence collective action in many of these studies are 
defined differently (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). Consequently, case studies become 
important in the analysis of collective action (Poteete & Ostrom, 2008). Research that 
uses large number of case studies (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990) to 
compare processes and outcomes of collective action, moreover, have more 
consistency in concepts and terminology (Agrawal, 2001a). These terms and concepts 
are constructed with the help of empirical data as well as game theoretical and 
experimental models that aim to determine how individuals behave in groups and 
under different resource conditions (Poteete & Ostrom, 2008).  
Arun Agrawal (2001), in his literature review of studies of institutions managing 
CPR across the world, classifies factors determining collective action into four 
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variable sets, namely resource characteristics, group characteristics, institutional 
arrangement and external environment. These variable groups were taken mainly 
from the three major works on CPR management by Elinor Ostrom (1990), Robert 
Wade (1988) and J.M. Baland and J.M. Platteau (1996). The merits of Ostrom’s and 
Baland and Platteau’s work was that they compared a large number of case studies to 
test the influence of different characteristics of groups in different situations 
(geographical and resource situations), while Wade’s work explored a single region 
in-depth to uncover insights into the dynamics of collective action. By reviewing 
these works and considering the specific resource differences of the agricultural 
sector compared to common pool resources, this study developed an analytical 
framework that identifies three sets of features that determine how collective action is 
structured: the group’s a) organisational features (e.g. external support, rules and 
regulations, past experiences, organisational structure, interest heterogeneity of 
participants, leadership) b) social features (e.g. social heterogeneity, social capital, 
norms) and c) economic features (e.g. economic heterogeneity, type of goods, 
distribution of goods, resource endowment of groups). This in turn helps to add 
specification to the third and fourth level of the four-level analytical framework that 
tries to understand how these institutional arrangements are structured (Figure 2.3). 
The next three parts of this section explain how this framework is constructed to 
delineate the organisational, social and economic features that influence the 
coordination of collective action. 
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Figure 2.5 Specification of the structural and governance level of collective 
action  
2.4.2 Organisational features 
The organisational features of a group coordinating collective action determine how 
they are governed. In order to manage the creation, acquisition and distribution of 
collective goods, initiatives such as the POFs have to be designed to address social 
dilemmas such as free-rider problems and shirking. The governance of such 
initiatives entails the regulation and control depending on external support, group 
size, rules and regulations, past experiences and leadership.  
How institutional arrangements come about by obtaining commitments of various 
participants and how actions of various stakeholders are coordinated is important 
when studying collective action (Ostrom, 1990). The emergence of institutions 
coordinating collective action, however, needs to be understood on a case-to-case 
basis as the impetuses vary widely. External support in the emergence of collective 
action organisations are crucial, with various sources of institutional supply 
manifesting through the state (Baland & Platteau, 1996), through non-governmental 
Social 
Features   
Organisatio
nal Features   
Economic 
features  
Level III and IV: Institutional arrangement, 
governance, resource allocation and incentive 
alignment 
Level II: Institutional Environment 
Level I: Institutional Embeddedness 
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organisations or NGO initiatives (Coulter et al, 1999; Thorp et al, 2005) and  through 
the action of privileged groups (Olson, 1965). A privileged group is a small group of 
individuals who stand to gain more from coordinating collective action than the 
average participant, and therefore has more incentive to coordinate collective action 
(Olson, 1965; Reuben & Riedl, 2009). The nature of external support of the 
organisation determines whether the collective action is a cooperation (similar to 
cooperatives) or coordination (similar to contract farming initiatives) or a mixture of 
both (Davies et al., 2004). This will determine whether collective action is directly 
controlled by participants, by a civil society, the state or privileged groups (Vanni, 
2014).  
In Olson’s work on collective action, the size of the groups involved in collective 
action was an important attribute that influenced the zero contribution thesis. His 
argument was that when groups are large, contributions of individuals involved go 
unnoticed increasing their propensity to free-ride. Mitchell, (1979), R. Hardin (1982) 
and Marwell et al (1988) strongly assert that when there is a case of a good having 
pure ‘jointness of supply’ and an individual’s use does not reduce the availability of 
that resource for others, the size of the group is irrelevant. Marwell & Oliver's (1993) 
work shows that the size of group has a variable effect on collective action depending 
on the goods they access. There is a negative size-effect when the benefits of groups 
from collective action decrease with increasing group size. A positive group- size 
effect is where the benefits of individuals increase with larger membership (for 
example, mass political movements and riots). Group size may also have no size-
effect if the level of benefits to members of the group is not affected by the size of the 
group. Social dilemmas such as free-rider problems, shirking and moral hazard may 
not be severe in groups with positive size-effects and no size-effects. However in 
groups, such as clubs, where  overcrowding reduces utility size, effect is relevant 
(Buchanan, 1965; Marwell et al., 1988; Ng, 1973).  
Rules and leadership are important organisational features in the management of 
institutional arrangements coordinating collective action. Rules and regulations in a 
group or organisation are considered rational controls that are used to prevent 
opportunistic behaviour (Dow, 1987). Rules are enforceable shared understandings 
“that certain actions in particular situations must, must not, or may be undertaken and 
that sanctions will be taken against those who do not conform” (Ostrom, 1998 pp. 
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10). Simple and clear rules to govern initiatives are important to reduce information 
asymmetry problems in regards to expected behaviour and regulations in the groups 
(Baland and Platteau, 1996). Ease of enforcement of rules and systems of sanctioning 
are also important when the consequences of free-riding are high in groups (Wade, 
1988; Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996).  
Another important organisational feature in collective action is appropriate 
leadership. Leadership aids in the mobilisation of members and in the formation of 
important linkages with the state and markets (Markelova et al, 2009). Appropriate 
leadership is also essential to identify and respond to changes in the institutional 
environment, such as policy change and changes in the markets that individuals or 
groups may not have the ability to cope with (ibid). Leadership also helps coordinate 
commitment by reconciling the interests of local traditional elites that may have an 
influence on initiating or stalling collective action (Baland and Platteau, 1996). 
Considering the importance of organisational features in enabling and coordinating 
collective action, it is important to see the prevalence of these features in POFs.   
Experimental studies using laboratory set games such as prisoners’ dilemma25 games 
have helped uncover trends on how individuals behave in groups and interact with 
each other using previous experiences of cooperation and non-cooperation (Axelrod, 
2006; R. Hardin, 1982; Taylor, 1987). These studies find that information of past 
actions builds trust and helps solve social dilemmas in collective action through 
reciprocity or tit-for-tat responses. It may also weaken the motivation to cooperate 
collectively if individuals have had poor experiences of cooperation, and when 
opposition norms are present. These norms emerge when rules are in conflict with 
interests and identities of individuals (Nee, 1998). Previous experience of organising 
is of heuristic importance in groups in which heuristics are ‘rules of thumb’ that are 
learnt from previous experiences and continuous trial and error.  
Successful collective action needs to effectively address and prevent social dilemmas 
to bring benefits to stakeholders. Here the organisational structures of collective 
                                         
25Merill Flood and Melvin Dresher first propounded the prisoner’s dilemma game in 1950 to elaborate the role of cooperation and to 
show conditions when cooperation and defection takes place, and what were their consequences. “In the Prisoner's Dilemma game, 
there are two players. Each has two choices, namely cooperate or defect. Each must make the choice without knowing what the other 
will do. No matter what the other does, defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation. The dilemma is that if both defect, both do 
worse than if both had cooperated” (Axelrod, 2006: pg 6-7) 
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action initiatives become important. The two sets of organisational features identified 
here are the ones that determine the characteristics of collective action (i.e. external 
support, size, past experiences and interest heterogeneity) and characteristics that 
determine how they are governed (i.e. rules and regulations and leadership). There 
may be close interaction between these two sets as the nature of rules and regulations 
may be determined by size, interest heterogeneity and past experiences. Similarly, 
leadership may be influenced by the nature of external support (coordination or 
cooperation). These relationships need to be uncovered when examining the 
empirical cases.  Institutional arrangements that coordinate collective actions are also 
influenced by the social context in which they are situated in. Therefore, the social 
features of the groups become important in determining how these initiatives are 
coordinated. The next part of the section deals with the social features that influence 
the functioning of collective action.  
2.4.3 Social features 
The importance of social features in the organisation of collective action is evident 
from studies which show that self-organised institutional arrangements of collective 
action formed on custom rules and conditional cooperation, or norms of reciprocity, 
have succeeded where state-initiated formal institutions have failed (Berkes, 1989; 
McKean & Ostrom, 1995). Mark Granovetter’s (1985) study on the relations between 
economic action and social relations illustrate that an individual’s decision to act 
economically cannot be understood in isolation to their social context. He elaborates 
how networks of personal relations and their density generate trust and discourage 
malfeasance in groups enabling better cooperation. These studies point out that social 
capital plays an important role in cooperation. Social capital comprises of networks, 
norms, trust, values and understandings that facilitate and enable coordination and 
cooperation among groups (Keeley, 2007; Putnam, 1995). Educationist L.J. Hanifan 
coined the term ‘social capital’ to highlight the role of community involvement in the 
success of local schools in Virginia (Putnam, 2000). Social capital has gained wide 
application in social sciences and empirical analysis have used it as a dominant 
determiner in climate change (Adger, 2003), economic development (Krishna, 2002; 
Deepa Narayan & Pritchett, 2000; Woolcock, 1998), education (Coleman, 1988) 
common pool resource management (Krishna & Uphoff, 1999; Ostrom, 2000b) and 
democracy (Putnam, 1995). 
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The study of social capital has helped in understanding how people interact and 
cooperate in well-defined social groups, networks and social structures to attain 
individual and collective benefits (Brunie, 2009). The three main features of social 
capital according to Putnam (1995, 2000) are norms, trust and networks. Norms are 
internal valuations (positive or negative) about a particular action accepted by a 
group, and since they are learnt from one’s milieu they differ across cultures, actions 
and situations (Ostrom, 1998). Trust, according to Glaeser et al (1999), is “a 
commitment of resources to an activity where the outcome depends upon the 
cooperative behaviour of others” (pp. 3). Networks are links between groups or 
individuals (Keeley, 2007) and are reinforced by personal relationships, norms and 
trust. Social capital is conditioned by traditional social structures such as race, caste, 
class and gender relations in society (Jennings, 2007; Krishna, 2000). 
In collective action, the role of social capital is crucial to enable cooperation. Social 
capital can be an effective mechanism through which behaviour in groups can be 
influenced and coordinated. In this regard, previous experiences (both good and bad) 
are crucial (Axelrod, 2006; Taylor, 1987). Norms of reciprocity conditioned on 
individuals’ previous experience in organising predisposes individuals to cooperate, 
restrain opportunistic behaviour and reinforce trust (Ostrom & Ahn, 2008). Wade 
(1988), in his study of collective management of irrigation systems in South India, 
and Baland and Platteau’s (1996) review of a large number of cases of commons, 
reveal that the role of social capital and experience from previously successful 
initiatives have great influence in the organisation and functioning of collective 
action.  Paul Collier (1998) highlights three economic benefits of social capital as a) 
transmission of knowledge about the behaviour of others leading to reduced 
opportunism, b) reduced information asymmetry through the diffusion of knowledge 
of markets and technology and, therefore, reducing market failures and c) reduced 
problems of free-riding facilitating collective action.  
Norman Uphoff (2000) differentiates collective action enabling social capital into 
two categories: the structural and cognitive forms. The structural form of social 
capital facilitates mutually beneficial social capital through established social norms 
and networks that are characterised by rules, procedures and precedents; the cognitive 
form of social capital predisposes people towards collective action through shared 
values, attitudes and beliefs (Uphoff, 2000). Social capital in groups may influence 
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and reconcile heterogeneities and aid in communication which are important 
structural variables in collective action. Since past organising experience also 
contributes to social capital, it leads to relationships of reciprocity within groups. 
Various studies such as those cited above have attempted to theorise how social 
features of networks, norms, trust and social capital are essential in enabling, 
supporting and sustaining collective action. The social composition of the groups 
based on the heterogeneity of social characteristics may influence how social capital 
is created and maintained in groups.  
Social capital in collective action through networks, norms and trust is crucial to the 
functioning of groups. It helps impose social control and limit self-interested 
behaviour (Ouchi, 1980). Social controls are different from rational control which 
comprise rules and regulations, and in both formal and informal institutions they play 
a crucial role in regulating how individuals behave (Ouchi, 1979). The role and 
functioning of social controls are often outside the ambit of transaction cost 
assessments (Ghosal & Moran, 1996). By assessing social feature of various groups, 
this study sheds light on the nature and influence of social capital in producer 
organisations, and how they predispose or facilitate collective action. How social 
controls and rational controls in groups interact in the functioning and governance of 
groups will also be interesting to observe.  
2.4.4 Economic features  
The primary difference between common-pool resources based institutional 
arrangements coordinating collective action and Producer Organisational Formats 
(POFs) is the nature of collective goods accessed by them. POFs are initiatives that 
jointly access private goods (inputs, credit, private sector R&D, and market 
information), public goods (public sector agricultural research and development and 
information, subsidies, markets) and CPR (irrigation facilities and other water 
resources) to improve production and sales to bring benefits to stakeholders who have 
been excluded due to distribution failures, missing markets and market imperfections. 
CPR collective actions, on the other hand, are designed to jointly access commons 
such water and forest resources and grazing lands and pastures, which are defined by 
the absence of property rights. Therefore in organisations coordinating collective 
action, the type of good that is provided to members becomes important as well as 
how it is distributed to all members. 
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Collective actions in agriculture production vary with many initiatives concentrating 
one activity, such as marketing, extension services, credit provision and input 
provision. Such studies tend to focus on outcomes of collective action in the form of 
welfare gains from accessing extension services (Ortiz, 2000; Willy & Holm-Müller, 
2013), improved market access (Fischer & Qaim, 2012b; Shiferaw, Hellin, & 
Muricho, 2011; Trebbin & Hassler, 2012), gender and technology access (Fischer & 
Qaim, 2012a; Mwangi & Markelova, 2009) and credit access (Sanyal, 2009). Other 
studies have borrowed heavily from common pool resource literature to understand 
how collective actions providing multiple goods and services are coordinated 
(Markelova et al., 2009; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004).  
Specification of the economic feature of POFs while studying collective action is 
crucial as the goods accessed by them differ from collective actions in common pool 
management. The main economic features of POFs are determined by the type of 
goods they access, the nature of resource endowment of the groups, how goods are 
distributed within the groups and also by the changes in surplus at the household 
level. Furthermore, the classification of goods is essential in understanding the nature 
of collective action and how they are organised. The type of good a group of 
individuals chooses to jointly access greatly determines the social dilemma or 
collective action problems the group faces (Ostrom, 2003). Public goods and club 
goods by definition are not always marketable, and markets are not an efficient way 
to distribute them. In such scenarios, the political economy process is important in its 
distribution (Coase, 1974). However, the failure of the state to effectively provide 
and distribute public goods will lead to underdevelopment and poor growth in an 
economy. For example, the failure to provide and distribute public goods, such as 
research and technical knowledge and subsidies in agriculture, can hinder sectorial 
growth and development when specific groups that depend on them are excluded 
(FAO, 2001; Vanni, 2014).  
Although private goods are distributed through the markets, the failure of markets to 
provide quality inputs (e.g. missing markets in essential private goods such as 
institutional credit) essential for agricultural production again lead to decreased utility 
and poor growth and development in the sector. As a result, collective action 
becomes necessary in a situation where a community or a group of people are 
deprived of a certain kind of private or public good (Staatz, 1987; Vanni, 2014). The 
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provision of essential private and club goods is the essential economic purpose of 
producer organisations. Thus, when assessing the economic features of POFs, it is 
crucial to determine the main collective goods they provide to improve production 
and marketing of goods. 
In this section, the structural characteristics of collective action (organisational, social 
and economic features) that determine how collective action initiatives are 
coordinated and maintained were discussed. Structural variables fundamentally help 
in establishing and understanding the type of collective action taking place, the nature 
of social dilemmas that could emerge and the potential challenges that may occur in 
the organisation of collective action.  Institutions that enable collective action resolve 
social dilemmas using mechanisms that consider the influence of these structural 
variables on the behaviour of individuals participating in them. In this thesis, 
different case studies of POFs will be assessed for the presence or absence of these 
features and their influence on the groups and their functioning. Table 2.1 
summarises the structural features of collective action. These variables will be used 
in this study to understand how POFs are structures as organisations of collective 
actions. The next section of this chapter identifies the factors that need to be 
considered when assessing resource allocation and incentive alignment in POFs.  
Table 2.1 Structural features of collective action  
Organisational  Social   Economic  
• External Support 
• Rules and regulations 
structures, leadership 
• Experience 
• Group size 
• Networks  
• Norms 
• Trust 
• Structural social 
capital  
• Cognitive social 
capital 
• Type of goods (public, 
private, common, 
club) 
• Production cost and 
price realisation 
2.5 Resources allocation and incentive alignment in 
collective action 
Along with an understanding of how collective action is structured on organisational, 
social and economic terms, it is crucial to determine if the economic goals for 
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organising are realised through the allocation of resources, and how incentives are 
aligned to sustain the collective. The fundamental role of POFs is to bring about 
changes in production cost and price realisation to improve viability of small and 
marginal farm production. In the four-level analysis of institutions discussed above, 
the fourth level deals with the determinants of institutional performance. At this level 
it is important to see how resources and collective goods are allocated within the 
group and how incentives to participate in collective action initiatives are also aligned 
(Lieberherr, 2009; Williamson, 2000). In this section, the factors influencing resource 
allocation in groups, including incentive structures, are discussed. A justification of 
carrying out a marginal analysis is also done in order to specify the fourth level of 
institutional analysis.  
Increased viability for members effectively depends on how collective goods 
accessed by the initiative are allocated to members. Initial endowment of resources 
and heterogeneity of resources among members may influence how goods are 
distributed. Initial resource endowment refers to the amount of resources an 
individual possesses (land, irrigation) or commands (access credit, information and 
markets) before participating in collective action. Resource heterogeneity refers to 
differing initial endowment among individual members participating in collective 
action. Literature of club goods sheds light on the nature of resource endowment and 
its influence on participating members. Scholars like Ng (1973) and Oakland (1972) 
argue that mixed clubs (heterogeneous groups) can be optimal when participating in 
collective action. Cornes and Sandler (1994), clarifies this assumption by stating that 
allocation of resources in heterogeneous groups depend on ‘fixed’ or ‘variable’ utility 
of collective goods. Utility is fixed when all members irrespective of size have the 
same entitlements to a particular resource or goods, while variable utility would mean 
that the level of entitlements to resources depend on resource endowment of members 
(ibid). In the case of POFs, fixed utility would mean that all members have equal 
access to resources that are made available to the groups. In a scenario of variable 
utility, members with higher levels of initial endowment and resources may benefit 
more from collective goods, making them the privileged group in collective 
initiatives. As discussed in section 2.4.3, privileged groups have more incentive to 
organise and therefore initiate and sustain collective action.  
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Initial resource endowment may also determine the level of economic and social 
power different members in a group possess. Participants in collective action can be 
heterogeneous in two distinct ways: in relation to their resources they possess and 
their level of interest to participate in collective action. These two ways, however, are 
related. Studies on common pool resource management in India and around the world 
has shown that members with greater power may appropriate more benefits from 
initiatives than members with lesser power (related to resource size) leading to social 
dilemmas in distribution (Agrawal, 2001a; Wade, 1994). Belonging to a higher caste 
or being male in patriarchal societies may also influence the economic power of 
individuals and their ability to access resources (Agarwal, 2010; Bandyopadhyay & 
von Eschen, 1988). Different members in POFs may have different resource 
endowment in terms of landholding sizes and access to irrigation which may give 
them more power over other members in the group. 
Granovetter (1978) and Oliver et al (1985) opine that interest heterogeneity or 
differing levels of interest to cooperate amongst group members can play an enabling 
role in collective action. Decisions to initiate collective action may rest on a group of 
highly motivated individuals or privileged groups who have more interest and agency 
than other members. They make up the ‘threshold’ (Granovetter, 1978) or ‘critical 
mass’ (Oliver et al, 1985), of the initiative. Although homogeneous interests may 
lead to increased cohesion within groups, sometimes heterogeneity in groups (e.g. 
privileged group influence) are necessary for its emergence. However, when 
collective action is coordinated, social and economic power in groups may need to be 
reconciled to incentivise members with lower resource endowment to participate in 
collective action.  
Therefore, the success of collective action crucially hinges upon the incentives 
heterogeneous members have in participating in them (Marwell & Oliver, 1993). 
Clark and Wilson (1961) in their study of organisations lists three kinds of incentives 
that are crucial to encourage participation: material, solidary and purposive 
incentives. Material incentives are tangible incentives given in utilitarian 
organisations (business firms, trade unions, trade associations) like salaries, bonuses 
and other fringe benefits. In collective action the material benefits accessed by groups 
and how they are distributed among members would form the material incentives of 
collective action. Solidary incentives are intangible incentives that sustain solidary 
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organisations (e.g. social clubs, voluntary organisations, colleges, universities, etc.) 
where rewards are non-monetary in the form of friendship, respect, sense of group 
solidarity and status. The social features and the level of social capital possessed in 
groups would form the solidary incentives in POFs, and it would be crucial to see 
how this is developed and sustained in groups. Purposive incentives are, again, non-
tangible incentives characterised in purposive organisation (e.g. groups formed for a 
specific purpose like social change). Where the purpose has become the central 
component for organising, the achievement of the purpose is incentive in itself.  
How goods are distributed in groups and the changes it brings to production and 
distribution costs to individual farmer households would determine the level of 
material incentives in initiatives.  The cost of accessing collective goods should 
effectively be lower than accessing them individually. A marginal analysis to identify 
changes in production and marketing costs through provisions, such as better access 
to markets, better information, technology adoption and higher bargaining power, can 
help determine the changes in profit at a household level. This study, therefore, 
carries out a marginal analysis in each of the cases using production data collected 
from farmers participating in POFs to determine the level of change collective action 
has brought about and determine the material incentives for organising.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter argues for an analytical framework that combines collective action 
theory and institutional theory to help understand how Producer Organisational 
Formats in places such as Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are structured, and how 
resources are allocated and incentives aligned to enable successful collective action. 
Collective action is a complex phenomenon as there are a large number of 
organisational, social and economic factors influencing their outcome. Although 
collective action theory developed to study common pool resources helps identify the 
main features influencing them, the variation of the production conditions of 
agriculture and the differing institutional context in which producer organisational 
formation takes place may have differing effects on collective action in the 
agricultural context. Many influential works on collective action and the theoretical 
contributions they have made do not focus on the context in which collective action 
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takes place. For this reason, institutional theory was combined with collective action 
theory to help assess this institutional context.  
Using Williamson’s (2000) four-level analysis, the framework aids in identifying the 
institutional embeddedness, institutional environment and institutional arrangements 
in which agricultural production takes place and POFs exist. This forms the first three 
levels of the analysis. However, the third and fourth level needs to be specified in 
relation to the topic and area of study and collective action theory add specification to 
this model. Reviewing literature on collective action and works on the management 
of common pool resources this chapter highlight the main organisational, social and 
economic features that influence the structure and governance of POFs as hybrid 
institutional arrangements. The characteristics of how resources are allocated and 
how incentives are aligned in groups are also reviewed to specify the fourth level of 
analysis. This institutional and collective action theoretical framework forms the 
basis on which the case studies in this thesis are analysed. In the next chapter, the 
institutional embeddedness, environment in which agricultural production takes place 
and the institutional arrangements that support it are discussed to establish the 
institutional context of POFs in India. This will help determine the challenges that the 
agricultural sector and small producers face, as well as the role and relevance of 
POFs in coordinating collective action. 
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Chapter III: The context and conditions 
of agricultural production in India 
3.1 Introduction  
Agricultural production is influenced by a unique set of production conditions 
associated with seasonality and geographical dispersion and risks associated with the 
climate, climate change and commodity market uncertainties. This makes agricultural 
production a complex economic activity and characterises the institutional context in 
which it is situated in. An assessment of the institutional context will help reveal the 
features and challenges of small producer agricultural production in India. The main 
purpose of producer organisational formats is to address some of these challenges 
that their members face in agricultural production. Therefore an assessment of this 
context is important to understand how collective action is coordinated among 
agricultural producers, and how they are structured in organisational, social and 
economic terms.  As collective action theory is limited in explaining this context, the 
analytical framework developed in the previous chapter combines institutional theory 
with collective action theory to address this. The institutional context of agricultural 
production is characterised by the institutional embeddedness of agricultural 
production, the institutional environment that influences it and various institutional 
arrangements crucial to production and marketing of agricultural goods. The aim of 
this chapter is to look at the institutional embeddeness, environment and 
arrangements of the Indian agricultural sector in order to establish the context in 
which agricultural production takes place. This will help situate the four cases that 
are discussed in chapters four and five and help to understand the influence of the 
institutions on the manner in which collective actions in Producer Organizational 
Formats (POFs) are structured. Institutions that influence agricultural production are 
assessed at the national and at the state levels, where the POFs are located.  
This chapter comprises of three parts, and figure 3.1 depicts the different aspects of 
the theoretical framework discussed by each section.  Section 3.2 discusses the 
institutional embeddedness of agricultural production. Here the role that caste, class 
and gender play on the social conditions influencing agricultural production is 
 72 
discussed. This helps in understanding the role of the social context and its influence 
on the institutional environment and various institutional arrangements in the 
agricultural sector. Section 3.3 discusses the institutional environment in which 
agricultural production takes place. Land distribution patterns in India and in 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, and land rights in agriculture that characterises the 
institutional environment are discussed this section. Section 3.4 assesses the structure 
and characteristics of credit institutions, research and extension, institutions and 
markets as institutional arrangements in Indian agriculture. This is done to identify 
the major challenges small producers face in accessing them, and also to ascertain the 
conditions collective action can potentially address or need to address.  
Figure 3.1 Analysis of institutions influencing agricultural development
3.2 Institutional Embeddedness - Social context of 
agricultural production in India 
Institutions are also ‘social systems of production’ that are integrated into the social 
configuration of a country or region (Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997). An 
understanding of the social influences in agricultural production is therefore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level I: Institutional Embeddedness – Section 3.2  
Level II: Institutional Environment – Section 3.3  
Level III: Institutional Arrangements – Section 3.4 
Level IV: Governance, 
Resource allocation and 
Incentive alignment 
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important.  In India, the social context in which production takes place determines 
access to resources and the ability of producers to manage risk (RFST, 2005; A. Sen, 
2000; Thorat, 2009). In India, the social context is characterised by the role of caste, 
class and gender influencing access to land, exchange relations and also an 
exclusionary role in society by determining access to credit, markets and information. 
This section describes the institutional embeddedness characterised by caste, class 
and gender and the influence on the agricultural sector. The role these institutions 
play is crucial to understand the social influences in agricultural production.  
3.2.1 Caste, class, gender and the embeddedness of 
agricultural institutions 
The caste system has long regulated economic and social life in India as a traditional  
hierarchical order of social groups that determine the economic rights (e.g. 
occupation and property rights) of individuals by birth (Lal, 1989; Scoville, 1991). 
The caste system or Varna system formally comprises of four categories: the 
Brahmins (priests and the learned), the Kshatriyas (warriors), the Vaishyas (traders 
and merchants) and the Shudras (artisans and manual labourers). The fifth category 
of the ‘untouchables’ were outside the caste system, performing menial work such as 
scavenging and other activities that were considered unclean. This group is 
constitutionally referred to as the Scheduled Castes  (SCs) (Banerjee and Knight 
1985). Another group of people outside the caste system were the tribal people who 
lived in in relative autonomy in their political and cultural systems referred to as the 
Scheduled Tribes (STs) (Yadav, 2002).  The different varnas are further subdivided 
into jatis or sub-castes, and in India today there are presently thousands of jatis.  
A majority of field workers, rural artisans and small farmers belong to the Other 
Backward Castes or OBCs (Jaffrelot, 2000). This group comprises of castes that are 
above the SCs and the STs, but below the forward castes of the Brahmins, Kshatriyas 
and the Vaishyas (ibid). According to the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO), 
‘Key Indicators of Situation of Agricultural Households in India’ (2014)26 about 45 
per cent of the total agricultural households in India belong to Other Backward 
Classes, 16 percent to Scheduled Castes and 13 percent to Scheduled Tribes (ST).In 
rural India, the OBCs have emerged to be a politically and socially powerful due to 
                                         
26 http://mospi.nic.in/Mospi_New/upload/KI_70_33_19dec14.pdf Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, 
Government of India. 
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their numbers. This classification is not a homogeneous as different sub-castes make 
up the OBC category. The numerically predominant OBC sub-caste often have 
control over entire villages, groups of villages and also districts (Yadav, 2002), thus 
achieving a ‘dominant caste’ status (Srinivas, 1959).  
The relationship between caste and class however is complex (Kumar et al., 2002). 
The Marxist definition of class is a reference to a group of individuals who share a 
common economic characteristic and interest defined by ownership of property or 
means of production (capital, land) (Ollman, 1968). Class in the agricultural context 
in India can be seen as political alignments defending a group’s “collective material 
interests” (Barbara Harriss-White, 1995a: pg 90). With relation to land and property 
rights, agricultural producers are differentiated into classes of  landholders (producers 
owning land), tenants (producers who lease out land for farming) and landless 
labourers (who work on the land for wages) (Bharadwaj, 1985). The other influence 
of class on agricultural producer and exchange is through the control of capital. 
Markets in India are analogues to merchant capital, and class plays a crucial role in 
exchange and distribution (Harriss-White, 1995a). Various classes of traders in the 
markets are responsible for transportation, information regarding price and quality 
standards (Jan & Harriss-White, 2012; Leplaideur, 1992), buying and selling of 
agricultural commodities (Chand, 2012; Chattopadhyay, 1969; Prasad, 1974) and 
credit (Basu, 1997).  The role of class in relation to land and capital in the markets 
are discussed in detail in sections 3.3 and 3.4 of this chapter.  
Caste and caste-based privileges in society have traditionally regulated the 
occupation of individuals and the right to own property (Thorat & Newman, 2007). 
These have been enforced and augmented through norms such as social ostracism and 
adverse measures such as violence and economic penalties (ibid).  As a result, along 
with gender, caste has traditionally been used as a mechanism of exclusion.  
Exclusion may be defined as the denial of equal access to opportunities imposed by 
one social group over the other, leading to their inability to participate fairly in polity, 
society and economy (Buvinic, 2005). Caste and caste status is, therefore, a source of 
social and economic power to dominant castes. Since this form of exclusion is 
culturally defined and embedded in social and economic relations, it is a forced 
exclusion (A. Sen, 2000) that leads to the denial of access to resources, employment, 
education and public services.  
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The dynamics of caste-based exclusion is an identity-based exclusion and different 
from regular forms of exclusion  in markets based on lack of income, in employment 
based on low productivity or in education based on low merit (Thorat, 2009). 
Therefore, exclusion and discrimination occur in multiple market and non-market 
transactions and societal interactions (ibid). The exclusion and restrictions in access 
to land, labour, capital and other factors of production have restricted social mobility 
and created imperfections in the factor markets and inefficiencies in resource 
allocation (Akerlof, 1976; Thorat, 2009). Thorat (2009) lists some specific instances 
of exclusion and discrimination by the dominant castes in agricultural production as: 
1. Limited access to markets for labour, agricultural land, inputs, capital, goods, 
and social services 
2. Different prices charged/paid for services received or goods sold in market 
transactions 
3. Exclusion from certain categories of jobs and discrimination in hiring 
4. Discrimination in the use of public services like roads and other infrastructure, 
water for domestic use and irrigation  
5. Physical or residential exclusion from other community members preventing 
full participation in community life 
 
Considering the pervasive influence of caste, collective action institutions are 
necessarily influenced by caste. Caste and the social capital it generates may 
predispose collective action through shared values and attitudes, as well as facilitate 
collective action through norms and social rules (Bardhan, 1993). The role of caste 
dynamics may also increase transaction costs due to the exclusion and discrimination 
mentioned above, and also excludes people from sharing the benefits of collective 
action due to its inherent social and economic power structure leading to the failure 
of collective action initiatives (ibid). Therefore, the reconciliation of the adverse 
influences of caste such as exclusion may be required of collective action initiatives 
to be successful or inclusive.  
Gender is another area of exclusion in the socio-economic landscape of agricultural 
production. Women play a significant role in agricultural production and allied 
activities in all developing countries. In fact, except for ploughing, women take part 
in all farming activities such as sowing, manuring and harvesting, and in some 
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activities such as storage and value addition, they play a predominant role (M. 
Aggarwal, 2003). According to the Census of India (2011), 87.3 per cent of all 
women workers in India are in the agricultural sector (this is almost twice that of 
male workers)27. In recent years, women’s role in agriculture is increasing as men 
move out of agriculture to urban areas in search of seasonal jobs, leading to the 
feminization of agriculture (Agarwal, 2010).   
Boserup (1970) noted that the activities of women are largely omitted in the statistics 
of production, and their income and role in agriculture have been largely undermined. 
Therefore, despite women’s prominence in agricultural production, access to and 
control over resources, a focus on gender in agriculture policy and the decision 
making power of women in agriculture are low (ibid). This has led to the exclusion of 
women in the developmental process in agriculture. According to the Research 
Foundation for Science and Technology report (RFST, 2005), women are the largest 
group of landless labourers. Despite egalitarian laws of succession and inheritance, 
they are often dispossessed from their land (this is discussed in the next section) with 
the death of a spouse or divorce. Agricultural development programs are often 
planned by men and targeted at men, and extension and information dissemination 
activities exclusively advise men about their activities (RFST, 2005). Similarly, 
women are also kept out of the decision-making processes related to various rural 
development activities such as Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP), 
Rural Employment Schemes (REP) and various other schemes which prefer to focus 
on men (ibid).  
Economic and social relations in agricultural production are, therefore, embedded in 
gender relations, the caste system and the caste relations it perpetuates. This affects 
institutions of property rights and land reforms and the nature of institutions that 
enable or provide access to inputs, credit, markets and information. The institutional 
environment of land relations and property rights, and the nature of government 
policy is embedded and influenced by these social institutions. Similarly, the 
institutional arrangements in the agricultural sector such as the mechanisms of credit 
and information delivery, the markets for the purchase of inputs and selling of 
outputs are predisposed by caste and gender dynamics. These social conditions 
                                         
27 http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/economic_activity.aspx 
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influence the institutional environment and the issues and challenges present in them.  
Considering that caste, class and gender play such a determining role in society and 
economy, they would also have a major influence on how collective action in 
Producer Organisational Formats is structured. The regional social dynamics of a 
region will influence the social composition (homogeneous or heterogeneous) of the 
initiative, determining the organisational features of the initiatives.  Social capital 
characterised by networks, norms and trust would also be conditioned by caste, class 
and gender dynamics and would affect the propensity of members to cooperate or 
free ride. In terms of the economic features of POFs, these social aspects would 
control how collective goods are accessed and distributed among members.  In the 
next section, the specificities of the institutional environment and the effect that caste, 
class and gender on agricultural production are discussed.   
3.3 Institutional Environment - Access to land, property 
rights and agricultural production in India  
The institutional environment refers to the political, legal and normative conditions 
that influence production, exchange and distribution in the agricultural sector. 
Property rights and access to land determine the institutional environment in the 
agricultural sector. Land being the most important factor of agricultural production, 
its equitable access is fundamental to development and growth in the sector. Land 
and landholding size in the Indian rural economy plays a production role as well as a 
social role as it determines status. Individuals with larger landholdings and water 
have had better access to technological innovations (green revolution technologies) 
and credit and labour markets (Mearns, 1999). Besides its productive aspect, land is 
an asset that acts as collateral in credit markets, security in events of natural disaster 
and a symbol of status (ibid). Therefore, land in the rural economy is also a source of 
economic and social power. Equitable distribution of land is also crucial in an 
economy, and when distribution of operational landholdings are equitable, it creates 
better access to credit markets, research and technology, and also creates a demand 
for non-farm goods leading to better growth in the economy (I. Singh, 1990). 
Deininger and Squire (1996) suggest that countries with more equitable distribution 
of land experience higher economic growth rates. The following part of the section 
highlights the nature of property rights and distribution of land in India. According to 
the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) 2006 data, 6.6 per cent of rural 
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households in India do not own land and the NSSO 2012-13 data show 67 per cent of 
households own less than one hectare of land.   
3.3.1 Property rights, unequal access and fragmentation of 
landholdings  
Agricultural production takes place through individuals or households cultivating 
their own land or through the leasing out of land. This leasing out or farming of land 
without property rights is known as tenure farming. In the 1950s, economic 
theorization viewed indigenous land tenure systems as inadequate security for 
cultivators and emphasised the need for permanent rights to incentivise investment to 
improve agricultural production (Marshall, 1956). Contrary to this, different studies 
in various developing countries have showed that there are advantages of land tenure 
systems, such as sharing risks (Cheung, 1968) and provision of credit and inputs in 
the presence of inefficient markets through interlocked contracts (Bardhan, 1989; 
Subramanian & Qaim, 2011). 
Land tenure practices have been categorized into three types of contracts, including: 
wage contracts, fixed rent contracts and share cropping contracts (Chaudhuri & 
Maitra, 1997). A wage contract is when the owner cultivates the land with hired 
labour (tenant) on fixed wages. Here the owner of the land bears climatic and market 
risks and has to monitor the hired labour who have no additional incentives other than 
the fixed wage. In a fixed rent contract, the tenant cultivates the land leased from the 
owner for a fixed share of the produce. The tenant in this case bears the production 
risks and may not have the incentive to increase production over a certain level due to 
perceived risks. The advantage to the tenants is that they may be able to access credit 
required for cultivation from the owner as tenant farmers when they otherwise cannot 
access institutional credit due to the absence of a credit supply effect (essentially 
insufficient collateral) (Bardhan, 1989).  In a sharecropping contract, the tenant leases 
land from the owner and the rent is a percentage share of the total output. Here the 
owner and the tenant share the risk (Cheung, 1969), and the tenant has the potential 
of interlinking credit to the lease is also possible. The advantage of interlinking credit 
and tenancy contracts to the landlord is that they may be able to screen inefficient 
tenants (Braverman & Stiglitz, 1982) and the tenants are able to overcome the credit 
supply effect, where credit can be gained as a result of the contract, but often on 
adverse terms. Incentive to invest in landholdings or improve the land is low in the 
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case of tenancy. However, longer-term contracts could possibly incentivise 
investments on land because tenure security enables a tenant to farm on a piece of 
land for longer periods.  
Land reforms or policies intending land reforms were undertaken in many developing 
countries in the years following the Second World War. While it was successful in 
countries such as Taiwan, Korea and Japan, it met with limited success in India. Land 
distribution in India during the colonial period was highly skewed in favour of 
dominant caste landowners who were given property rights by the British to extract 
land tax (A. Banerjee & Iyer, 2005). Therefore, the actual cultivators of the land did 
not have any rights to the land. Land reforms in India comprised of three major tasks: 
a) the abolition of the intermediaries known as the jagirdars or inamdars, b) tenancy 
reform with the intention of providing security of tenure by fixing fair rents and c) 
regulating landholding size through land ceiling and land redistribution28 (Appu, 
1996; Deshpande & Torgal, 2003; Ray, 1996). The responsibility of carrying out land 
reforms were with individual state governments and different states had varying 
levels of success in implementing them.  
Intermediaries were individuals who worked for the state, feudal lords or zamindars 
and collected rent from tenants. They were often allowed to retain a large portion of 
the rent they collected from the tenants (Timothy Besley & Burgess, 2002). The 
abolition of intermediaries was relatively straightforward and successful in most 
states as it had a low political cost (Mearns, 1999). However, tenancy reform and 
land ceilings met with less success. The main reason for this was that land reforms 
from the beginning were a politically contentious issue. Herring (1983) states that the 
ruling elite did not have the political will to implement land reforms, as they were 
electorally dependent on the agrarian elite. The landlords who possessed larger land 
holdings were bitterly opposed to land ceilings (Ray, 1996). As a result, little was 
achieved in this regard, and in 35 years, less than 2% of total operated area had 
ceilings imposed or land redistributed (ibid). Similarly, tenancy reforms in most parts 
of India have been absent, weak or counterproductive and resulted in the eviction of 
tenants, rising of informal tenancy agreements on adverse terms, and shorter 
                                         
28 Land ceiling was a process by which the maximum amount of land an individual or household could own was fixed and any land 
above the ceiling level was considered surplus land. This surplus land could be acquired by the state without compensation for 
redistribution among the landless. In various states the ceiling was fixed at different levels.  
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(seasonal) tenancy that led to further erosion of incentive structures (Appu, 1997). 
According to Ray (1996), the loss of access to land by the rural poor as a result of 
eviction was around 30 per cent of total operated land, deepening the problem of poor 
land access for cultivators.  
Unequal access to land has persisted in India due to the failure to implement land 
reforms. Additionally, the nature of this unequal access has had a caste dimension. 
The scheduled castes made up a significant segment of the ‘tillers of the soil’ and the 
land reforms would have effectively transferred land from non-scheduled castes to 
the scheduled castes (Neelakantan, 2011). Table 3.1 shows the percentage of land 
possession according to social groups in India. In all land size categories OBCs are 
the largest caste group. The table also shows that in medium and large farms the 
percentage of SC and ST are very low and the share of OBCs and others (higher 
castes) is larger. The other group that have limited access to land in India are women. 
Although by law, women have equal rights to inherit property in India, in practice 
there are persistent gaps between legal rights, actual ownership and effective control 
over land (Mearns, 1999). Due to norms and customs, the pressure for women to 
forfeit their legal right to land in favour of male members is high (Agarwal, 1995). 
As a result, women irrespective of caste have little access to land. 
Table 3.1 Percentage of land possession according to social group in India (2014) 
Size of Land Possessed 
(Ha) 
ST SC OBC Others 
<0.01 9.4 28.0 52.2 10.4 
0.01-0.40 9.7 22.4 44.6 23.3 
0.41-1.00 15.7 15.9 45.2 23.2 
1.01-2.00 17.6 10.9 45.5 26.0 
2.01-4.00 13.8 7.7 47.2 31.3 
4.01-10.00 8.0 6.2 44.4 41.4 
10.00 + 3.2 2.9 52.8 41.1 
All Sizes  13.4 16.3 45.4 24.9 
Source: NSSO, 2014 
Along with unequal access, another structural problem associated with agricultural 
land is the increased marginalisation. Table 3.2 shows that about 67 per cent of land 
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holdings or households in India are marginal in size owning less than 1 hectare of 
land. Small farms comprise of about 18 per cent, while medium and large holdings 
were less than 4.2 per cent and 0.7 per cent respectively. The trends in the 
distribution of landholdings from 1960-61 to 2010-11 show that the percentage of 
marginal holdings to total holdings increased from 39.1 per cent to 67 per cent. 
Currently the average size of landholdings in India is 1.10 hectares per household 
(Chand et al., 2011).  
Table 3.2 Changes in the Size Distribution of Operational Holdings and 
Operated Area: 1960-61 to 2010 -11 
Category of 
Holdings  
Percentage of Operational 
Holdings 
Percentage of Operated Area  
1960-61 70-71 81-82 91-92 2010-11 60-61 70-71 81-82 91-92 2010-11 
Marginal (< 
1 ha) 
39.1 45.8 56.0 62.8 67.0 6.9 9.2 11.5 15.6 22.2 
Small (1-2 
ha) 
22.6 22.4 19.3 17.8 18.0 12.3 14.8 16.6 18.7 22.0 
Semi-
Medium (2-
4 ha) 
19.8 17.7 14.2 12.0 10.0 20.7 22.6 23.6 24.1 23.5 
Medium (4-
10 ha) 
14.0 11.1 8.6 6.1 4.2 31.2 30.5 30.1 26.4 21.1 
Large (> 10 
ha) 
4.5 3.1 1.9 1.3 0.7 29.0 23.0 18.2 15.2 11.0 
All Sizes  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) 2004 and Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India 
In Karnataka the landholding sizes are close to the national average at 1.49 hectares; 
in Tamil Nadu, the average size is lower than the national average at 1 hectare. The 
main reasons for the marginalisation of land have been: a) population increase, b) 
lack of employment diversification from the agricultural sector to the non-agricultural 
sector and c) the institutional importance of land in the rural economy (Reddy & 
Mishra, 2009; Mearns, 1999).  
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Since independence, the population in India has been growing at 2 per cent, while net 
sown area has been growing at 0.2 per cent (Krishnaji, 2011). Therefore, while the 
number of holdings between 1961 and 2003 increased from 51 million to 101 million, 
operated land in fact declined from 133 million hectares to 108 hectares leading to 
increased marginalisation of land (NSSO, 2004). Another reason for the reduction of 
land-person ratio has been the slow diversification of the workforce away from 
agriculture. Slow growth in the manufacturing sector and inadequate employment 
creation has slowed the shift of surplus labour from agricultural to non-agricultural 
sectors. In the years following liberalisation, despite high growth in the level of 
employment in absolute terms, employment in organized manufacturing remained 
almost constant (Patnaik, 2007). Therefore, growth in India has been one of jobless 
growth that has failed to absorb labour from the rural regions. Beyond its importance 
as a factor of production, land in India is a durable asset as land prices considerably 
outstrip rate of inflation (Mearns, 1999). Land, moreover, is safe collateral for credit, 
a source of political power (Neale, 1969) and a source of identity and rootedness in 
local communities (Agarwal, 1994). This political, social and economic power it 
wields has resulted in an unwillingness to sell land, leading to a rigid land market 
(Mearns, 1999). This non-production importance of land and the inheritance laws 
which stipulate that all heirs receive equal share upon inheritance has also led to 
divisions in family landholdings.  
Considering the poor access to land, marginalisation of land holdings and the 
persistence of rigid land markets, land leasing is an important practice for improving 
access to land (Ballabh & Walker, 1992; Bell, 1990; Melmed-Sanjak, 1998; Sadoulet 
et al., 1998; Vaidyanathan, 1994). Although land tenancy has fallen considerably 
since the land reforms, according to the 1991 census of the Government of India, 19 
per cent of rural households lease land, and 90 per cent of this group comprise of 
small and marginal farmers (Parthasarthy, 1991). Later estimates state that between 
15-35 per cent of land is cultivated by tenants (Haque, 2000). However, liberalisation 
of tenure will still have to address the issue of reverse tenancy (where marginal 
landholders lease out land to large landholders) under adverse conditions for large-
scale farming and absentee landlordism which may alienate marginal farmers 
(Haque, 2003). The other pertinent issue that needs to be addressed is how tenures 
can address the credit supply and security effects that make tenancy systems 
inefficient. 
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The institutional environment influenced by the social context determines the purpose 
and relevance of POFs in India. In the absence of land reforms and the prevalence of 
land fragmentation, the average size of farms are becoming smaller and increasingly 
falling under the viable threshold size. This puts a majority of producers at a 
disadvantage in accessing markets, credit and extension services, technology and 
lumpy inputs like management and asset specific machinery.  Similarly, informal 
measures to remedy issues of poor access to land through sharecropping contracts 
have disadvantages with regards to accessing formal credit, inputs and technology 
and bargaining power to fix fair rents in fixed rent and sharecropping contracts. In the 
different case studies in this thesis, we see that the institutional environment in the 
agricultural sector shape the purpose of Producer Organisational Formats. The 
institutional environment influences their organisational and economic features and 
determines the type of goods and services they access, as well as the nature of their 
external support, leadership and structure. The next section discusses the main 
characteristics of markets, credit and research and development institutions as 
institutional arrangements that influence and determine conditions of agricultural 
production.  
3.4 Institutional arrangements supporting agricultural 
production in India  
Institutional arrangements are rules, regulations and structures that are designed for 
particular situations involving a subset of individuals or groups. The purpose of these 
arrangements is to prevent conflicts that are mutually damaging and also to distribute 
entitlements, opportunities and public goods that are essential to individuals or 
groups which they may not be able to access otherwise. Due to the seasonality, 
geographical dispersion and risks and uncertainties of the market and climatic 
conditions, institutional arrangements in agricultural production are essential to 
address some of these concerns affecting it to enable growth and development (P. C. 
Timmer, 1988). The main institutional arrangements are markets, credit institutions 
and institutions for the dissemination of research and technology. These crucial 
institutional arrangements have external economies of scale, and understanding the 
nature and characteristics of credit, research and extension institutions and markets is 
important to identify the challenges small and marginal producers face when 
engaging with these institutions ((Johnson & Ruttan, 1994). Collective action 
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initiatives become highly relevant in the agricultural sector due to their ability to 
address these challenges and increase viability of small and marginal producers. The 
aim of this section is to assess the structure and characteristics of institutional 
arrangements of credit, R&D and markets, to identify the major challenges small 
producers face in accessing them and to identify the conditions collective action 
initiatives like POFs can potentially address or need to address. This section also 
shows how social influences of caste and gender and the institutional environment 
characterised by the ownership of land also influence access to institutional 
arrangement for marketing, credit and research and extension services.  
3.4.1 Agricultural markets  
Agricultural markets in India are institutions containing “bundles of other institutions 
and are nested in yet others” making it institutionally complex ( Harriss-White 1995a 
+ b;). According to Harriss-White (1995b),  
…real market comprises a unique meta institution replete with constituent institutions with enabling, 
disciplining and constraining functions and interacting with yet others (legal, social and political; in 
production, consumption and the state). By means of these constituent institutions information on 
production, prices, buying and selling is organised and transfers of ownership affected. (pp. 586) 
This complexity in agricultural markets is primarily due to the many forms of 
exchange relations and the highly differentiated nature of commodities being 
transacted in them. The various firms that operate in the market are national agri-
businesses, big retailers, agro-processors, traders and their agents and unlicensed 
petty commodity producers and traders with different forms of contracts and 
exchange relations with primary producers (Jan & Harriss-White, 2012). The 
differentiations in commodity markets are also startlingly large. Different 
commodities and the different varieties of the same commodity catering to specific 
consumers are transacted in the markets through various channels of marketing 
chains. As exchange relations are conditioned by social factors that determine 
economic power in the markets, and markets are institutionally complex, small and 
marginal producers are often at a disadvantage when participating in the markets.  
The allocative function of agricultural markets in India is far from efficient as 
exchange relations are not uniform or equal, nor are they set only in price terms 
(Bharadwaj, 1985). This means that the production status of individuals and social 
position of households influence exchange through social dominance and power 
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equations (ibid). Caste, class and gender are, therefore, important determinants of 
transaction conditions in agricultural markets. Social discrimination in the markets 
may prevent access to markets and market goods or allow access on less favourable 
terms. This form of discrimination is not on the basis of skill, productivity and in 
many cases actuarial risks such as finance and insurance market risks, leading to 
‘access failures’ (Dorward & Kydd, 2005).  
Structure of agricultural markets  
Furthermore, agricultural production is linked to the upstream and downstream 
markets through forward and backward linkages. From the upstream markets, 
producers’ acquire inputs, credit, labour and land in the case of tenant farming and 
other services required for production. The downstream market on the other hand is 
where producers sell their produce.  Figure 3.2 depicts the structure and various 
exchange relations in the upstream and downstream markets. Owing to the highly 
differentiated nature of agricultural markets that involves a large number of firms and 
individuals, a generic description of markets has its limitations. Therefore, the 
depiction of markets in Figure 3.2 uses studies and information on cotton, oil and 
grain markets in India to depict the fragmented nature of the supply chain, the 
differentiated nature of markets and the various participants in the marketing process. 
As all POFs explored in this study produce and market one of these goods, the figure 
is representative of the markets for these commodities.  
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Figure 3.2: Forward and Backward Linkages in Indian Agricultural Markets29 
Source: Adapted from Naik and Abraham (2009) 
Note: the different coloured lines denote different channels through which goods are sold and distributed in the market.  
The upstream markets 
The upstream markets consist of organisations and individuals that provide factors 
essential for agricultural production such as inputs (pesticides, fertilizers and seeds), 
credit, labour and land. These organisations may be state-supported input 
cooperatives30 (fertilizers, pesticides and seeds), credit cooperatives and banks or 
NGOs providing information, credit or extension services. When producers are 
excluded from availing credit services from banks, input services from cooperatives 
and support services from NGOs due to the lack of property rights (in case of tenants) 
or insufficient collateral, they use the services from unregistered and extra-legal 
sources such as moneylenders, traders, and private mills (rice and cotton).  
The input markets often comprise of local traders and government agencies selling 
seeds, pesticides and fertilizers to famers. Traditionally, seeds for the next growing 
season were reused from the year’s harvest. With the emergence of hybrid /HYV 
                                         
29 The basic structure of this illustration of the downstream markets is adapted from the supply chain of cotton marketed through 
informal traders, APMC and the Cotton Corporation of India (CCI). The specific marketing channels were identified through field 
work in 25 different APMCs in Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana and Karnataka by Naik and Abraham (2009). The marketing 
channels are similar for rice and oil seeds in India, and other commodities may have fewer or more intermediaries.  
30 The National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation (NAFED) is a federal organization with primary co-operative 
marketing societies under it at the state level. There are 2937 primary cooperatives in the country with the task of distributing 
chemical fertilizers, pesticides, seeds and agricultural implements along with non-agricultural commodities like iron and steel, 
cement etc.  
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seeds, reuse of seeds leads to lower yields, and seeds need to be bought every 
growing season. In situations where producers cannot afford certified seeds, when 
regulated input markets are missing or when input markets are geographically distant, 
alternative input markets provide uncertified, cheap and often poor quality seeds that 
increases the risk of crop failure or non-attainment of potential yields. The 
fundamental problems related to input sourcing, management and use are discussed 
in section 3.4.3 of this chapter which highlights the importance of R&D in 
agriculture.  
The lease markets in the upstream market cater to agricultural equipment and land 
leases. The equipment lease markets provide farmers with tractors, tillers, sprayers 
and transportation which small farm production may not be able to invest in. The 
land lease markets provide landless farmers and small farmers with land for 
sharecropping on yearly or seasonal fixed, wage or sharecropping contracts. The rural 
banks and NGOs are the formal credit institutions that provide credit services in the 
form of loans, and micro-credit services to producers. In situations where formal 
sources of credit cannot be mobilised due to poor resource possession (insufficient 
collateral or outstanding debt), informal credit from money lenders become an 
important source of capital, making them essential but inefficient actors in the 
agricultural production process (Ghosh, 2013).  
When state approved or registered institutional markets cannot be accessed, 
alternative markets for land, credit and inputs play a vital role in the rural economy 
(Harriss-White & Bouman, 1994). Social factors in the form of pre-existing power 
and network relations of castes and social status play a crucial role in these 
alternative markets. Often moneylenders are of particular castes who know the farmer 
personally or through their family members which establishes a guarantee with the 
borrower (Basu, 1997). The terms of these informal contracts are often arbitrarily 
determined depending on the relationship between the trader/moneylender and the 
farmers. This leads to an oligopolistic and exploitative relationship between the 
markets and the primary producer in the upstream markets (Bhaduri, 1973). 
Therefore, the major problems resulting from access failure in the upstream markets 
are sourcing of inputs, seeds and credit. This issue of credit access is discussed in 
section 3.4.2 Collective actions like POFs need to address these access failures to 
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ensure availability of essential factors of production on fair terms in order to benefit 
small and marginal farmers.  
Downstream markets 
In India, the downstream markets or markets linking the primary producer to the end-
consumer are highly fragmented with a large number of intermediaries in the supply 
chain (figure 3.2). The main reason for this is that agricultural produce is traded and 
marketed in regulated and unregulated markets. Unregulated procurement and 
marketing is done through intermediaries such as village merchants and 
commissioning agents that act as middlemen between farmers and retailers or end-
users.  Regulated procurement and marketing are carried out through mechanisms, 
rules and guidelines stipulated by various marketing legislation in the country. The 
three channels through which regulated agricultural marketing is done are through 
state-trading, cooperative marketing and private trade31. State trading in India is done 
through governmental organisations, such as the Food Corporation of India (FCI), 
Cotton Corporation of India, Jute Corporation of India and National Agricultural Co-
operative Marketing Federation (NAFED), along with specialised commodity boards 
which are setups for crops such as rubber, tea, coffee, tobacco and spices. State 
trading through these various organisations is crop specific, where commodities are 
purchased from the producers directly or through traders, but purchases are limited 
by their procurement capacity. Cooperative marketing is often done through 
commodities with high-asset fixity such as milk and fruits like grapes and bananas. In 
these instances, members who belong to cooperatives sell their produce through them 
by way of specialised supply/value chains. 
A majority of agricultural commodity exchanges takes place through private trade in 
the Agriculture Produce Marketing Committee (APMC). The APMC is the primary 
market infrastructure in the country and can be found in all states (except Jammu and 
Kashmir, Kerala and Manipur) as a marketing platform for the sale of primary 
agricultural products32. Referred to as mandis, their main function is to regulate 
market practices such as weighing, methods of sale, methods of grading and methods 
of payment. To date, there are 7246 functioning mandis in India. The aim of 
                                         
31 Annual Report 2006-07 Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India.  
http://agricoop.nic.in/AnnualReport06-07/AGRICULTURAL%20MARKETING.pdf 
Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India  http://agricoop.nic.in/
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providing a platform  for marketing activities and reducing exploitation by traders 
and mercantile capital proved successful initially, yet over time, power moved back 
into the hands of middle-men and traders through malpractice, exploitation and rent 
seeking practices in the mandis (Chand, 2012).  Until the Inter-Ministerial Task Force 
on Agricultural Marketing Reforms (2002) recommended amending the APMC act in 
2003, APMC had the exclusive right to function as a market. With the amendment 
enacted in 2003, private agencies and cooperatives now have the opportunity to set 
up markets to conduct trade,  contract farming initiatives can be set up to purchase 
goods directly from farmers and processors, and bulk buyers can procure products 
directly from the farmers  bypassing the APMC (ibid). 
In figure 3.2, the different channels through which cotton, oil and rice are sold are 
highlighted to illustrate the highly fragmented nature of the APMC.  The main actors 
in the APMC are the commissioning agents or the arhatias whose primary function is 
to procure produce on behalf of the final users who are often the big mills, 
wholesalers or retailers. The two types of commissioning agents are the ‘katcha’ 
arhatia and ‘pucca’ arhatia. The katcha arhatia procures produce directly from the 
farmer or village merchants, or they employ traders to procure produce for them 
(Naik & Abraham, 2009). The produce brought by the katcha arhatia’s are often in 
the raw or unprocessed form such as raw cotton, oil seeds or paddy. The produce is 
then sold to the pucca arhatia, who processes the produce (into ginned cotton, oil, 
de-husked rice) before selling it to the final buyers who are most frequently mills or 
wholesalers. The pucca arhatia often works with katcha arhatia, and in many cases 
they also procure produce directly from farmers.  
Primary producers may not always find it convenient to sell their produce directly in 
the markets owing to geographical constraints of distance and poor infrastructure, and 
the risks of not finding a buyer in the market are significant. In such situations, they 
sell their produce to traders who work for a katcha arhatia who scout villages for 
farmers ready to sell their produce. Farmers also sell their produce to local village 
merchants who play the role of consolidating produce at the village level before 
selling to traders or the katcha arahtia.  Households headed by women are especially 
prone to being hindered by geographical constraints and constraints of low 
bargaining power in the markets. In such situations, selling to village merchants at 
lower prices is the only option. Village merchants and commissioning agents 
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frequently provide credit services to farmers on the condition that the produce will be 
sold to them at harvest at a predetermined price.  
In this way, an interlinking of the market takes place where agricultural produce is 
often procured below market price. According to Bell and Srinivasan (1989), "An 
interlinked transaction is one in which the parties trade in at least two markets (a 
combination of inputs, credit or land) on the condition that the terms of all trade 
between them are jointly determined" 33(pp. 73). The different forms of interlinking 
are land-labour linkages (Bharadwaj & Das, 1975), trader-credit linkages (Harriss-
White &  Bouman, 1994), and land-credit linkages (Bardhan, 1980; Bardhan & 
Rudra, 1978; Majid & Nadvi, 1987). Land-credit linkages are conditions where the 
landlord also extends credit to the tenant to cultivate the land and repayment is often 
in either cash or kind. Trader-credit linkages are where traders who buy produce or 
sell inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and pesticides extend credit to cultivators on the 
condition that they sell their produce at a fixed (often depressed) price to them on 
which the debt payment is adjusted. Various studies on institutions have focused on 
the interlinked relations and have evaluated these contracts to have the potential to 
reduce moral hazard, monitoring costs and uncertainties in the absence of adequate 
information, while providing essential credit services in the absence of formal 
institutional options (Bardhan, 1989; Braverman &  Stiglitz, 1982). However, the 
terms on which these contracts are stipulated are determined by the social power of 
the participants of the contract. Often the tenant or primary producer has low 
bargaining power (conditioned on gender, caste or class) making these relationships 
extractive. In credit-labour ties, landlords often extract free or underpaid labour 
services, in credit-trader ties, producers cannot avail higher prices as prices are fixed 
beforehand leading to exploitative relationships and forced commerce (Bhaduri, 
1986; Bharadwaj, 1985).  It is evident from the structure and functioning of Indian 
agricultural markets that the agrarian mercantile class has a strong influence on credit 
and commodity markets in India. According to some scholars, (Chattopadhyay, 1969; 
Prasad, 1974) the mercantile class used this strong influence and power in 
commodity exchanges and expropriated from small farmers on unfavourable terms.  
Due to the fragmented nature of the supply chain, the differences between the selling 
price in the market and the price the final consumer pays can be large. According to 
                                         
33 Parenthesis added  
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Chand (2012) an average of 4 to 6 transactions take place before the produce reaches 
the final consumer. The trading class are often organised on caste and sub-caste 
identities and have pre-conditioned consolidated power in the market. As a result of 
these conditions, there is an oligopsonistic relationship that is carried across the 
supply chain between different agents.  
Often sales are conducted through non-transparent means and the absence of grading 
and information on quality makes price realisation difficult for small farmers (Naik 
and Abraham, 2009).  Commissioning agents also arbitrarily increase market 
commission rates leading to an increase in transaction costs (Chand, 2012). Gulati 
(2009) provides examples of the Azadpur fruits and vegetable market in Delhi and 
Vashi market in Mumbai where agents’ fees range from 6 per cent to 10 per cent and 
8 per cent to 15 per cent of total sale value respectively.  The fragmented nature of 
the markets hinders the channels through which information flows in the markets, 
leading to information asymmetry between buyers and sellers. This poses the 
problem of signalling in agricultural markets. The problem of signalling occurs when 
buyers and sellers cannot make marketing or production decisions due to poor 
information flows within the market. Often fraudulent weighing and under-pricing of 
produce in the absence of grades is often used to increase margins. Thus, information 
about the quality of the product in a highly differentiated market where there are 
many transacted varieties of rice, cotton, tobacco needs grades and standards to 
determine quality and price of a produce.  
Agricultural markets in India are complex institutional arrangements with many 
forms of exchange relations and highly differentiated commodities being transacted 
in the markets. The prominent factors that determine these markets are: a) allocative 
conditions are not set on price terms alone as social factors such as caste, class and 
gender have an influence on them and b) the supply chain in downstream markets 
connecting producers to end consumers are highly fragmented with a large number of 
intermediaries leading to marketing malpractices (e.g. poor weighing practices, no 
grades and standards), poor price realisation and poor signalling. The challenge for 
collective action initiatives designed to increase benefits for small and marginal 
producers is, therefore, to help producers participate in market activities by 
neutralising the social factors that hinder them and to enable better price realisation 
by providing marketing services to bypass the fragmented marketing chain. For 
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example, through collective marketing of produce by small producers reliance on 
intermediaries can be reduced. Initiatives such as POFs, in this respect, should be 
able to help address these problems.  
The role of intermediaries, such as merchants and traders at the village level, are also 
highly relevant in the rural economy because of the high search and logistics cost to 
small producers. Often due to the inability of farmers to store their produce or take it 
back from the markets they have to ‘distress sell’ their produce. In female-headed 
households with limited quantity of produce, although the price offered at a farm gate 
is a non-competitive price, selling to intermediary may be a better option in the 
absence of other alternatives. POFs should also enable farm gate purchases at a 
competitive price to substitute the role of intermediaries. Effective collective action 
in relation to the institutional arrangement of markets should enable better price 
realisation for produce sold in the market and reduce marketing costs through 
measures such as supply chain coordination through buying contracts in order to 
increase price realised by producers. 
Increase in marketable surplus would also entail increase in production or yields in 
agriculture. In a simple production function; increase in production requires a 
corresponding increase in factors of production which include land, labour, capital 
and total factor productivity (TFP). TFPs are factors that account for the change in 
production not related to land, labour or capital, and in agricultural production these 
factors entail technology, extension services and management. As the potential to 
increase land and labour is often limited in small and marginal agricultural 
production, access to credit (a form of capital) and technology is crucial to increase 
agricultural production as it increases access to quality inputs. Institutional 
arrangements to disseminate research information and technology to small producers 
through extension-based activities are also needed in the agricultural sector along 
with institutions to provide credit on fair terms. The next two sections will evaluate 
the existing institutions in the delivery of credit and extension services important for 
agricultural growth and development.  
3.4.2 Credit Institutions and agriculture  
The slow turnover of capital and limited surpluses has restricted the scope of internal 
financing in small and marginal agricultural production. This has made access to 
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credit crucial in Indian agriculture. The three main sources of institutional credit in 
India have been the credit cooperatives, commercial banks and the Regional Rural 
Banks (RRBs). Credit cooperatives were set up primarily to finance rural lending, 
and in the years following independence in 1947, to finance farming and other small-
scale non-farm activities.  The role of credit cooperatives in rural lending has fallen 
since the entry of commercial banks. The share in total agricultural lending fell from 
69.5 per cent in 1975 to 15.88 per cent in 2011-1234. The main reason for this has 
been increasing defaults by borrowers, inability to raise resources through increased 
deposits and cooperatives’ increased dependence on external support from the 
government35. Commercial banks in India were not exclusively agricultural credit 
banks as they served urban areas as well. Commercial banks, however, were 
mandated by the ‘priority sector lending clause’ that states that 18 per cent of lending 
has to be to the agricultural sector36. The RRBs were setup in 1975 to prioritise 
lending to the rural areas and support agricultural production. The aim of the RRBs 
were to make credit available in rural areas where banking facilities were absent and 
national banks did not operate (MoF, 2007). They were different from commercial 
banks in the sense that they focused on small and marginal farmers, rural artisans and 
agricultural labourers (ibid).  
In the years following liberalisation in 1991, changes in the financial sector have led 
to an emphasis on prudential regulation and a diluted focus on social banking (ibid). 
Expansion activities of commercial banks in rural regions were inhibited, and 
branches were shut down. Between 1991 and 2006, seven per cent of banking centres 
were closed (Narayana, 2011). Presently there are over 14,000 RRBs working in 516 
districts in various states.  Although RRBs account for 30 per cent of all rural bank 
branches, their share of total agricultural credit dissemination has not risen over 10 
per cent (ibid). The failure of cooperative banks has been disadvantageous since the 
reach of cooperative banks has been wider than commercial banks with twice the 
number of rural outlets and four times the number of accounts (MoF, 2007).  
                                         
34 Source: Computed from Lok Sabha Unstarred Questions No. 5937 and 7117 on 11.05.2012 and 18.05.2012 found in 
www.indiastats.com  
35Report of the Task Force on Revival of Cooperative Credit Institutions, 2005, (Chairman: A. Vaidyanathan).  
36If banks did not meet the 18 per cent target they were given the option of investing the remainder in the Rural Infrastructure 
Development Fund (RIDF). Many commercial banks have opted for this option in the recent past (Ministry of Finance, 2007).  
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Since 2002, microfinance institutions have been attempting to increase the reach of 
institutional credit among the poor. Microfinance fundamentally entails the provision 
of small amounts of credit for a short period of time to individuals who would 
otherwise avail the services of informal sources of credit (Ghosh, 2013).  In rural 
India, Self-Help Groups (SHGs) were established to disseminate credit with the help 
of banks. SHGs are small groups of 10-12 individuals who collectively borrow a 
specific sum of money without collateral. Individual members vouch for each other 
and peer monitoring is used to prevent ex-ante moral hazard problems and adverse 
selection problems and ex-post wilful defaulting on credit repayment (Ghosh, 2013).   
According to the Microfinance Information Exchange37 (2012), 75 per cent of micro-
credit borrowers were based in Asia (32 and 22 million in Bangladesh and India 
respectively). Despite this volume, micro-credit programmes were too small to bring 
about significant changes in the agricultural sector. The cumulative credit disbursed 
by micro-credit programmes between 1992 and 2006 was only 6% of the total 
agricultural credit disbursed in 2005-06 alone (Ramakumar, 2010). Besides the 
problem of borrowed principle being too low to create farm-level capital or to buy 
sufficient inputs, micro-credit programmes have also been criticised for their coercive 
tactics to ensure repayment and their exclusion of some groups of women and 
scheduled castes (Ghosh, 2013). 
Liberalisation of the economy in India which resulted in an opening up of the markets 
has also led to the diversification in agricultural production towards high-value 
commercial crops such as cotton and horticultural crops (G. S. Bhalla & Singh, 
2012). Although these commercial crops bring higher yields and better prices, they 
have also increased the cost of production (ibid). This, coupled with producers risks 
related to market price volatility and climatic risks related to rain-fed agriculture, has 
led to the reluctance of institutional sources to lend to farmers, especially small and 
marginal farmers leading to an increase in lending from non-institutional sources 
(moneylenders, traders, intermediaries). Higher rates of interest and the lack of 
insurance in the form of crop or weather insurances have also led to the increased 
indebtedness of farmers. The rising cost of production in addition to the 
diversification of agricultural production and fall in institutional lending have led to 
                                         
37http://www.themix.org/publications/mix-microfinance-world/2013/02/2012-asia-regional-snapshot
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the re-emergence of money lenders in rural India as a dominant source of credit 
(Satyasai, 2008). 
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According to the Situation of Agricultural Households Survey (2014) carried out by 
the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO), 52 per cent of all agricultural 
households in India are in debt. The level of indebtedness is much high in the South 
Indian states compared to other regions of the country. Figure 3.3 shows over 93 per 
cent of agricultural households are indebted in Andhra Pradesh and the levels are 
much above the national average in the states of Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. 
The NSSO survey also revealed the relationship between the size of landholdings and 
access to formal credit. Table 3.3 show the indebtedness in the agricultural sector in 
relation to the landholding size of agricultural households.  
Figure 3.3 Percentage of agricultural households in debt in selected states in 
India  
Source: Situation of Agricultural Households Survey, NSSO, 2014 
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The borrowings of households possessing less than 2 hectares of land (marginal 
landholders) are higher from informal sources and the percentage of borrowing from 
formal sources (especially banks) goes up with increase in land size. Furthermore,  
S.M. Kumar’s (2013) study on formal agricultural credit and caste shows how social 
status impacts access to credit in that lower castes have often been disfavoured in the 
dissemination of agricultural credit, especially from cooperative banks. Due to this 
marginal farmers of lower castes are further disadvantaged in accessing rural credit. 
Table 3.3 Percentage of indebtedness of different landholding sizes in relation to 
different sources 
 Formal Sources Informal Sources 
Size of 
Landholding 
Govern
ment 
Cooperative 
Society 
Bank Employer
/landlord 
Agricultural/ 
professional 
money lender 
Shopkeeper
/trader 
Relatives 
or family 
Others 
<0.01 0.4 1.6 12.9 0.6 63.7 1.4 17.5 1.8 
0.01-0.40 1.3 14.6 31.0 0.8 32.4 2.5 14.2 3.1 
0.41-1.00 1.7 13.9 37.6 0.8 27.4 6.6 10.6 1.4 
1.01-2.00 2.6 14.7 47.5 0.7 23.3 1.5 7.6 2.0 
2.01-4.00 1.9 15.6 50.0 1.4 23.8 1.2 5.8 0.3 
4.01-
10.00 
3.8 17.5 50.2 0.4 18.7 1.4 6.5 1.5 
10.00 + 1.1 14.3 63.5 0 16.1 0.5 3.8 0.6 
All Sizes 2.1 14.8 42.9 0.8 25.8 2.9 9.1 1.6 
Source: Situation of Agricultural Households Survey, NSSO, 2014 
Among the reasons for low credit dissemination to small and marginal producers 
from institutional sources are the associated high transaction costs. Despite an 
advance in information and communication technologies and an improvement in 
decentralised governance, bureaucratic complexities such as paper work, mortgage 
procedures, inspection of land and bribes characterise these transaction costs (MoF, 
2007). Government and parastatals (e.g. cooperative and rural banks) often do not 
have enough local knowledge about borrowers, and this makes collateral an 
important criterion for borrowings (Bardhan, 1996). This disqualifies marginal 
farmers, tenant farmers and households without proper title deeds to the land from 
accessing credit. These institutions also do not have access to systems of peer-
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monitoring and social sanctions which may provide security for borrowings (ibid). 
Poor access to institutional credit and the need for credit in farming activities thus 
make non-institutional sources of credit an important but unviable source of credit for 
small households, affecting surplus creation and growth in the agricultural sector. 
These informal institutional arrangements have more local knowledge of borrowers 
and also possess socially constructed agency based on caste status and class to 
recover borrowed credit.   
According to the Ministry of Finance’s Report of the Expert Group on Agricultural 
Indebtedness, 2007, a substantial portion of household debt was for agricultural 
production purposes, with regional variations. In states such as Assam and Kerala, 40 
and 44 per cent of agricultural credit was used for production purposes respectively, 
while in Karnataka and Maharashtra 78 and 75 per cent of the credit was used for 
production purposes. The report also points out that indebtedness was relatively low 
in less-developed states in India, while being high in agriculturally developed states. 
Between 1995 and 2012, there were 282,400 reported cases of suicide by farmers due 
to agrarian distress, and 39.2 per cent of these cases were from Andhra Pradesh, 
Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka38. The report clarifies, however, that indebtedness 
was an important factor associated with suicides but not the only factor. Other factors 
emphasized in the report include uncertainties related to the weather, markets, 
technology, and spurious inputs in the absence of risk-mitigating strategies that put 
farmers under duress (pp. 88).    
This section has highlighted the importance and challenges of agricultural credit 
institutions in the agricultural sector. Due to high risks and production characteristics 
of small producers, the reach of formal institutional credit has been limited. This has 
made informal credit institutions such as traders, moneylenders and landlords an 
important source of credit despite adverse terms and conditions on which they make 
credit available. Although SHGs and other micro-credit organisations use peer-
monitoring and social sanctions to secure borrowings, their impact have been low due 
to their low principle size and inability to provide interlinked services such as land 
and inputs. If POFs are to be effective agents of credit delivery, they should be able 
to: (a) make credit accessible to small and marginal producers who often do not have 
                                         
38 Source: National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs. Government of India. Compiled from the “Accidental Deaths 
and Suicides in India” report of various years  
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sufficient collateral or (b) make sufficient credit available to meet basic production 
requirements such as inputs (if not long term credit) with minimal collateral.  
Apart from high rates of interest charged through informal credit sources and low 
price realisation for produce sold in the markets, another reason for growing 
indebtedness includes crop failure. This can result from weather-related uncertainties, 
lack of knowledge about new technologies and associated growing practices, 
spurious inputs and lack of general information about changes in environmental 
conditions such as soil fertility. Furthermore, addressing issues related to crop 
failure-induced indebtedness requires institutional arrangements for not only research 
and developing technology, but also for disseminating knowledge about new 
technologies and associated growing practices which would reduce this problem for 
small and marginal farmers. The next section evaluates the research and extension 
service infrastructure in India, and the systems of dissemination to understand their 
shortcomings and the need to redress them.  
3.4.3 Agricultural research and extension  
Research and development and technological extension to farms are of utmost 
importance in order to spur growth in the agricultural sector. The Indian green 
revolution undoubtedly is one of the best examples of how agricultural science and 
technology contributes to growth and productivity. India developed from being a 
food grain importing country in the 1950s to establishing a substantial surplus of food 
grain in the late 1960s, and since the1970s India has become a food grain exporting 
country. However, despite increased crop productivity, 48 per cent of Indian children 
under the age of 5 are malnourished (UNICEF, 2008), almost half the arable land has 
been classified with deteriorating soil conditions and thousands of farmers have been 
driven to suicide from the mid-1990s due to crop failures (Raina, 2011). To explain 
this contrast there is a need to look at the nature, content and direction the agricultural 
research system has been taking. As an example, The Eleventh Five-Year-Plan report 
(2008) of the Planning commission states: 
…research has tended to focus mostly on increasing the yield potential by more intensive use of water 
and bio-chemical inputs. Far too little attention has been given to the long term environmental impact or 
on the methods and practices for the efficient use of these inputs for sustainable agriculture. These 
features are widely known but efforts to correct them have not been adequate; at any rate they have not 
made much of a difference (GOI 2008, pp. 13).  
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Agricultural research in India is in the public domain and the three major constituents 
of agricultural research include agricultural policy, agricultural research and 
extension of research and technology. Figure 3.4 depicts the major components and 
characteristics that make up the agricultural research and extension framework in 
India. Agricultural policy is framed by the state through the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA) and is conditioned by international trade and environmental agreements. The 
policy environment directs the research of the Indian Council of Agricultural 
Research (ICAR), the State Agricultural Universities (SAUs) and private sector 
research. Extension activities are undertaken by the Department of Agriculture, the 
Directorate of Extension Education and various civil society organisations (Raina, 
2003).  
Figure 3.4 Constituents of agriculture research and extension in India
According to Raina (2011), research and extension services in India was “designed to 
work with elites in a top down fashion and geared to the centrally administered 
modernisation of the middle and large farmers” (pp. 109). The strong extension bias 
against small and marginal farmers has led to a focus on the technological 
dissemination and knowledge of progressive farmers, and only certain kinds of crops 
and certain regions (where irrigation facilities were available). The main reasons for 
this extension bias was a misplaced confidence in modern technology and the opinion 
that ignorance attributed to small and marginal producers tied them to their traditional 
methods of farming, and their mind-sets were perceived as being difficult to change 
(Goldsmith, 1990). Input intensive agriculture over the years have resulted in 
widespread water stress resulting from ground water depletion, soil and water 
contamination due to increased nitrate levels, reduction in soil fertility due to intense 
farming, soil erosion due to poor land management and increased water salinity due 
to over-irrigation in semi-arid regions (MoF, 2007). Therefore, although food 
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security through surpluses has been met, the stark contrast in lagging development 
with small and marginal farmers has been high.  
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The traditional research and extension services in India reflect the policy approach to 
food security along with the extension bias that was built into the approach. The 
ICAR at the central level and the SAUs at the state level were set up to plan, 
coordinate and execute agricultural research (Pal & Saxena, 2003). ICAR and SAUs 
used the expertise of the Krishi Vigyan Kendras (KVK) or the agricultural knowledge 
centres to disseminate the knowledge and technology they had generated. In the mid 
1990’s, the Government of India, in collaboration with the World Bank, instituted 
National Agricultural Technology projects in various parts of the country to 
decentralise and diversify agricultural research. These projects eventually became the 
Agricultural Technology Management Agency (ATMA).  Some initiatives have been 
taken by the private sector; however, they have been small, commercial crop-oriented 
and region specific. ITC’s e-choupal initiative is the most well-known, while others 
have been undertaken by large corporations such as Mahindra, Rallis and Tata. 
Figure 3.5 depicts the different sources of information and research extension in the 
agricultural sector in India. 
Figure 3.5 Sources of information and extension in Indian agriculture  
 
Traditional sources of information among farmers have often been other farmers, 
traders, merchants and input sellers. They are, however, unreliable sources of 
information which sometimes have adverse consequences. Often in order to sell their 
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produce, input sellers suggest seed varieties or inputs which are unconducive to the 
growing environment of the farmer, accentuating the risk of crop failure or 
suboptimal yields. Furthermore, farmers who source this kind of information may 
subsequently pass this information on to other farmers. Since the early 1990s, NGOs 
have emerged to play an important role in providing extension services on behalf of 
the government. They have been instrumental in the formation of Self Help Groups 
for implementing programmes like watershed management schemes. However, as 
their sources of information are the traditional research establishments, their role has 
been limited in this respect.  
The two marked changes in research and extension and related activities from 
liberalisation in 1991 were the reduction in agricultural R&D funding and the 
amendment of the seed act. The reduction of public expenditure on R&D to 0.49 per 
cent of GDP (most developing country expenditure averages to 0.7) has put a strain 
on already slacking extension activities. The National Seed Corporation (estd. 1963) 
and a network of State Seed Corporations have had the prime responsibility of 
distributing seeds in India until the New Policy on Seed Development was conceived 
in 1988 to make the seed sector in the Indian market responsive, and in 1991 a 
hundred per cent foreign equity was allowed in seed production and distribution. 
According to the Ministry of Finance’s Report of the Expert Group on Agricultural 
Indebtedness, 2007, this had two major consequences in the agricultural sector:first, 
in the absence of proper regulation, the supply of genuine seeds began to decline and 
spurious seeds began to flourish in the market; second, the price of seeds shot up, 
especially with the entry of GMO seeds and seeds borne out of private sector 
innovation. The added danger of these seeds were, when they were grown without 
adequate knowledge of input management and land preparation, their propensity to 
fail or yield sub-optimal harvests increased.  
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The major challenge of agricultural R&D in India arises out of the lack of effective 
research-extension linkages, scale and complexity of the agricultural sector and the 
lack of operational resources to carry out extension activities. Research and extension 
need to be effectively linked to enable the provision of research information and 
technology from lab to farm and feedback from farm to lab. This feedback from 
farms is essential to develop knowledge and understanding of region and crop 
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specific factors that influence agriculture. However, the top down nature of 
knowledge and information flow prevents good feedback flow to enable situation 
specific research (Macklin, 1992).The scale and complexity of the agronomic 
diversity in India requires the formation of region specific knowledge. In India the 
existing extension service caters to 90 million farms  (Sulaiman, 2003) and the public 
sector extension services are simply insufficient to cater to this number. There are 
over 100,000 extension workers in India and depending on the region the worker to 
cultivator ratio varies. In Kerala, the ratio is 1:300 while in Rajasthan, it is 1:2000 
(ibid). In 2011-12, 26 farmer field schools set up to disseminate information in the 
state of Karnataka trained only 780 farmers. Similarly in the Tamil Nadu 24 farmer 
field schools set up trained 720 farmers39. It is often due to the lack of information 
access through extension services that farmers rely on other sources like traders for 
information. In a survey of 247,613 agricultural households in India, the NSSO found 
that information and extension services sourced from state bodies (or formal sources) 
were low (expect veterinary services for animal husbandry) and the main providers 
were private sources such as commercial agents and traders, progressive farmers and 
mass media (Table 3.4).   
Table 3.4 Access to information and extension services from different sources  
Source of information and extension services Percentage of access  
Extension agent 11% 
KVK 6% 
Agricultural University/college  2% 
Private commercial agents (traders etc.) 19% 
Progressive farmers 57% 
Radio/T.V./newspaper/internet 37% 
Veterinary department 21% 
NGO 3% 
Source: Situation of Agricultural Households Survey, NSSO, 2014 
Due to the scale and complexity of the agricultural sector in India, the lack of a 
sufficient operational budget has hindered extension activities. The reduction in 
                                         
39 Source : Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 4314, dated 7.5.2007, & Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2789, dated 11.12.2012 
found on www.indiastats.com  
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public expenditure has further accentuated this problem. The operational budget for 
extension activities is low in India and 85-90% of the Department of Agriculture’s 
budget goes on salaries, with only about 15% available for organisational support 
(Raina, 2003). This restricts the potential of these bodies to disseminate information. 
Another important challenge in agricultural extension in India is simply the way 
extension activities are perceived in India. van den Ban and Hawkins (1998) point out 
that in India extension is viewed just as the provision for information when 
demanded by the producer and technological change when research bodies deem it 
necessary. Extension, therefore, does not extend to aiding farmers in input, resource 
and land management, and in developing skills necessary for these activities or the 
provision for any organisational support.  
Research and extension services in the Indian agricultural sector have been closely 
linked with the political and economic need to attain self-sufficiency in food 
production and achieve food security in the country. This policy influenced 
agricultural research in a direction that relied on high yielding input intensive variety 
of crops which over time has had environmental externalities. As research and 
extension was biased towards large producers or producers with access to resources 
such as irrigation, the benefits were not evenly spread (Raina, 2011). They were also 
highly centralised, top-down processes that have not adequately considered regional 
variations in geographical and climatic conditions. In the post-liberalisation period, 
reduction in public expenditure in agriculture and the rising cost of technology has 
led to the emergence of spurious inputs in the markets. Extension services is India 
have limited reach due to poor research and extension linkages, the scale and 
complexity of agriculture, low resources available for extension and how extension 
and its role in agricultural development in India is viewed. Thus, an important good 
that POFs need access to is research and extension services. This will help to 
crucially improve production practices, increase access of small and marginal 
producers to new technologies and knowledge, and also help reduce externalities 
such as environmental degradation. Access to research and technology comes at a 
high initial cost owing to search and information cost. However, once it is accessed, 
it can be disseminated to others at no (or little) additional costs. In this scenario, 
POFs formed through collective action can reduce per capita cost of accessing 
information and technology. This also requires linkage with research institutions and 
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research and extension disseminating bodies, which may be possible through these 
POFs.  
This section assessed the structure and characteristics of markets, credit institutions 
and institutions for research and dissemination in the agricultural sector. Just as 
institutional arrangements determine the purpose, institutional arrangements also 
determine the functions and aims of Producer Organisational Formats and the 
challenges they aim to address. The various POFs explored in the latter parts of this 
thesis aim to address concerns and challenges mentioned in this chapter such as 
access to credit, markets and research and extension. This assessment also showed 
the challenges faced by small and marginal producers in accessing these institutions 
due to poor external economies of scale and social influences of caste and gender. 
Not all POFs provide all of these goods and services; rather, they provide them in 
different combinations. This greatly influences how these producer organisations are 
organised and the economic changes they bring to small and marginal producer 
members.  Producer organisational formats are also institutional arrangements 
involving a subset of producers governed by a certain set of rules and regulations 
situated in the social context and institutional environment described in this chapter. 
They are also influenced by other institutional arrangements and they are 
fundamentally designed to address concerns and challenges faced by their small and 
marginal farmer members situated in this institutional scenario. 
3.5 Conclusion  
In summary, this chapter has assessed the institutional context in which agricultural 
production takes place in India in order to understand the challenges small and 
marginal producers face. The institutional context of agricultural production is 
characterised by its institutional embeddedness, the institutional environment it is 
situated in and the various institutional arrangements that influence and determine 
production conditions. Understanding this is important because Producer 
Organisational Formats are formed and coordinated as collective actions to address 
some of the challenges characterised within this institutional context. Therefore, any 
attempt to explore how producer organisations are structured on organisational, social 
and economic terms needs to be done with reference to this institutional context.  
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Using the framework developed in chapter two, this chapter highlights the 
characteristics of institutional embeddedness, institutional environment and 
institutional arrangement in the agricultural sector in India (3.6). The social context 
characterised by caste, class and gender in which agricultural production is embedded 
plays an important role in determining an individual’s level of access to factors of 
production, markets and information.  
Figure 3.6 Institutional factors influencing agricultural development  
This institutional embeddedness influences the institutional environment 
characterised by property rights regimes and access to land, which is the most 
important factor in agricultural production. It establishes the conditions in which a
majority of agricultural producers in India are small and marginal due to the issue of 
fragmentation of landholding below a threshold size of viability. An important 
purpose of POFs, therefore, is to address the disadvantages in the institutional 
environment of Indian agriculture that small and marginal agricultural producers 
face.  The resource structure and social characteristics of small and marginal 
producers also affects their access to institutional arrangements of markets, credit 
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institutions and institutions that undertake research and dissemination activities. 
Thus, small producer viability crucially hinges on the ability of farmers to effectively 
access resources and services from these institutional arrangements, and this forms 
the key aim and function of producer organisational formats. 
The next two chapters comprise of four case studies of Producer Organisational 
Formats from the states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. These chapters will look at 
how these different producer organisations emerge and are structured to address the 
various production and access challenges discussed in this chapter. Chapter 4 
compares two Joint Liability Group-based producer organisations in the state of 
Karnataka. The chapter identifies the major institutional challenges members of each 
of these organisations faced and how they were structured on organisational, social 
and economic terms in an attempt address some of these concerns. 
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4.1 Introduction  
Producer organisation formats were formed primarily to deal with the production 
challenges faced by small and marginal producers. The major challenges they face 
were in accessing essential goods and services necessary for production. Producer 
Companies (PC), Joint Liability Groups (JLG) and Farmers’ Federations (FF), were 
the three producer organisational formats identified for the study, and the four case 
studies in this thesis show how they were structures in organisational, social and 
economic terms.  In this chapter, Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development 
Project (SKDRDP) and Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society (SFWS) of Karnataka were 
cases of two Joint Liability Group initiatives explored to understand how they were 
structured, and how they access credit, inputs and extension services. It also assesses 
how these organisations were similar and differ from each other, and how this 
influenced their functioning. Using the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 
2, this chapter will explore the organisational, social and economic features, the 
incentive structures and how resources were distributed in the two cases in order to 
understand the nature of challenges each group faced in organising as collective 
actions and how these challenges were addressed. 
The two cases compared in this chapter are Joint Liability Groups whose primary 
function is to provide credit to their members. Although there are more than 300,000 
Joint Liability Groups in India today, a majority of them have not been able to bring 
benefits to their members to same extent as these cases explored in this chapter. I 
argue that these two cases are unique because they successfully coordinated 
collective action and provided goods and services such as inputs, extension services, 
labour sharing services and mechanisation services to its members, while most other 
Joint Liability Groups only provided credit. From these cases it is also clear that the 
external support from the state and organisational support from an NGO, along with 
previous experience of coordinating collective activities and the use of federated 
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small groups were crucial for enabling collective action and preventing social 
dilemmas.  In these two case studies we also see social capital arising from religious 
ideology and cultural similarities as a crucial factor in the coordination of collective 
action characterising the social features of the two cases. In economic terms, these 
cases revealed that although there were changes in profit resulting from collective 
action, households with marginal landholdings did not make sufficient profits to 
depend solely on agriculture. The case of Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society is unique 
as it shows how sharecroppers without property rights were able to address some 
production issues such as credit and input access as well as negotiate fair 
sharecropping contracts.  
This chapter is divided into four parts: the first section assesses the nature and 
characteristics of Joint Liability Groups in India; the second and the third sections 
comprise the two case studies of Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development 
Project and Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society respectively, where their organisational, 
social and economic features and the resource allocation and incentive alignment 
features are studied. The concluding section of this chapter compares the two cases 
for their similarities and differences as JLG organisations coordinating collective 
action.  
4.2 Joint Liability Groups  
The Joint Liability Group scheme was started by National Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural Development (NABARD), under the directions of the Reserve Bank of India’s 
(RBI) in 2004-05 to increase ‘financial inclusion’ and aid tenant farmers, tenants with 
verbal contracts, sharecroppers and small and marginal farmers’ access to collateral-
free loans40. According to the NABARDs guidelines, informal groups of 4 to 10 
individuals/households form borrowing groups through which credit is disseminated 
for farming activities. As of March 2012, there were 332,707 Joint Liability Groups 
formed in India with the highest density of groups in the South and Eastern parts of 
India41 (Figure 4.1).  
  
                                         
40 Source: Guidelines for financing Joint Liability Groups and Tenant Farmers, Reserve Bank of India, 2006 
41 The estimated number of JLGs in South and East India are 148,119 and 123,132 respectively.
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Figure 4.1: Number of joint liability groups in India (as of 31.3.2012)  
Source: Rupnawar and Kharat (2014) 
Ghatak  and Guinnane (1999) argue that joint liability has the potential to solve 
information asymmetries, lower transaction costs, prevent adverse selections (sorting 
and screening) and reduce moral hazard problems associated with accessing and 
recovering credit. When lending is done through groups, there is more information 
available about borrowers as members in groups screen each other for reliability, and 
they also monitor each other (peer monitoring) increasing repayment and reducing 
moral hazards (actions on the knowledge that its cost or consequence will be paid by 
someone else) (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999). Due to these advantages, Joint Liability 
Groups (JLGs) are now an integral part of the first Financial Inclusion Plan (FIP) 
(2010-2013) of the Reserve Bank of India and measures are being taken to increase 
the number of Joint Liability Groups in the current FIP (2013-16) (GOI, 2014). 
Joint Liability Groups in themselves are not producer organisations and in most cases 
the only collective activity they undertake is to share liabilities for borrowed credit. 
They often do not have the resources, technical expertise or the organisational skills 
to form producer organisations. Joint Liability Groups are considered semi-formal 
groups because only the financial institution that provides them with loans recognises 
them. In order to access additional goods and services such as extension services and 
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subsidies, different groups of joint liability groups under the guidance of NGOs s 
register themselves as a society or a federation to expand their activities. NGOs 
coordinate linkages with the state and financial institutions (e.g. NABARD and the 
local banks) to enable access to inputs, extension services and also undertake joint 
initiatives such as labour sharing, along with credit. They also provide managerial 
expertise to organise producers into groups and help govern their various activities. 
This chapter explores the cases of two such Producer Organizational Formats in the 
state of Karnataka (Table 4.1) 
Table 4.1 Joint Liability Groups  
Name Location  State  
Sridevi Farmers Welfare 
Society (SFWS) 
 
Koppal District Karnataka  
Shri Kshethra 
Dharmastala Rural 
Development Project 
(SKDRDP ) 
Dakshina Kannada and 
Chikmagalur Districts Karnataka  
4.3 Case I: Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural 
Development Project (SKDRDP) – Pragithi Bandhu 
Model 
The Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project is an NGO based in the 
Dakshina Kannada district of Karnataka. The NGO was set up in 1982 as a charitable 
wing of the Dharmasthala temple, an 800-year old establishment, to undertake charity 
and social work in the region. Over the years the NGO has implemented life 
insurance and pension schemes, women empowerment schemes, microfinance 
schemes, set up de addiction centres among other schemes and community 
development measures. Their collective action program was called ‘Pragithi Bandhu’ 
(meaning “friend of progress”) and it was a joint liability based rural development 
program that was formed to help small and marginal farmers with challenges of 
accessing formal credit. This large initiative operated in nine districts of south and 
south-western Karnataka and had more than 163,000 members in over 25,000 Joint 
Liability Groups. Many of the members of the project were devotees of this temple. 
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The initiative provided credit, information and extension services (i.e. information 
about good agricultural practices and technology adoption) to its members and 
coordinated a unique labour sharing scheme. Under this scheme, members of the 
groups were mandated to work on each other’s land for one day each month. In a 
group of five members, each member gets five labour days a month from the group. 
The Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project had active 
collaborations with the state agricultural departments and it helped carry out training 
and extension dissemination activities for rural development.  
Table 4.2: Features of the organisation 
Strength of the initiative 163,000 members  
Group structure  Federated groups of 5 members  
Collective goods obtained  Labour, information, extension services, 
credit 
Data for this study was collected from Dakshina Kannada and Chikmanglur districts 
of Karnataka. Dakshina Kannada district was chosen because the headquarters of Shri 
Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project was located there, and it was the 
first region where this program was implemented. Chikmanglur district, in contrast, 
was the newest region where the program was started and has been active for just 
over four years. For this study, 42 primary producers were surveyed in both districts 
and production data was also collected to determine the changes of collective action 
brought to producers.  
4.3.1 History and context of the group 
Dharmasthala is a famous temple town and pilgrimage centre for Jains and Hindus 
located in Dakshina Kannada district of Karnataka. For centuries the temple had 
played an important social and administrative role in the lives of the people in the 
region and in neighbouring districts. The overseer of the temple was given the title of 
‘Heggade’42 and had been the traditional lawgiver and dispute-settler for devotees of 
the temple. His other duties were to manage the temple and its activities, which 
involved charitable activities. The Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development 
                                         
42 The Heggade is a hereditary title and the person bestowed with the title has a near deity-like relevance to believers. D. Veerendra 
Heggade is the present ‘Dharma Adhikari’  or the overseer of the temple since 1968 
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Project was established to carry out these charitable duties or ‘Abaya dhana’ of the 
temple. 
Karnataka was one of the few states in India where the third round of land reforms43 
was implemented in the 1980s with some success. According to Deshpande and 
Torgal (2003), in the pre-reform period, the Dakshin Kannada region had one of the 
highest tenanted landholding sizes, with 54.4 per cent of holdings and 43.6 per cent 
of cultivable land under tenure. Land reform in this region saw 77.72 per cent of all 
applicants for land ownership rights getting the land they laid claim to (ibid). The 
average size of the land that tenants received was quite small (approximately one 
acre)  and many new farmers were not able to cultivate their land because of poor 
access to resources such as credit, extension services and quality inputs. Due to this, 
some of them left their land fallow while continuing to work as manual labourers.  
The Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project began its Pragithi 
Bandhu (PB) groups in the early 1990s to motivate and support farmers in cultivating 
their own land. In 1991, Self-Help Groups (SHGs) with 5-8 members each, focusing 
on small group savings and labour sharing arrangements, were formed. The labour 
sharing scheme of the initiative was an integral part of the Pragithi Bandhu initiative. 
Although this redressed concerns of labour availability at no cost, small group 
savings was not sufficient to provide the necessary capital for agricultural production. 
Furthermore, savings through labour sharing did not free up enough capital for other 
farm investments. Because of these limitations, the Joint Liability model was initiated 
in 2001 to provide the members of the Pragithi Bandhu groups with credit required 
for farming activities. These groups were one of the first joint liability models 
initiated in India, emerging earlier than the NABARD initiated models.  
4.3.2 Organisational features 
The Pragithi Bandhu model was hierarchically organised and the basic units were the 
farmers’ groups, which comprised of 5 to 8 members. A typical group consisted of 
member households who were in geographical proximity to each other. The group 
sizes were kept small to complement labour sharing arrangements where small 
                                         
43 The third round (1970s and 1980s), known as the radical stage, aimed at giving the land to its actualcultivators. Although the first 
two rounds (abolition of intermediaries and providing security for tenure) were implemented to some extent in India, the third round 
was implemented only in a few states. Kerala and West Bengal were the states where this was more successful.
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groups were necessary for effective labour rotation and monitoring. Every 25 to 30 
PB groups came under a village level federation made up of a representative from 
each group. Each village-level federation had an independent inspector or 
‘sevaniritha’ whose responsibility was to inspect groups and their functioning. The 
village level federation reported directly to the regional office of Shri Kshethra 
Dharmasthala Rural Development Project (Figure 4.2).  
Figure 4.2: Structure of organisation 
A certain criterion was followed when primary groups were formed or when villages 
were adopted into the scheme. In the region or village where new groups were being 
formed, the elders of the village, political leaders and influential people of the region 
were involved and taken into confidence. Although these individuals or groups may 
not participate in the initiative, according to Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural 
Development Project officials, this was important to gain local level support for the 
activities of the initiatives. The reputation, religious and administrative significance 
of the temple in the region also worked to validate this initiative at the local level. 
Village level politics and caste- and class-based hindrance were therefore minimal in 
this initiative.  
The organisation structure was a top-down one, where the NGO coordinates 
collective action and other activities through the groups. Performance of the groups 
were constantly evaluated and graded by inspectors and the village level committee. 
SHRI KSHETHRA 
Village level federation  Village level federation  
Groups Groups Groups Groups Groups Groups Groups Groups 
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Group grades were based on the regularity on which group activities, such as labour 
sharing, repayment of loans, savings and meetings, were undertaken. The grades then 
determined the group’s eligibility to access credit and other inputs and services from 
Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project. The A grade was given to 
groups that were functioning well, B grade for groups with minor defects, C grade for 
groups with some problems such as credit recovery  and D grade for groups marked 
for closure. Groups were disbanded if there was an outstanding loan for repayment, if 
people migrated or if there were incidences of death among members. An auditor 
conducted a study of the groups’ accounts and presented a balance sheet with the 
assets and liabilities of the groups. In 2008-09, out of the 13,110 groups that were 
graded, 303 groups (2.1%) were marked as D and 539 groups received (4.1%)  C 
grades44. The presence of selection protocols and evaluation criteria goes to show that 
the producer organisation had a code of conduct characterised by rules and 
regulations that were strictly implemented in the groups. These rules and regulations 
formed the rational controls of the groups, preventing the emergence of social 
dilemmas, such as shirking (not participating in labour sharing) and wilful default on 
credit repayments.   
The external support for the Pragithi Bandhu groups came from Shri Kshethra 
Dharmasthala Rural Development Project, the NGO supporting this program. The 
NGO played an important role in helping the initiative form linkages with the state 
made available collective goods such as credit and extension services, thus playing a 
coordinating role.  The NGO had an administrative role by which it obtains 
commitments from members and supported the formation of groups, and, therefore, it 
also takes on the role of enabling cooperation.  Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural 
Development Project had been involved in many grassroots level initiatives, and over 
the years they gathered the technical and management expertise needed to coordinate 
such activities. This previous experience was crucial in enabling them to coordinate 
this large initiative.  The organisation also has no size-effect as the benefit to 
individual members did not reduce with an increase in its size. The financial 
resources of the NGO, its linkages with the state, previous experiences and 
management resources allowed the group to expand, making it a large initiative. 
Therefore the main features that characterise the organisation of Pragithi Bandhu 
                                         
SDRDP 2008-09 Annual Report. 
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groups were a) the external support from the NGO, b) small federated groups that 
enabled monitoring and c) previous experience of collective action. The management 
expertise and the resources of Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development 
Project helped the initiative expand, thus has no group size effect.   
4.3.3 Social features 
Networks, norms, trust and values which facilitate collective action and predispose 
individuals to cooperate is what is referred to as social capital. Social capital that 
facilitates collective action is referred to as structural social capital, while social 
capital predisposing individuals to cooperate is referred to as cognitive social capital. 
Social capital played an important role in the formation, maintenance and functioning 
of primary Pragithi Bandhu groups.  A certain criterion was followed when primary 
groups were formed, or when villages were adopted into the scheme. Resource 
homogeneity and geographical proximity of different member households were 
considered crucial in the formation of new groups. Therefore, different members in a 
group often had similar landholding sizes or resources and farm land in the same 
location. Familiarity and geographical proximity of households brought with it a level 
of social capital that increased cohesion within the groups. Pre-existing networks and 
trust of the neighbourhood, therefore, crucially contributed to the social capital of the 
group. According to Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project 
officials, groups were self-selected and members chose which group they wish to 
belong. This also helps in the creation and maintenance of social capital within 
groups. Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project’s group based 
activities in the region had also helped in building social capital for over two decades. 
Norms for good conduct, trust and values from previous experiences gained from 
participating in collective action helped in the promotion of collective activities of the 
Pragithi Bandhu groups. Social capital in these groups was also maintained and 
promoted through purposive measures, such as mandatory group meetings, savings 
groups and the sharing of labour. 
Members in Pragithi Bandhu groups that were surveyed belonged to different castes 
groups. The major caste groups were the Gowdas and the Lingayats, Poojaris, 
Bhandaris, Naikas and the Upparas belonging to the Other Backward Castes and 
Kurubas and the Lambanis belonging to the scheduled tribe and Scheduled Caste 
category (table 4.3). The survey indicated that 67 per cent belonged to Other 
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Backward Castes and 33 per cent belonged to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. 
In the survey, groups that had members belonging to different caste groups were 
considered heterogeneous groups, while groups with similar caste members were 
considered homogeneous groups. Fifty two percent of the survey participants 
reported that they belonged to socially heterogeneous groups (table 4.4). 
Table 4.3: Caste composition of participants (n=42) 
Caste level Number of respondents Percentage 
Other Backward Castes 28 67 
Scheduled Tribes 14 33 
Table 4.4: Social Characteristics of the groups in the survey (n=42) 
Characteristics Number of respondents Percentage 
Homogeneous 20 48 
Heterogeneous  22 52 
High social capital also contributed to low attrition rates within the organisation.  45 
per cent of the households in the survey have been in the Pragithi Bandhu groups for 
over 10 years, and 33 per cent of the surveyed households have been in the groups for 
less than 5 years (Table 4.5), and most of these households were surveyed in 
Chikmagalur District where this initiative was relatively new. Hence, the networks, 
norms and networks evident in these areas form structural social capital which 
facilitates collective action in Pragithi Bandhu groups. 
Table 4.5: Years members have been in the Initiative (n=42) 
Years in groups Number of respondents Percentage 
>10 19 45 
5 to 9  9 21 
2 to 4 14 33 
A major part of the loyalty and group ideology was furthermore derived from a faith-
based affiliation to the organisation that initiated this endeavour.  Religious ideology 
was an important factor in group behaviour and dynamics. As Shri Kshethra 
Dharmasthala Rural Development Project was an arm of a religious establishment, 
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the affiliated faith and belief systems may have influenced an individual’s propensity 
not to free ride. One farmer in the initiative stated, 
We have a moral obligation towards our neighbours and a religious obligation to our faith. We have a 
karma not to cheat on our labour sharing and to ensure that we pay our loans back on time. More than 
any organisation to which we owe allegiance to this is for our faith that we make sure this happens. 
An official at the Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project 
headquarters stated that this was encouraged within the organisation as it helped in 
the development of groups and maintains group-based activities:  
…I think the spiritual component plays an important role. We always think that we should use 
spiritual component for development. It brings discipline and commitment to development. We use 
it. We consciously inculcate spirituality in people in that sense.  We don’t encourage any ‘go to 
temple’ or anything.  We have people from all faiths. Catholics …Muslims ... We encourage to 
believe in what you have, your faith but bring this spiritual attitude with you
45
. 
However, geographical and cultural proximity to the temple may also have 
influenced faith-based sense of obligation. In the neighbouring district of 
Chikmagalur, approximately 90 kilometres from the temple, groups surveyed did not 
show a similar allegiance. As one farmer stated: 
…no, we don’t see our obligations that way. Yes it is a faith based organisation but our obligations 
are more to other members of the groups and we take care not to let each other down and I would 
not say it is because of the faith of the organisation or my faith. 
Of the 17 farmers interviewed in different villages in Chikmagalur, only two 
mentioned having a religious obligation not to free ride. The rest stated that members 
of their group were friends and neighbours, and that there was a moral obligation not 
to free ride. A majority of the respondents of the survey said labour sharing was the 
main factor that influenced their participation in Pragithi Bandhu groups. The other 
main benefit mentioned was the credit that was made available through the Joint 
Liability Group initiative.  
Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project has also undertaken a 
number of gender based development activities since the early 1990’s. These 
developmental activities were undertaken through SHGs called ‘Jnanavikasa 
women’s SHG’, with the objective of disseminating and promoting savings activities, 
                                         
	 Interview Manaorma Bhatt 
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family planning, child care and nutrition, social empowerment and health education 
among others. Women’s only Pragithi Bandhu groups were also present in the 
initiatives to support women-headed households. In the absence of a male member, in 
many groups women substituted the men in labour sharing. This showed that the 
initiative had a strong gender focus to include and accommodate women in their 
initiative.  
Networks, norms and trust played a crucial role in the functioning of groups. The 
Pragithi Bandhu initiative took care to maintain this social capital by using pre-
existing networks and trust that were present from the groups’ earlier group-based 
activities in the formation of groups. Religious ideology was a major source of 
structural and cognitive social capital in Pragithi Bandhu groups as it predisposes and 
facilitates collective action in some regions of the initiative. Group formation 
guidelines that consider geographical proximity of members to each other and 
previous experience of participating in group activities by members was also a major 
source of structural social capital in the groups. The social capital found within the 
groups helped in implementing social controls that supported rational controls (rules 
and regulations) in coordinating group-based activities and preventing social 
dilemmas. The presence of women’s groups, specifically formed to tackle gender 
specific issues of agricultural production has also helped women-led households 
within the initiative.  
4.3.4 Economic features 
The majority of the members in the group were small and marginal farmers who grew 
both perennial and seasonal crops. The major perennial crops were spices such as 
pepper, ginger and cardamom, plantation crops like rubber and coffee along with 
arecanut; the seasonal crops they grew included rice and various vegetables. The 
Pragithi Bandhu scheme provided a combination of private and public goods to its 
members to help them with their production activities. The major goods provided 
were labour through labour sharing, credit and research and extension services to 
support farming activities. Only members owning land were eligible to be part of the 
group. Additionally, members of the groups were expected to work their agricultural 
land and not use hired labour (in lieu of them) for labour sharing practices. Although 
many farms use additional hired labour on the farms during preparation and harvest 
periods, this was not part of the initiative itself. Due to this, larger farms which use 
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only hired labour do not participate in this venture, helping to make the groups 
economically homogeneous.  Labour sharing has brought both tangible (reduced 
labour costs) and intangible benefits (creation of social capital) to members in the 
Pragithi Bandhu groups.  
According to the survey, an average of 45 man-labour days46 or 13,483 rupees was 
saved per year per household through this arrangement. Some groups voluntarily took 
part in additional labour sharing than was stipulated by the initiative. According to 
Ponnappa, a member of a Pragithi Bandhu group, labour sharing had freed up family 
labour, and, due to this, members of the household could migrate to towns for higher 
paying seasonal jobs or hire themselves out as wage labourers. Sixteen farmers out of 
the 42 farmers that were interviewed said they or one of their family members 
migrated to urban areas in search of work which paid a higher wage. Twenty-three of 
them said that they hired themselves out as manual labourers to earn additional 
income for their families.  
Collateral-free credit was another input that was provided by this collective action. 
Farmers in groups were eligible for credit amounts between 25,000 and 100,000 
rupees per growing season. Credit was also given to groups to buy essential farming 
equipment such as water pumps and tillers, thus enabling capital formation at the 
farm level. Loans were sanctioned on recommendation by the village level federation 
whose decisions were based on group grades, resources and repayment capacity.  The 
interest for the loans was fixed at 10 per cent per annum. The assured availability 
reduced the dependence of members on informal sources of credit from money 
lenders and other non-institutional lending sources. The geographical location and 
cropping patterns of Pragithi Bandhu members also reduced risks of crop failure and 
therefore potential risks of default. Since the Dakshin Kannada district was located 
on the windward side of the Western Ghats which received the benefits of the yearly 
south-west monsoons, drought risks in this region were lower than in arid and semi-
arid regions. Also, perennial crops such as coffee, spices, arecanut grown in this 
region can withstand drought-like conditions more than seasonal crops such as rice 
and cotton. 
                                         
This is referred to as man-labour days because the daily wage for men is higher than the daily wage for women. In the coastal 
region of Karnataka, the daily wage for men is 150-200 rupees while for women it is 100 rupees.  
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The Pragithi Bandhu initiative did not undertake or extend any marketing activities to 
its members. The prime reason for this was due to the variation in the crops that was 
grown by different members in the groups. Instances of farmers jointly marketing 
their produce in some regions were observed, although this was not a set practice. 
Farmer’s markets at the local level were being initiated; however, there has been no 
attempt so far to initiate forward linkages or contracts with the market. Commodity 
markets for spices, coffee and rubber were efficient because marketing and sales 
were achieved through alternative channels made available by the respective 
commodity boards of these produces.  
Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project actively collaborated with 
agricultural universities to help farmers’ access information and technical knowledge 
in order to improve farm and field level practices. Experts were invited to conduct 
demonstrations and training programs for farmers to assist them in cultivation 
practices and to manage their land better. The state has played an important role in 
supporting the organisation as well as making available information and technical 
knowledge for the dissemination to primary producers. National Bank for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (NABARD) has made funds available to implement System 
of Rice Intensification or SRI, a method to increase yields, reduce water use, reduce 
cost of cultivation and environmental stress. Due to Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala 
Rural Development Projects active involvement in developmental activities, the 
government used them to implement other programs like Village Development 
Programs (VDP) through which land management practices, livestock care, health 
care awareness and other activities were carried out. Funds and subsidies that were 
available for farmers from the government were made also extended to the farmers of 
the groups.  
The main economic features of the Pragithi Bandhu groups were that the initiative 
provides members with both public goods (information and research and extension 
services) and private goods (credit). Once the good was made available no member 
could be excluded from its access of consumption except under conditions of non-
compliance to rules and regulations. This allowed the access of resources by 
members irrespective of location, social identity or economic endowment. Women’s 
groups in the Pragithi Bandhu model further addressed specific gender-based 
concerns of poor access in the groups.  
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4.3.5 Resource allocation and incentive alignment in the 
groups 
According to Dr. Manjunath, the executive director of the Shri Kshethra 
Dharmasthala Rural Development Project, a majority of the participants of the 
initiative were small and marginal farmers. The survey of 42 farmer members shows 
that the average size of landholdings in the group was 4 acres (1.6 hectares)47. With 
regard to irrigation, a majority of the respondents had access to different sources of 
irrigation and only 26 per cent of the respondents undertook rain-fed cultivation and 
were exposed to drought risks (table 4.6). This showed that the resource structure in 
this initiative was largely homogeneous. As the organisation was governed and 
overseen by an NGO, the role of privileged groups in the initiatives was absent.  
Table 4.6: Access to irrigation by farmers (n=42) 
Irrigation Condition  Number Percentage 
Rain fed 11 26 
Well 7 17 
Bore well 15 36 
Tank  7 17 
Canal/river 2 5 
The collective goods made available in this initiative were excludable but non-
rivalrous. Excludability came from the fact that members who did not follow group 
norms and protocols, such as labour sharing and attending group meetings, could be 
excluded from borrowing credit from Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural 
Development Project. The goods were non-rivalrous within the group since the 
provision of a good to one member did not reduce its availability for another 
member. Therefore, the distribution of goods among the groups and within the groups 
were not conditioned on social or economic factors but were based on compliance to 
the rules, regulations and expectations of the initiative. The utility of collective goods 
in the initiative was fixed, which meant that larger landholders did not benefit more 
from the goods made available in the initiative. Furthermore, all members had to 
participate in labour sharing and were provided with a fixed amount of credit, which 
may have discouraged larger farmers from participating in the initiative.  
                                         
47 The smallest landholding size in the survey was half an acre or 0.2 hectares  
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The main incentives for participation in the initiative were purposive, solidary and 
material in nature.  Shared beliefs in the value of labour sharing (purposive), religious 
affiliation of members (solidary) and economic necessity (material) predisposed 
members to participate in collective action. Twenty three per cent of respondents 
cited religion as being a major factor influencing participation (table 4.7) and this was 
a major source of cognitive social capital of the group. 
Table 4.7: Factors influencing participation in collective action (n=42) 
Particulars  Number of respondents Percentage* 
Labour  32 76,19 
Credit 12 28,57 
Information  3 7,14 
Extension benefits 8 19,05 
Ideology/religion  10 23,81 
* As respondents cited more than one factor as their influence, the percentage and numbers are higher 
The economic changes the initiative brought about to different members of the 
groups were the major source of material incentive to the group. Table 4.7 reveal that 
a majority of the respondents of the survey cited access to collective goods made 
available by the initiative influencing their decision to participate.  This has helped 
reduce cost of production through the labour sharing carried out by the groups and 
accessing credit at interest rates set by the banks. Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural 
Development Project has also been able to provide credit for farming and capital 
formations, such as purchasing equipment, along with extension services including 
field demonstrations to provide information about improving cultivation practices 
(Table 4.8).  
Table 4.8: Changes from collective action  
Particulars  Nature of benefits 
Labour  According to the survey conducted for the study (n=42) the average 
labour sharing savings was 13,483 rupees  
Technology  System of Rice Intensification (SRI), farming machinery 
Credit  Farming credit access at reasonable interest rates has helped reduce 
dependence on informal sources of credit  
Marketing  Collective marketing on own initiative 
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Using production data collected from 42 respondent households the profit and change 
in profit resulting from collective action was computed. Table 4.9 shows the average 
net profit, change in profit and percentage variation from net profit for different 
categories of landholdings. Some groups undertook  only the minimum requried 
amount of labour sharing and therefore every group was able to save 6000 rupees. 
Marginal landholding household (<2.5 acres) showed the highest change in profits 
followed by the small landholders. The percentage of change was larger because the 
labour requirement in smaller holdings could be met more fully through labour 
sharing, while large landholdings had to continue hiring additional labour to meet 
their requirements. Larger changes in profits were seen in groups who took up labour 
sharing beyond the required limits. Some groups undertook six times the amount of 
labour sharing than what was mandated, while others undertook only the minimum. 
This was observed in all land holding categories. The provision of multiple goods and 
services to members were responsible for a major part of the changes that the Pragithi 
Bandhu scheme brought to its members which has shown to be the major difference 
of this initiative compared to other Joint Liability Group initiatives that provide only 
credit to its members. As most members belonged to the group for over 10 years and 
a majority over fiver years, changes in costs resulting from reasonable interest rates 
and extension services could not be calculated for this group.  
Table 4.9: Changes from collective action in Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural 
Development Project (n=42)* 
  Max Min Average Median  
Marginal 
< 2.5 acres 
Net Profit (π)* 156,600 6,000 39,905 29,325 
Change in Profit (δπ) 36,000 6,000 12,943.48 10,000 
Percentage change from net profit 32.44 34.10 
    
Small 
2.5 - 5 
Net Profit (π) 214,295 16,000 75,586.82 54,800 
Change in Profit (δπ) 36,000 6,000 12,090.91 9,600 
Percentage change from net profit 16.00 17.52 
    
Medium and large 
> 6 acres 
Net Profit (π) 225,100 22,400 118,020.8 104,562.5 
Change in Profit (δπ) 36,000 6,000 12,942.86 9,600 
 Percentage change from net profit 10.97 9.18 
* The profit function used to compute this is given in appendix VI 
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The case of the Pragithi Bandhu scheme shows the importance of external support, in 
this case through NGO intervention, in the formation and coordination of collective 
action. The other organisational feature of small federated groups and previous 
experience of organising were also crucial for the coordination of collective action in 
this initiative. Religious ideology played an important role and has contributed to the 
social capital which has been crucial for addressing social dilemmas (wilful 
defaulting on repayments, freeriding, moral hazard problems). It was an important 
source of cognitive and structural social capital that predisposed individuals to 
participate in collective action, enabled cohesiveness among group members, and 
maintained group-based activities such as labour sharing. In economic terms, the 
provision of other goods and services along with credit was crucial for improving the 
viability of producers in the groups. The goods that were made available to members 
were non-rivalrous and non-excludable within the group, which helped to sustain the 
interest of members to participate in the initiative. However, it was also apparent that 
in the case of marginal landholding households, it did not sufficiently raise household 
incomes so that families could solely depend on agriculture. Increased returns from 
farming under the initiative still remained an important material incentive for 
members to participate in this collective action.  In the next section, the case of 
Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society is discussed to compare how the two cases are 
similar and different.  
4.4 Case II: Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society 
Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society (SFWS) is a Joint Liability Group (JLG) based 
producer’s organisation located in Kartigi, Koppal District in the north-eastern part of 
Karnataka. This case was unique because 80 per cent of its 300 participants were 
tenant farmers who lease land from bigger landowners for cultivation every farming 
season. In the absence of property rights, landless farmers in India have no access to 
institutional credit and subsidised inputs. Their dependence on informal institutions 
like money lenders and intermediaries make them vulnerable in market transactions. 
Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society presents a case study of a group of sharecroppers 
who setup a Joint Liability Group in 2009 to jointly access machinery, credit, and 
inputs such as pesticides and fertilizers through collaborations with National Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) and the Karnataka State 
Cooperative Marketing Federation Limited (KSCMF). This organisation comprises 
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of 300 tenant farmer members cultivating over 1500 acres of leased land. Unlike Shri 
Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project, Sridevi JLG Farmers Welfare 
Society members grow only rice. For this study, thirty members of this initiative were 
surveyed and the results are discussed throughout the following. 
Table 4.10: Features of the organisation  
Strength of the initiative 300 members farming approximately 
1500  acres of leased land 
Group structure Federated groups of 5 members  
Collective goods obtained Inputs: Fertilizers, Pesticides, credit, 
machinery   
4.4.1 History and context of the group 
Kartigi is located on the ‘left bank’ canal system of the Tungabadra project48 in 
Koppal District. The 225 kilometre long canal system transformed this once semi-
arid region into a major rice-growing belt of Karnataka. Located on the state border 
with Andhra Pradesh, the agricultural transformation brought an influx of Telugu 
speaking migrant agricultural labourers into the region. Over time, many of these 
seasonal workers settled down, becoming tenant farmers to big land owners who 
often found it difficult to hire and manage seasonal labour.  
In the absence of title deeds (property rights) for the land they cultivate, these tenant 
farmers cannot access institutional loans from banks, subsidise fertilizers and other 
inputs such as seeds distributed by the state, or avail minimum support price for their 
produce. To compensate for this missing market of essential services, landlords, 
money lenders, input suppliers and mill owners began providing interlinked services 
including credit, inputs and purchasing services to tenant farmers. Furthermore, 
interlinked land-credit markets began to emerge between landowners and tenants. 
This has led to the growth of indebtedness and agrarian distress in the region.  
                                         
The Tungabadra project, which dammed the Tungabadra River in 1953, stores 180,000 million cubic feet of water used for 
generating hydro-electricity and irrigating the parched regions of the erstwhile Madras, Hyderabad and Mysore states (now mostly 
Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka). Presently, its irrigation network comprises of a three-canal system – the left bank canal (225 km 
long), the lower level canal (349 km long) and the high level canal (196 km long) irrigating over 300,000 hectares of land. The left 
bank project that irrigates over 121,405 hectares of land has converted the regions in the Raichur and Koppal districts among others 
into the ‘rice bowls’ of Karnataka.   
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Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society was set up in response to this condition of 
sharecropping farmers in this region. It began as a philanthropic endeavour by 
Nagaraju, a large landowner and proprietor of a local rice mill, to help local tenant 
farmers in the region. Being a second-generation Telugu migrant, Nagaraju wanted to 
initiate a project through which tenant farmers of his community could access 
institutional credit and reduce their dependence on moneylenders and other credit 
agents. Using his influence and standing in the local community, he started a Joint 
Liability Group scheme with a group of tenant farmers in collaboration with Pragathi 
Gramin Bank, the local bank and National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD). While the Joint Liability Group enabled access to credit 
for cultivation, the problems of sourcing inputs in the market remained a concern for 
agricultural producers. In order to tackle this problem, the group registered itself as a 
society and formed the Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society in 2009. Once they 
registered as a society, they formed linkages with fertilizer and pesticide cooperatives 
to source inputs and avail subsidies. 
The registration process and formation of these linkages was complex as it involved 
different departments and ministries of the government. The financing of the group 
was by National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), under the 
Ministry of Finance; the inputs sourced were through collaboration with the Ministry 
of Fertilizers and Chemicals; and technical support (mechanisation) for cultivation 
came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture. This required high level of 
coordination and involved high search and opportunity costs.  When the organisation 
was being registered as a society, the group had to justify why they intended to form 
another group when there were government societies responsible for the distribution 
of inputs to farmers49. The registration of the society had to undergo a chain of 
scrutiny50 before being approved. Considering these challenges, initiatives such as 
this would not have been able to emerge without proactive external support from 
NGOs or effective leadership. Joint Liability Groups in themselves could only 
provide credit to tenant farmers. However, by registering as a society, they were able 
to avail other goods collectively. It is often civil society organisations such as NGOs 
                                         
49 The existing societies in the district were Raithra Seva Sahakara Naimitha (RSSN) and Vyavasaya Seva Sahakara Naimitha 
(VSSN). According to informants, these societies sold fertilizer allotments given by the government for distribution in the open 
market while siphoning the difference as a profit. Their record books, however, showed the allotments were made to needy farmers.  
50 This chain of scrutiny often involves a background check, review of the aims of the organization, and an audit of its documentation 
and various collaborations it undertakes.  
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who have the agency to coordinate and liaise with the state to provide services to 
groups. In this case, the leadership initiative of an individual was able to coordinate 
the formation of groups.  
4.4.2 Organisational features 
The primary structure of the groups was based on the guidelines of Joint Liability 
Group regulations stipulated by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD). According to the regulations, each group should comprise 
of five members who stand as collateral for each other for the credit the bank lends 
through the federation. Beyond this structural setup, the rules and regulations of the 
Joint Liability Group societies were self-formulated, and credit institutions were not 
involved in their implementation. 
Figure 4.3: Structure of the federation
 
Figure 4.3 depicts the basic structure of Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society. The 
different borrowing groups form the primary level of the organisation. A member 
from a group or two was selected to represent the group in a 40-member general 
committee. Each committee member stood as a guarantor for various groups in the 
Executive committee 
(13) 
General Committee (40) 
Groups Groups Groups 
Groups 
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case that members defaulted. The committee members had to compensate the 
defaulted amount and settle the accounts with members within the group. Thirteen 
members from the general committee were part of the executive committee 
responsible for input purchase, stock inventories, distribution of inputs and managing 
the federation. A general body meeting was convened every month where decisions 
and issues concerning the society were discussed with all members of the initiative. 
In order to build up confidence and rapport with the banks, a strong emphasis was 
placed on the repayment of loans. The primary task of farmers, after the sale of their 
produce, was the repayment of loans to the banks.  The 40 member of the executive 
committee were selected based on their economic standing in the community. They 
were often members who own their own land and were the privileged group of 
Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society. The role of the privileged group based general 
committee was to prevent default of payment. Some respondents spoke about 
coercion being used by general committee members regarding repayment of credit. 
Similar to the case of Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project, the 
organisation played a coordination role as well as a cooperation role. The leadership 
of the group formed ties with other organisations such as banks and input 
cooperatives (fertiliser and pesticide) to coordinate various activities of the group, 
while also giving importance to coordinating and forming groups, thus enabling 
cooperation.  
The individual groups were used only to provide loans and inputs, and no other 
activities were carried out jointly. Therefore, the linkages and support to the group 
was from credit institutions and input cooperatives. Leadership was a key element in 
the sustenance of the initiative.  Nagaraju’s standing in the Telugu-speaking 
community and his connections with the local bank, National Bank for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (NABARD), and district authority helped reduce the 
organising costs of setting up the initiative. It was observed that Sridevi JLG Farmers 
Welfare Society had a negative size-effect as the activities of the group were 
monitoring intensive, and the functioning of the group hinged on its linguistic and 
tenant farming identity. Additionally, the group’s administration had little experience 
or management expertise to coordinate a larger initiative. The main organisational 
features of SFWS were: that the external support it received from leadership was 
crucial to form linkages with the state and parastatal organisations to access goods 
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and services. The primary groups were small and federated to enable monitoring and 
efficient credit recovery; strict rules and regulations about how credit and inputs were 
disseminated and how repayment of the loan needed to be carried out were essential 
rational controls the organisation undertook to prevent social dilemmas. The 
organisational feature that sets Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society apart for the other 
cases explored in this thesis is the lack of previous collective action experience 
among members. This was reflected in the absence of group-based activities such as 
group meetings and other purposive measures to cultivate and maintain social capital.     
4.4.3 Social features  
Approximately 93 per cent of the members in Sridevi JLG Farmers Welfare Society 
were from a Telugu-speaking minority community in Kartigi, a Kannada-speaking 
region. Members of this initiative belonged to the Kamma, Chaudhry, Lingayath, 
Kapu and Lamini castes. The Kapu and Lamini castes are scheduled castes while the 
Kamma, Chaudhry and Lingayaths are considered Other Backward Castes. In the 
survey that was conducted for this study, a majority of the participants (63 per cent) 
belonged to the Kamma community which was the dominant caste (Table 4.11). 
When asked regarding the social homogeneity of their groups, 47 per cent of the 
respondents said they belonged to groups in which all the other members were from 
the same caste (table 4.12).  
Table 4.11: Caste Composition of members surveyed SFWS (n=30) 
Caste Number of Respondents Percentage 
Kamma 19 63 
Chaudhry 3 10 
Kapu 3 10 
Lamini 3 10 
Lingayath 2 7 
Table 4.12: Social characteristics of the groups SFWS (n=30) 
Characteristics Number of respondents Percentage  
Homogeneous  14 47 
Heterogeneous 16 53 
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As majority of the members in Sridevi JLG Farmers Welfare Society belong to the 
Telugu speaking minority community in a Kannada speaking region, the level of 
solidarity among members of the group was high.  This identity and solidarity 
brought with it trust, networks and norms (valuation of expected behaviour) to the 
functioning of the group contributing to its social capital. This linguistic identity 
along with the fact that tenant farmers could acquire goods they would otherwise not 
be able to attain also predisposed members to participate in collective action. Visits to 
Kartagi and different farmer households revealed that no member to date has 
defaulted on their loan repayment, nor did any farmer leave the society. This low 
attrition was due to the benefits the group provides to farmer members who would 
otherwise have to depend on informal sources and their adverse terms to source credit 
and input. This showed that there was a high level of interest among members to stay 
in the group which helped muster cognitive social capital that predisposed individuals 
to cooperate. Therefore, despite the group having no previous experience of 
coordinating collective activities, cultural homogeneity of the group helped build 
social capital within the initiative.  
The influence of caste-based power, however, was prevalent in the organisation of 
the group and its governing structure. Economic endowment of members (land 
owning members) determined their standing and influence within the federation. 
Most land owning member were from the Kamma castes and, they made all decisions 
in the federation. Their status was also used in ensuring that members of the groups 
did not default, thus playing a monitoring role. Thus, norms characteristic of caste 
hierarchies played an important enforcing role within the initiative.  
The major social feature of Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society was the group’s cultural 
homogeneity. As members belonged to the same cultural group of the region’s 
Telugu speaking community, this was also a major source of cognitive social capital. 
Group-based activities among the members were limited as the groups were formed 
only for the dissemination of credit and inputs. As members in the groups had no 
previous experience in organising, and there were no group-based activities such as 
distribution of extension services and group savings taken up, the reliance on groups 
was low. Purposive measures to build social capital such as meetings and information 
sharing were absent in groups. This meant that structural social capital predisposing 
individuals to act collectively, although present, was weak. Alternatively, stringent 
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monitoring procedures using privileged groups and their influence in the community 
reduced the reliance on peer monitoring. In this group, although social controls were 
used to influence repayment schedules and adherence to rules and regulations, the 
role of rational controls were stronger.  
4.4.4 Economic features 
Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society made available private collective goods to 
members. Credit, fertilizers and pesticides and mechanised farm equipment were the 
main goods. Although there were plans to initiate marketing activities through the 
Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee, they had not been initiated yet. Each 
member in the group was given 50,000 rupees as credit to farm five acres of land. 
The federation did not stipulate how much land individuals could lease, however, 
credit and input support was provided only to cultivate five acres of land. The entire 
credit sum was not given in cash; fertilizers and pesticides worth 35,000 rupees were 
given to each member, and 15,000 rupees in cash was given for other expenditures, 
such as labour and machinery rent. This ensured that most of the credit lent was spent 
on production activities.  
The major change Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society has brought about, other than the 
provision of credit, has been fertilizer and pesticide inputs. A critical challenge facing 
tenant farmers has been the sourcing of inputs from the markets at a fair price or the 
retail price. In the region, due to low bargaining power of tenant farmers or the need 
to buy inputs on credit, prices charged to them was often higher than the retail price. 
In order to make inputs available to its members at a fair price, the federation 
established collaborations with the Karnataka State Cooperative Marketing 
Federation Limited (KSCMF), the apex cooperative institution in the state 
responsible for the distribution of agricultural inputs and implements. This 
collaboration allowed for the bulk purchase of fertilizers and pesticides by the 
federation at wholesale prices. Another advantage was that inputs could be purchased 
during the off seasons when prices were lower51. Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society 
also collaborated with the Karnataka state Agricultural Department to purchase a rice 
transplanter through the help of a subsidy52. With the turn to mechanisation during 
                                         
	 Only 80% of the discount was passed on to the farmers, while the federation, as a corpus for its activities, retains the remaining 
20%.  
	A loan of 5 lakhs and a subsidy of 4.6 lakhs were given by the Agricultural Department of Karnataka.
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the sowing process with the help of the purchased rice transplanter, members could 
reduce the cost of labour.  
Furthermore, the availability of credit for farming may have diminished the role of 
traders and mill owners as informal credit agents; however, the moneylenders still 
had a role in supplying credit for private consumption purposes. The survey reveals 
that 40 per cent of farmers still had dealings with informal credit sources, 10 percent 
had dealings both formal and informal sources, and 27 per cent had no credit 
relationship other than with the federation (Table 4.13).  
Table 4.13: Different sources of credit after collective Action (n=30) 
Particulars  Number of respondents Percentage 
No credit  8 27 
Informal  12 40 
Formal source (banks) 7 23 
Both  3 10 
 Extension services, however, were not provided by Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society 
to its members. Channels of information dissemination to improve farming and other 
land management practices to maintain soil health and nutrition levels were evidently 
lacking. Additionally, collaboration with technical organisations or agricultural 
universities to source information regarding better practices and environmentally safe 
practices were also missing. A farmer revealed that: 
We have not demanded that any such services be given to us from the federation. We lease out land for a 
growing season and sometimes for a year and often the next sowing season, we may not lease the same piece of 
land. So generally, we try to get out as much as we can from the piece of land we lease by high fertilizer 
application and readily available canal water
53
. 
Clearly, the focus of most tenant farmers was to maximize output from the land 
through input intensive agriculture. The availability of canal water and subsidised 
inputs from the society made it possible for farmers to have this focus. An important 
input not provided by the joint liability group was seeds. The farmers often sourced it 
from the market or from traders. In order to save on input costs, respondents revealed 
that uncertified seeds were used which have the risk of being spurious. This practice 
                                         
	From field notes collected during the survey. 
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and the absence of extension services have led to high variations in yields on the 
farms of different members. Table 4.14 shows 13 bag differences in yield among 
tenant farmers in similar agro-climatic and irrigation conditions. The average yield 
per acre was 402 kilos, which was low for intensive input, irrigated farming.  
Table 4.14: Average yield for five acres (Bags of 75 kgs) (n=30) 
Particulars  Min Max Difference Average Std.dev 
Yield per acre 32 45 13 39.93 2.91 
Yield per acre after lease  18 31 13 25.62 3.07 
4.4.5 Resource allocation and incentive alignment in the 
groups 
Although a majority of members participating in the initiative were landless 
sharecropping farmers, some members owned land. Around 20 per cent of members 
surveyed for this study owned land. As the region was located in the catchment area 
of a canal irrigated zone, all members had access to irrigation facilities and this 
reduced drought risks for these farmers. The resources allocated to members of the 
initiative were non-rivalrous and non-excludable within the group. This meant that 
members could not be excluded from accessing or using the collective good once 
made available, and the use of the resource by one member did not reduce its 
availability for another member. However, the cultural homogeneity of the group 
revealed that cultural identity may have been an exclusionary principle of the group.   
In terms of distribution of resources in the group, the utility of collective goods made 
available to the group was fixed. This meant that the amount of credit and inputs 
given to each member of the group was fixed irrespective of whether the member 
leased or owned additional land. Fifty thousand rupees worth of credit and inputs 
were given to cultivate five acres of land. Members with additional land had to 
source resources for cultivating it outside the initiative. However, access to 
mechanisation had variable utility in the initiative. The transplanter that was owned 
by Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society could be leased by all members of the initiative, 
and members with additional land were able to save on labour costs.. This was a 
major incentive for landowning members to be a part of the initiative.  
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The solidary incentive for participation in the group was the cultural identity of the 
members, as well as the economic identity as sharecropping farmers. Belonging to 
the same linguistic group brought with it elements of trust and norms that were 
crucial for the formation of the groups. Their identity as sharecroppers also helped 
mobilise interest as they shared similar challenges of poor access to credit and inputs.  
However, the material incentives were the major factor that predisposed individuals 
to participate in this initiative. Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society made available 
credit, fertilizers and pesticides as well as farm machinery to its members. This 
helped to reduce costs of production by over 3,500 rupees per acre and transportation 
costs by over 1000 per farmer. The use of the transplanter has helped save 1,715 
rupees per acre in labour (transplanting and weeding) and nursery costs (Table 4.15). 
The availability of these goods was made possible by the networks that the leader of 
Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society had with the state. 
 
Table 4.15: Changes in cost of production before and after collective action 
(Rs/per acre) 
Particulars  Before After Percentage change 
Input costs 
Fertilizer and Pesticides (incl. 
transportation costs) 
8,510 7,000 17.74 
Labour Costs 
Sowing  2,000 1,115 44.25 
Weeding  600 230 61.66 
Harvesting  2,000 2,000 0 
The other major benefit of organising as a group was that members were able to 
prevent the exploitation of high rents. Land lease agreements were fixed contracts of 
bags of rice per acre. In Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society, the rent was between 12-16 
bags of rice of 75 kilos each per acre, depending on conditions such as soil health and 
distance from the canal (Table 4.15). The average price of land lease was often 
known to members of the group giving them information to bargain. Similarly, 
different members also shared information regarding market prices of grain.  
Although this may increase awareness of market prices among farmers, it may not 
have resulted in price realisation. Table 4.15 reveals that prices varied by about 300 
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rupees per bag of rice in the markets or mills where the grains were sold. Although 
these services were not made available by the initiatives, the organisation of groups 
enabled the sharing of information to bring about some changes in bargaining. These 
formed the material incentives for members to stay in the groups, and the benefits 
predisposed members to participate in collective action. 
Table 4.15: Lease rate and market price of farmers   
Particulars  Min Max Difference Average Std.dev 
Lease Rate Per Acre (Bags 
per Acre) 
12 16 4 12.47 5.06 
Average Market Price 
(Price per bag*) 
900 1,200 300 980.83 46.72 
* In rupees  
Using production data collected from 30 farming households, the net profit and 
change in profit was calculated to determine the changes brought about through 
improved access to inputs, credit and mechanisation (Table 4.16). The three 
categories of producers in Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society were: sharecroppers who 
did not own any land, partial sharecroppers or small landholders who additionally 
leased land, and large farmers (above 10 acres) who leased land only to be a part of 
the initiative (the privileged group). Larger changes in profit were seen for 
sharecropping farmers and land leasing small farmers. For both these categories, the 
percentage change in profit resulting from collective action was around 30-32 per 
cent. 
For the larger landowners, credit and input provision did not bring much change in 
input costs. The change in profit for large land owners was through mechanization. 
The use of Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society’s transplanter helped the large 
landowners reduce labour costs by 1255 rupees per acre. The relatively large size of 
leased land and improved bargaining of rents have helped producers make reasonable 
returns.  
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Table: 4.16: Change from collective action in Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society * 
(n=30) 
    Max Min  Average Median  
Only 
lease 
  
  
Net Profit (π) 59,333.3
3 
21,571.
67 
41,456.7
7 
39,566.67 
Change in Profit (δπ) 14,084.4
3 
9744 12,501.8
1 
12,687.50 
Percentage change from net profit  30.16 32.07 
 
Partial 
lease -
small 
  
Net Profit (π) 101,070.
67 
22,676 55,425.3
3 
56,538.67 
Change in Profit (δπ) 20,740 16,975 18,230 18,230 
Percentage change from net profit  32.89 32.89 
 
Partial 
lease- 
large 
  
  
Net Profit (π) 554,713.
33 
109,340 358,497.
89 
40,9451.6
7 
Change in Profit (δπ) 38,310 25,760.
00 
32,244.1
7 
32,662.50 
Percentage change from net profit  8.99 7.98 
* The profit function used to compute this is given in appendix VI 
In sum, the main organisational features that enabled the formation of Sridevi 
Farmers Welfare Society was the external support it received from a leader through 
whom linkages were formed with the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD) and input cooperatives. These linkages characterised the 
main economic features of the group. As sharecroppers they were able to access 
credit which helped them to address the credit supply effect of not possessing 
property rights. This formed a major incentive to form and participate in collective 
action. They were also able to negotiate fair sharecropping contracts from landlords. 
However, they did have long term contracts as lease agreements were only for a year. 
As a result, sharecroppers did not have security for their land, and, therefore, did not 
invest in extension services to improve land quality. The main social feature of the 
group was that it was a culturally homogeneous group as all members belonged to a 
Telugu speaking minority in Karnataka. This was a major source of cognitive social 
capital that predisposed individuals to cooperate. Their economic identity as 
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sharecroppers sharing similar problems also facilitated collective action in this group. 
Sridevi Joint Liability Group Farmers Welfare Society was an example of collective 
action addressing concerns of credit flow concerns and production disadvantages of 
sharecropping and tenant farming in Koppal district in Northern Karnataka.  
4.5 Discussion  
Joint liability groups in themselves are not organised as collective actions capable of 
bringing about access to collective goods and services other than institutional credit. 
Therefore, despite the large number of such groups being promoted by National Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), very few emerge as 
organisations promoting collective action.  Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society and the 
Pragithi Bandhu scheme were examples of initiatives that have organised themselves 
as producer groups to access inputs such as subsidised pesticides and fertilisers and 
extension services along with credit to improve the agricultural production conditions 
of its members. Although both these initiatives were Joint Liability Groups, they 
were structured differently according to their unique economic conditions and the 
necessities of their stakeholders. In this section, the similarities and differences of 
these initiatives are compared to highlight the factors that influence the structure of 
these initiatives coordinating collective actions. Table 4.19 highlights the similarities 
and differences of the Pragithi Bandhu scheme (PB) and Sridevi Farmers Welfare 
Society (SFWS).  
Table 4.19: Similarities and differences of PB and SFWS 
Features  Similarity  Differences 
Organisational - Joint liability group 
initiative supported 
by NABARD 
- Hierarchically 
organised  
- Small federated 
groups  
- Centralised decision 
making  
- Formal rules of 
 PB was governed and managed by an 
NGO, while there was no NGO support 
or intervention in SFWS.  
 PB had previous experience in 
organising collective action, while 
SFWS was a new initiative 
 PB was a large initiative compared to 
SFWS 
 SFWS had a negative group size effect 
while PB had no size effect.   
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functioning (rational 
controls) 
- Cooperation and 
coordination role of 
the organisation 
 
 
Social  - Heterogeneous caste 
groups in both 
initiatives 
- Importance of social 
capital in organising 
the initiative (social 
controls) 
 The major source of social capital for 
PB was from previous organising 
experience and religious capital based 
on their ideology 
 Homogeneous cultural identity of 
members in SFWS was a source of 
social capital 
 PB had gender specific initiatives  
 Purposive measures to encourage 
group activities were taken to build 
social capital in PB   
 Dominant caste members and  
members with resource endowments 
influenced governance in SFWS  
 
Economic  - Credit a major 
collective good  
- No marketing 
initiative  
- Collective goods 
were non-excludable 
- Lower risks due to 
high rainfall and 
access to canal 
irrigation  
 PB grew multiple perennial and 
seasonal crops, While SFWS members 
grew only rice  
 PB provided credit and extension 
services, SFWS provided credit and 
inputs and no extension services.  
 SFWS was able to make favourable 
tenure contracts 
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Resource 
allocation  
- Collective goods 
were non-rivalrous  
- Majority of 
members were 
homogeneous 
resource (land and 
irrigation) 
endowment  
- Collective goods had 
fixed utility in 
groups  
 
 PB comprised of small farmers, while a 
majority were landless farmers in 
SFWS.  
 Access to mechanisation had variable 
utility in SFWS 
Incentive 
alignment  
- Material incentives 
to organise were 
high  
- Solidary incentives 
played a major role 
in maintaining 
groups  
 Purposive incentive in the form of 
religious beliefs played a major role in 
PB 
4.5.1 Organisational similarities and difference  
The Pragithi Bandhu scheme of Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development 
Project (SKDRDP) and Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society (SFWS) were both 
hierarchically organised hybrid institutions with a highly centralised decision making 
structure. Considering the two initiatives provide credit as a major good, they 
comprise of small federated groups of 5-8 members to serve the purpose of joint 
liability and labour sharing. Small groups enable monitoring of various activities of 
members and prevent social dilemmas such as defaulting on payment and shirking in 
labour sharing activities. Rules and regulations as rational controls were crucial in 
these groups to prevent wilful defaults on repayment and shirking in the case of 
labour sharing. The main organisational differences between the two initiatives were 
with regard to how the groups were governed, their previous organisational 
experience and the size of the initiatives. Pragathi Bandhu groups were governed by 
the NGO and not by stakeholders, while Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society, in 
practice, was governed by a privileged group of economically powerful members. 
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The reputation of Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project, the NGO 
supporting the Pragithi Bandhu scheme, and the influence of leadership and the 
privileged group in the case of Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society, was crucial in 
acquiring external support and forming ties with financial institutions such as 
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), technical 
institutions such as agricultural universities, and cooperatives that provide inputs to 
bring changes in agricultural practices and production costs. The NGO and leadership 
played a coordinating role. They also enabled cooperation as they played a role in 
obtaining commitments from different participants, helped in the formation of groups 
and helped manage and promote group-based activities.   
Another major organisational difference of Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society and 
Pragithi Bandhu scheme was the size of the initiative. Sridevi Farmers Welfare 
Society as an initiative identifies itself as a minority group and had limited expertise 
in managing large initiatives. Therefore its scope to expand is limited. Shri Kshethra 
Dharmasthala Rural Development Project was a large organisation that has been 
involved in community-based development work for decades. Its reputation, 
experience and expertise in organising collective initiatives and its linkages with the 
state has helped it expand its developmental activities in other regions of the state of 
Karnataka. Therefore the Pragithi Bandhu scheme had no group size-effect while 
SFWS’s potential to expand was limited by its negative group size-effect, which 
means that the larger the group became, its organisational effectiveness could 
potentially diminish. Therefore, the main organisational factors which have 
influenced collective action in the two groups were external support, federated group 
size and previous experience in the case of the Pragithi Bandhu scheme. 
4.5.2 Social similarities and differences 
A comparison of social features of the two groups reveals that there were more 
differences than similarities. This was because these organisations were influenced 
by their social and ideological characteristics, and this has played an important role in 
how these two respective organisations were structured and function. Social capital in 
both these groups was crucial in the organising and regulating these groups. Sridevi 
Farmers Welfare Society can be identified as an initiative comprising of Telugu-
speaking tenant farmers in Koppal district. Owing to this cultural identity, the 
cognitive social capital predisposing individuals to cooperate was high. Shri Kshethra 
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Dharmasthala Rural Development Project as an NGO identified itself as a religious 
NGO undertaking development. Its religious identity contributed to the groups’ 
cognitive and structural social capital and defined the perception of collective 
obligation to each other. The traditional influence of the temple in the local 
community has also reduced potential interference from rural elites mustering their 
support for the initiative in the region. Over two decades of experience in 
participating in group-based activities have also helped generate structural social 
capital through network relations and trust in various groups, helping also to facilitate 
and sustain collective action initiatives.  
Structurally, the groups under the Pragithi Bandhu scheme were socially 
heterogeneous as members of different castes participated in groups. In Sridevi 
Farmers Welfare Society, the Kamma caste, land-endowed group formed the 
privileged group within the organisation. The power coming from resource 
endowment and caste status was used in the enforcement of rules in the initiative. 
There were also no other purposive measures to build social capital in Sridevi 
Farmers Welfare Society and group-based activities such as savings groups, 
mandatory meetings, and group-based provisions of extension services were missing 
in this initiative. On the contrary, purposive action in the form of labour sharing, 
mandatory group meetings, savings group activities and information sharing helped 
to nurture structural social capital in the Pragithi Bandhu scheme. There were also 
‘women’s only’ groups under the Pragithi Bandhu scheme to support female-headed 
households in farming activities. Restricted by its identity as a sharecropper and 
linguistically homogeneous group, Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society was an exclusive 
group where other social groups may not be accommodated. Conversely, Shri 
Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project as an NGO has approached its 
initiative with an inclusive aim by accommodating farmers of all castes and religions, 
and this has enabled them to expand their initiative to other regions of Karnataka. 
The main social feature influencing collective action in the two initiatives were 
cognitive social capital from religious ideology and cultural similarities and structural 
social capital from previous experience in the case of the Pragithi Bandhu scheme. 
Social capital was a crucial element for enforcing social controls and complimented 
rational controls characterised by rules and regulations to prevent the emergence of 
social dilemmas.  
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4.5.3 Economic similarities and differences 
The main economic characteristic of the members in both these initiatives was their 
land endowment. In the case of Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society, a majority of the 
members were landless, while a majority of the members of the Pragithi Bandhu 
scheme were small and marginal landholders. Therefore, the primary aim of these 
organisations was to redress the challenges of poor access to credit, inputs and 
extension services that concerned these groups. The Pragithi Bandhu scheme and 
Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society were mainly credit-providing organisations which 
also made other services such as labour sharing, inputs and extension services 
available to its members.  
The provision of collateral-free credit runs the risk of unintended default in situations 
of crop failure, and wilful defaults when groups or individuals refuse to repay. 
Though Joint Liability Group initiatives may help in reducing wilful defaults, there 
was still a risk of unintended defaults due to vagaries of the weather that could lead to 
crop failures. Therefore, many organisations such as NGOs do not initiate 
agricultural lending on large scales due to high risks associated with weather 
dependent crop failure. For this reason the location of these two initiatives was 
crucial in the provision of credit to its members. The Pragithi Bandhu groups were 
located in a region with high seasonal monsoon, while Sridevi Farmers Welfare 
Society was located on the banks of a major canal system that effectively reduced the 
risks of crop failures and increased the capacity of members to repay borrowed credit.  
The main collective goods made available to members of the Pragithi Bandhu groups 
of the Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project were labour sharing 
benefits, credit and extension services which have helped reduce production cost in 
agriculture. Tenet farming in India is challenging due to sharecroppers’ inability to 
access credit, subsidised inputs and extension services provided to the farm sector in 
India. This was due to the lack of property rights which prevents access to 
institutional credit. Considering the small size of land holdings in India, 
sharecropping may have the potential to address issues relating to small land size if 
sufficient tenure security was provided. Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society was an 
example of how collective action could help tenant farmers access credit and inputs 
to increase production by addressing issues of access to credit and inputs. However, 
in the absence of long-term contracts, farmers were not keen to invest in methods 
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necessary to improve practices or access extension services which can potentially 
increase yields. This was reflected in the low yields despite high levels of fertiliser 
application and access to irrigation. This may also be due to poor soil conditions 
resulting from mismanaged high input agriculture. In this way, an additional 
advantage collective action has brought about has been increased bargaining power in 
negotiating land rents. The tightened regulation and credit discipline within the group 
ensures the credit provided to farmers is used for farming. It is crucial to note that 
economic necessity among members and the disadvantages that small farmers face 
predisposed members to participate in collective action. 
4.5.4 Similarities and differences in resources allocation and 
incentive alignment  
The similarities of these two initiatives in relation to how resources were allocated 
and incentives were aligned were more than those regarding aspects of their structure. 
This shows that these initiatives had similar aims of increasing access to resources 
and services to improve production conditions of their members. However, the means 
of achieving them varied as they were conditioned by their unique geographical, 
resource and social characteristics. This makes the understanding of how collective 
action is structured in organisational, social and economic terms crucial in 
determining how initiatives can achieve their economic goals.  
The primary difference between the resource structures of the two groups was that 
Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society was an initiative that comprised largely of 
sharecroppers who cultivated leased land, while in the Pragithi Bandhu scheme, 
members possessed property rights to their farms. In both cases, the majority of 
members participating shared similar resources structures (small and marginal or 
sharecropping farmers) and therefore also similar production challenges. As 
organisations which coordinated collective action, all the goods that were made 
available to members were non-rivalrous, and in the case of Sridevi Farmers Welfare 
Society, they were non-excludable. Members could be excluded from accessing 
credit in Pragithi Bandhu scheme if groups did not adhere to group activity protocols. 
All collective goods that were made available to members had fixed utility, therefore, 
all members, irrespective of resource endowment, had access to these resources. Only 
mechanisation had variable utility in Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society and since 
farmers owing land could gain more through reduction of production cost. This was 
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also an incentive for more resource-endowed farmers who formed the privileged 
group of the initiative to stay in the producer organisation.  
In both initiatives, material incentives proved crucial for the functioning of the group 
as they increased viability of small and marginal production, compared to if they 
would not have organised. This was the central incentive for different members of the 
group to organise. Solidary incentives were also important to facilitate members to 
cooperate and conform to the rules of the group. In the Pragithi Bandhu scheme, the 
religious beliefs of the group and the NGO coordinating the initiative gave purposive 
incentive to some members of the group.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at two cases of credit-providing producer organisations in the 
state of Karnataka to understand how these initiatives were structured in 
organisational, social and economic terms. This shed light on how small and marginal 
and landless agricultural producers were able to access credit, inputs and extension 
services that were otherwise not available to these groups. This chapter also assessed 
how these groups were similar and differed from each other. They were similar in 
terms of their hierarchical structure, federated small groups and ability to provide 
goods that were non-rivalrous and non-excludable to all its members. However, they 
were different in regards to how they were organized (NGO or leadership), and how 
they were governed (NGO or privileged group). They were also socially different in 
terms of the social groups they served (exclusive and inclusive groups). The resource 
endowment of members (small and marginal and landless), the crops they grew 
(seasonal and perennial) and they services they provided (labour sharing, 
mechanisation, input provision) differentiated the groups in terms of their economic 
features. These differences emerged as a result of the variations of the organisations’ 
aims and purposes and prevented the potential social dilemmas that might emerge. 
The next chapter looks at two producer organisations in the state of Karnataka and 
Tamil Nadu. In contrast to Pragithi Bandhu scheme and Sridevi Farmers Welfare 
Society, these two cases are non-credit providing organisations with a strong focus on 
marketing and value addition which provide additional considerations for analysing 
how they are structured or incentivised differently.   
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Chapter V: Non-Credit collective action 
initiatives- The Cases of Farmers’ 
Federation and Producer Companies 
5.1 Introduction  
Aharam Producer Company (APC) and Savayava Krushikara Sangha (SKS) like Shri 
Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project and Sridevi Farmers Welfare 
Society are two producer organisations in the states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka 
respectively that emerged to address similar production challenges of access for their 
small and marginal producer members. Unlike the cases in chapter 4, these 
organisations did not provide agricultural credit to their members. These organic 
cotton growing producer organisations however, have been able to successfully 
integrate their supply chain (Aharam Producer Company) and form forward contracts 
with a textile company (Savayava Krushikara Sangha) through which they have been 
able to attain higher premium price. In this chapter, the cases of Aharam Producer 
Company and Savayava Krushikara Sangha are studied to understand how they are 
structured in organisational, social and economic terms. This will help to see how 
they differ from credit-providing organisations that were looked at in the previous 
chapter, as well as how they differ from each other as a producer company and 
farmers’ federation.  
This chapter points out that the characteristics of Producer Organisational Formats 
(POFs) as producer companies, joint liability groups and farmers’ federations may 
not matter, as performance crucially depends on how they identify region specific 
challenges and structure themselves to address these challenges. This chapter, in 
contrast to chapter 4, comprises of non-credit providing organisations, and, I argue, 
that the nature of goods (credit, marketing services) provided by Producer 
Organisational Formats depended on geographical factors such as rainfall and 
climatic risks, infrastructure such as canal systems and the ability to form linkages 
with the state and markets. In the two cases explored in this chapter, the main 
collective goods were in the form of inputs (seeds), information and extension 
services, marketing services and value addition services. The main interventions in 
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these initiatives were in the downstream markets which were absent in the cases 
explored in the previous chapter. Similar to chapter 4, the two cases assessed here 
highlight the role played by federated small groups, previous experience of 
organising, external support as organisational features and structural and cognitive 
social capital as social features in how producer organisations are structured. Aharam 
Producer Company and Savayava Krushikara Sangha, however, differ from the 
previous cases in terms of their goods and services they provide to their members. 
The critical point this chapter makes is that the collective goods the producer 
organisations accessed influences the behaviour and propensity of members to free 
ride or shirk and, therefore, organisational and social features of group vary 
accordingly.  
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part looks at the main characteristics 
of farmers’ federations and producer companies in India. In this section, the reasons 
for their comparison in this study are also established. The second and third part of 
this chapter assesses the structure of the two cases and how resources are allocated 
and incentives aligned within them. The last part concludes the chapter by comparing 
the organisational, social and economic features of the two organisations to 
understand how they are similar and differ from each other. These case studies show 
how non-credit providing producer organisations are organised and coordinated to 
address production and access concerns among small and marginal agricultural 
producers to improve surplus creation at the household level. Crucially, it also shows 
how achieving this is conditioned on how resources are allocated and incentives 
aligned in these initiatives.  
5.2 Producer companies and farmers’ federations in 
India   
Producer companies are formally recognised producer organisations whose functions 
and structure is mandated under the Companies Act of India. These companies 
comprise of members involved in activities such as producing, harvesting, procuring, 
grading, handling, marketing, selling, exporting of primary produce or importing of 
goods and services for production. Presently, there are 300 producer companies in 
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India involving 500,000 farmers54. There are another 200 companies in the process of 
being formed and another 1000 organisations were sanctioned in 2013. This is largely 
due to that fact that in recent years, there have been attempts to promote 
organisations such as producer companies to improve productivity in the agricultural 
sector and other non-farm sectors involved in production and marketing of 
agricultural commodities. In the 2013 budget speech, the Finance Minister, P. 
Chidambaram, stated that 50 crore rupees (500 million) has been earmarked to 
provide support for registered producer organisations, and each producer company is 
eligible to avail a maximum of 10 lakh rupees (1 million) as support to be used as 
working capital55. These policy initiatives by the government to support and promote 
such organisations in India as a means to improve productivity are important. 
However, the success of these organisations depends on their ability to access these 
schemes and provisions and effectively distribute them among their members.  
Farmers’ federations are not structurally mandated in policy like producer companies 
or through schemes of parastatals as in the case of joint liability groups. They emerge 
through NGOs or leadership interventions with the aim of organising collective 
action to enable access to specific goods or services for agricultural production. 
These organisations register themselves as trusts or societies to legitimise their 
functioning. As a result, the actual size of this segment or classification of their 
activities is hard to determine.  The term ‘farmers’ federations’ is used in this study to 
denote the form of collective action involving primary producers that are not 
structurally producer companies or joint liability groups. Although their features may 
differ from case to case, their similarities lie in the nature of collective action, the 
collective goods they acquire and the legal form of their identity.  
There are no specific guidelines as to how members and production activities are to 
be organised within the company. The guidelines and legislature mandates only the 
general governance structure of the producer company as they do in most business 
firms. The nature of goods, the type of service provided, how services are disbursed 
among members and how social dilemmas are addressed will depend on how 
producer companies are organised as collective actions. Therefore, Aharam Producer 
                                         
54  http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/agri-biz/govt-steps-in-to-provide-link-between-farmers-retail-
chains/article4530325.ece 
55 Source: ibid 
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Company, the producer company identified for this study, is not different from the 
Savayava Krushikara Sangha a farmers’ federation or from the Joint Liability Groups 
assessed in the previous chapter in terms of its aim to improve access to its small and 
marginal producer members.  
The cases of Aharam Producer Company and Savayava Krushikara Sangha were 
chosen for comparison for their similarities and differences. First, in terms of 
similarities, both of the organisations were produer organisations coordinating 
collective action. Second, Aharam Producer Company and Savayava Krushikara 
Sangha were initiatives that undertook the growing of organic cotton, and therefore 
faced similar challenges. Third, both the initiatives were non-credit Producer 
Organisational Formats, but undertook post-harvest marketing interventions (farm 
gate sale of cotton at premium price and value addition). The differencs was that they 
were situated in different states in south India and that they were different formats 
carrying out similar activities. Table 5.1 details the location of the two cases.  
Table 5.1 Cases for the study 
Name Location  State  
Aharam Producer 
Company  
Madurai District Tamil Nadu  
 
Savayava Krushikara 
Sangha 
H.D. Kote Taluk, Mysore 
District, Karnataka 
Karnataka  
5.3 Case I: Aharam Producer Company  
Aharam Producer Company (APC) is an incorporated company located in the 
Madurai district of Tamil Nadu. This initiative is one of the flagship projects of 
Covenant Centre for Development (CCD), an NGO that has been working on 
livelihood and social issues in the region for over three decades. The producer 
company (PC) is one of a series of development initiatives that Covenant Centre for 
Development has undertaken to effectively integrate primary producers into the 
markets. Aharam Producer Company is a producer company with seven divisions of 
cotton, mango, groundnuts, vegetables and coconut coir and a weaving and 
handlooms. Although the company was setup in 2005, different divisions were added 
to it consequently. Only the cotton division of the company and its stakeholders were 
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studied as farmers grew similar crops (cotton), making it comparable with the case of 
Savayava Krushikara Sangha, a cotton-growing collective action initiative. 
Additionally, the cotton wing has established its own spinning factory in an attempt 
to integrate the supply chain. Cotton from farmers were procured by the company, 
ginned, spun and the yarn is then sold to the market. The proceeds from this were 
disseminated among primary producers.    
This initiative had 250 members who collectively access inputs such as seeds, R&D 
benefits like extension services, information and training and marketing benefits of 
the integrated supply chain and value addition to bring economic viability to small 
and marginal agricultural producers (Table 5.2). Therefore, the private goods this 
collective action provided its members are inputs, marketing services, technical 
expertise for organic farming and returns from value addition. The public goods it 
provided were extension services and information about good growing practices. 
Twenty-two respondents were interviewed for this case study using a detailed 
questionnaire.  
Table 5.2: Features of the organisation 
Strength of the initiative 
 
250 members  
Group structure  
 
Federated groups of 12-18 members  
Collective goods obtained  Seeds, growing technology, 
information, training, joint marketing, 
value addition, organic farming 
5.3.1 History and context of the group 
Aharam Producer Company is an initiative that is supported by the Covenant Centre 
for Development (CCD) is an NGO working on livelihood-based initiatives in 
Madurai district of Tamil Nadu, since 1988. The initial focus of Covenant Centre for 
Development was to rehabilitate at-risk adolescents in towns, who had migrated to 
urban areas in search of a livelihood due to agrarian distress in rural areas. A majority 
of the child migrants were from the drought-prone areas of the Ramnad Plains of 
Tamil Nadu56. In order to deal with this problem, Covenant Centre for Development 
                                         
56The districts in this region are Madurai, Shivagangai, Vrithunagar and Ramanathapuram. 
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began development programs and livelihood-based activities in different villages in 
and around Madurai. The initial development activities targeted women through the 
formation of Self-Help Group (SHG) savings schemes to help them to support their 
families during the lean drought periods. During droughts, male members of the 
families often migrated into cities in search of work. This organisation was among 
the first to start SHG-based activities in the region.  
Since Self-Help Group models were unable to effectively raise income levels and 
living standards in rural areas, Covenant Centre for Development began initiatives 
that attempted to link producers and livelihood activities to the markets. Its first 
initiative was a Ford Foundation-funded project to conserve medicinal plants in the 
region, promote home-based healing systems and traditional knowledge in the year 
2000. This project helped set up a federation of 2000 medicinal plant gatherers called 
Muligai Sagupediyar Muligai Sekharipur Sanghanghalin Kootameppu (MSMSSK), 
which means: the federation of medicinal plant gatherers and cultivators. MSMSSK 
was set up as a public limited company in 200057.  The success of this venture and the 
amendment of the Company’s Act that enabled the formation of  producer companies 
led to the formation of ‘The Aharam traditional crops Producers Company’ (APC) in 
2005. In 2008, Covenant Centre for Development set up ‘Adaram Energies Initiative 
Private Limited’, a private limited company, with the assistance of funds from British 
Petroleum (BP).  In 2011, another private limited company called Kalasam Sacred 
Foods private was established as a joint venture with CSR Capital, a Danish firm 
involved in rural development investments. When BP withdrew support because of 
the financial crisis, CSR Capital took over shares in the Adaram Energies Initiative as 
a minority stakeholder.  
The focus of this case, the cotton division, is one of the seven divisions that make up 
Aharam Producer Company. This division was setup in 2009 after Bestseller 
Foundation, Denmark, extended a grant to Covenant Centre for Development to 
implement the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) standards in cotton cultivation in the 
                                         
57 A Public Limited company is a company registered under the Company’s Act with a minimum of 7 shareholders and no maximum 
limit of shareholders. Shares in the company are easily transferable unlike a private sector company. The gatherers and anyone who 
invests in MSMSSK hold the share in this company.  
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region58. This program required the formulation of operating procedures for growing 
cotton responsibly guided by proper information dissemination and extension 
activities. This made it necessary for the formation of farmer groups for the 
dissemination of information, capacity building and operationalisation of a cotton 
procurement system. Once the initiative was implemented and the project completed, 
Aharam Producer Company adopted the initiative as its cotton division.  
Covenant Centre for Development had good ties with the state and its various 
departments that use their services in agriculture-based capacity building in other 
regions of Tamil Nadu. Since the 1990s, the state has actively engaged the NGO for 
disseminating extension and training activities. In Madurai and the neighbouring 
districts59, Covenant Centre for Development provided extension and agricultural 
support services to farmers on behalf of the government. This has legitimised the 
Covenant Centre for Development as a relevant government service provider and has 
also helped in acquiring international funding for its other activities. Therefore, the 
linkage the NGO had with the state was significant in establishing various collective 
initiatives and organisations. In this respect, Covenant Centre for Development has 
similarities with the case of Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project 
discussed in the previous chapter.   
5.3.2 Organisational feature 
Aharam Producers Company (APC) had seven federations under it dealing with 
commodities such as cotton, mango, groundnuts, vegetables and coconut coir and a 
weaving and handloom division (Figure 5.1). The stakeholders of the producer 
company were the different federations and not individual primary producers. The 
federation represented groups of primary producers who elected bearers to represent 
them at the federation level. This made it top down and hierarchical organisation 
coordinated by the producer company. The federation comprised of savings group or 
‘kalasam’ with 12 to 18 members who jointly saved a fixed amount of money every 
week within the group. Kalasam is a sacred earthen saving-pot symbolic of the 
                                         
58 BCI is a standard of practices that aim to make cotton growing environmentally less harmful, improve livelihoods and bring about 
supply chain innovations. The fund provided by Bestseller foundation was 60 lakh rupees of which 15 lakhs was in the form of 
rolling fund by which cotton could be purchased from its member farmers. 
59Covenant Centre for Development has been associated with a state-run programme called Mathi, under the Tamil Nadu 
Corporation for Development of Women. Recently, the International Federation for Agricultural Development (IFAD) entered into 
an understanding with Covenant Centre for Development to replicate its federation structures in the Mathim region in Nagapattanam.  
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Meenakshi temple of Madurai. This respected symbol was chosen to denote a sacred 
duty by members towards their groups. Different savings groups at the village level 
(or 2-3 villages) fell under a sub-federation called the ‘mahakalasam’ (maha meaning 
greater). 
Figure 5.1: Structure of the organisation 
Regions where the groups were to be formed were first identified based on 
geographical considerations. Continuous settlement areas or a cluster of villages were 
identified and progressive farmers with larger resource endowments were educated 
about the potential benefits of organising and asked to support the initiative. Groups 
of 12-18 people were then formed, and members were trained in basic record keeping 
and informed about various functions and duties of groups and group members. 
Additionally, the previous savings group functions of SHGs were maintained. The 
Covenant Centre for 
Development   
MSMSSK APC  Adaram Energies 
Kalasam Foods 
Weaving  Mango Cotton  Groundnut Paddy Vegetables Coconut 
Mahakalasam 
Kalasam Kalasam Kalasam Kalasam
Mahakalasam 
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NGO therefore played a coordinating role connecting the initiative with the state and 
donor organisations in the past. It also played a role in enabling cooperation through 
the formation of groups and implementation of rational controls or rules and 
regulations. In this way it is similar to the credit providing producer organisations 
assessed in chapter four.  
Members were sensitised about the aims and intentions of the group, rules and 
regulations were made clear and purposive measures such as group meetings and 
group information sharing were implemented which  were the organisation’s rational 
controls put into place to coordinate collective action. Covenant Centre for 
Development’s previous experience in organising group initiatives was instrumental 
during the formation of the cotton division. Capacity-building initiatives were 
essential in educating members about the basic functions and activities of the groups.  
Federating groups into smaller sizes helped in the monitoring of groups, as well as 
building social capital by mandating regular group-based activities. Another aspect of 
the group was that there was leniency in the enforcement of rules. The common 
problems of non-conformity, according to officials, were due to poor awareness and 
issues in the groups. These include poor practices such as not conforming to organic 
farming protocol, not keeping proper records of farm activities, not attending 
meetings and spraying banned pesticides such as DDT 
(dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) on crops. Consequently, these people were 
identified, and the group’s or federation representatives re-educated them on good 
practices. The flexibility of rules was allowed because non-conformity did not have 
severe repercussions on the other members of the group. For example, defaulting on 
payment in Joint Liability Groups affected all members of the groups, while non-
conformity to (uncertified) organic protocol had little effect on other members of the 
group resulting in social dilemmas.  
The main organisational features of Aharam Producer Company are with regard to its 
external support, previous organisational experience and group size. This initiative 
was coordinated by Covenant Centre for Development, an NGO working in the field 
of development for decades. This had helped form linkages with state as well as 
international donor agencies along with development-centred venture capital bodies 
to support various initiatives. Previous experience of coordinating group-based 
activities and livelihood activities greatly helped in the formation of groups. The 
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basic administrative units of Aharam Producer Company were the primary groups. 
These federated groups were larger than the other cases in this study with 12-18 
members. Unlike credit providing organisations, the risks of social dilemmas such as 
defaulting was lower in Aharam Producer Company, and the relatively less 
importance placed on peer monitoring allowed for lenient rational controls and larger 
groups. Certification was done internally, and this informal system had no strict 
adherence contracts.  In the absence of formal compliance procedures, the 
consequences of free riding were not high. This allowed for larger groups in Aharam 
Producer Company. 
5.3.3 Social features 
Social factors were given a lot of consideration when the groups were formed in 
order to reduce friction and foster group cohesiveness. Villages in this region were a 
confederation of smaller hamlets which were in close proximity to each other. These 
hamlets were often segregated on caste lines, or in some cases, based on jatis or sub-
castes.  Therefore, they were by default socially homogeneous. These preconditions 
determined and influenced the formation of groups in Aharam Producer Company. 
The main castes within the cotton growing villages were the Marvars, Thevars, 
Gounders, which were categorised as Other Backward Castes (OBCs) and Scheduled 
Castes (SCs). A majority of the respondents of the study were Thevars and Gounders, 
and in the villages visited, only one member belonged to the scheduled caste (Table 
5.3) 
Table 5.3: Caste composition of respondents in the study (n=22)  
Caste  Number Percentage 
Thevar 13 59.09 
Gounder 8 36.36 
SC 1 4.55 
Homogenous groups were formed based on family and clan structures and named 
after their clan’s religious deity. Meetings for group activities were often carried out 
on the sacred ground of the temples to give the group and the initiative legitimacy.  
Villagers or different villages used these meeting points traditionally to solve their 
inter-communal and domestic disputes.  Due to the strong caste identities in different 
villages there were no attempts to form mixed groups. In this way, pre-existing norms 
were considered in forming and managing the groups. While enabling the formation 
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of groups, the village level social dynamics also played a role in hindering group 
formation. In 2011, three groups were discontinued in the federation due to village-
level disagreements. Pre-existing village level conflict was the reason for this. Often 
conflicts between hamlets were traditional60  and this particular conflict reignited 
when the producer company formed groups in a hamlet that was not approved by 
another social group. This led to group slowly withdrawing from the activities before 
dropping out altogether.  
Caste-based identities in the case of Aharam Producer Company formed the cognitive 
social capital in the group predisposing members to form homogeneous groups. At 
the same time, religion also played an important role in forming positive attitudes 
towards cooperation, contributing to the group’s cognitive social capital. 
Geographical considerations, caste-based considerations and previous experience of 
organising helped the initiative use pre-existing norms, networks and trust in the 
formation of the group. This structural social capital facilitated the coordination of 
collective action in the region. These social controls supplemented the lenient rational 
controls to enable and maintain cooperation in the primary groups and in the Cotton 
initiative of the company.   
This initiative has also been beneficial to women involved in agricultural production 
in the region. Due to better wages in the neighbouring state of Kerala and higher 
wages in the construction industry in larger towns, men often migrate out of the 
farms in search of work. Consequently, women have to take up the task of farming. 
Due to the presence of female-headed households, the company also formed 
women’s only groups in villages. Rajamma, a respondent from a women’s group in 
the Aharam Producer Company, states that the support and benefits from the 
federation made it easier for them to continue cultivation. The extension activities 
and inputs have helped them in production. The biggest support of the initiative, 
according to a women’s group member surveyed in this study, was marketing 
support. Farm gate purchases reduced exposure to adverse market practices such as 
under grading, improper weighing and low pricing that women were frequently more 
vulnerable to.  
                                         
60 Interview with Kumresh  
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In sum, the main social feature governing the structure of this producer organisation 
was the rigid caste relations prevalent in the region. Caste identities formed the 
structural and cognitive social capital in the group. The various groups were socially 
homogeneous. The initiative also had women’s groups that aimed at addressing 
gender-based disadvantages in production and marketing. Religion did play an 
important role in the organisation as religious symbols were used to identify groups 
and legitimise group based activities.  
5.3.4 Economic Features  
Growing of organic cotton had been the central aim of the cotton wing of the Aharam 
Producer Company. Although organic farming was formally introduced with the 
Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) standards, many growers in the region have been 
default organic growers even before the initiative started. A majority of farms in this 
region are rain-fed, and effective application of fertilizer cannot be done without 
timely rain or access to irrigation as the fertilizer would not dissolve into the soil. 
Therefore, farmers have been practicing basic organic farming methods with poor 
yields in the absence of good land management practices.  
The collective goods made available through the producer company were information 
and extension services and marketing practice of procurement and value addition. 
The individual groups were used in the dissemination of information, and extension 
and training activities in organic cultivation. Information regarding timing of summer 
ploughing, seed treatment, manuring, manure preparation or good practices like 
proper picking and cleaning cotton was given to farmers. Experts from different 
organisations including universities and NGOs conducted extension education 
programmes to educate stakeholders in good production and post-harvest practices. 
Value addition was done through the spinning mill belonging to the cotton division. 
Raw cotton was procured from villages, ginned in local ginneries, spun and sold as 
yarn in the market. The company did not provide credit services to its farmer 
members due to the high risk of rain-fed agriculture. Approximately 60 per cent of 
the farmers surveyed had access to formal sources of credit from banks and 14 per 
cent of farmers in the survey admitted to being in debt bondage with local 
moneylenders. The activities of moneylenders in the region have reduced after the 
emergence of SHGs and financial inclusion initiatives in the past two decades. Local 
banks have been active in this region extending loans to farmers under the guarantee 
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of the SHGs. The role of Covenant Centre for Development has been instrumental in 
this development. However, 40 per cent of farmers surveyed in the study did not have 
access to institutional credit and had to use the services of moneylenders.  
Under the initiative, cotton was procured from the famers through procurement 
centres set up in each village. The cotton is instantly weighed and payments were 
made promptly to farmers. As the produce was not ‘certified’ as organic there was no 
premium paid for the produce61. The procured cotton was spun into yarn before being 
sold in the market. The profits were then distributed to member farmers through the 
groups. However, the spinning unit owned by the federation was presently not 
running on capacity. Electricity shortages62 and inadequate yields were reasons for 
this. The capacity of the spinning unit was 250 kilos a day and presently it is 
functioning at 110 kilos under its capacity. In order to increase capacity, there was 
also a need to expand the initiative to include more farmers. However, hindrance in 
sourcing of working capital has limited this endeavour.  
The changes this initiative had brought about were through linkages that enabled the 
provision of information and extension services and better marketing practices in the 
downstream markets. The changes collective action had brought were better practices 
at the farm level helping to reduce the cost of production, reduce marketing costs and 
value added benefits at the market level. According to internal studies conducted by 
Covenant Centre for Development, the groups on an average had been able to bring 
about a 10 per cent increase in price63. This, according to some farmers and the 
federation coordinator, was a result of better quality seeds and farm management 
practices that reduced wastage of resources. At the market level, unfair marketing 
practices had been noted to bring down income by 30-40 per cent in crops like cotton, 
especially when grades were not determined at the markets. The common problems 
were improper weighing, and underpricing of cotton. A purchaser within the 
federation narrated the following incident: 
                                         
Organic certification was not considered by the organization because Aharam procured the cotton for value addition. It was 
reasoned that certification required higher monitoring and implementation costs. The market for which the cotton was produced for 
did not require organic certification.  
62 There were 12 hour power cuts in the state and in early 2012 the mill had been able to process only 70-90 tonnes. With no power 
shortages it can process close to 200 kilos a day. 
63 Interview Tachinamurthy 
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…I was in the field during buying time, we had packed, loaded the raw cotton to the ginning factory… 
one old lady came in for the selling of cotton and (s)he brought 14 Kgs of cotton…this is a very small 
quantity, and the price was some 26 or 28 rupees, while the market rate was 24 something, but we gave a 
fixed (price of rupees) 26. When we did her weighment, she saw that (it was) 14 kilos…she left because 
she was not satisfied. But she soon returned saying that the village local dealer weighed it and said there 
was only 11 kilos…. through improper weighment, a trader can cheat a farmer by almost 40 per cent of 
his yield according to the total volume.   
Through village level procurement systems, transaction costs of transportation, lower 
price realisation due to poor bargaining power and the inability to find reliable buyers 
were mitigated. Additionally, the value addition component helped farmers realise a 
higher price for their produce compared to selling raw cotton in the market.  
5.3.5 Resource allocation and incentive alignment in the group  
All members in the producer company were small and marginal farmers with an 
average landholding of 3.65 acres (1.4 hectares) (table 5.5).Therefore, they had 
homogeneous resource endowment in terms of ownership of land. However, with 
regard to access to irrigation, table 5.4 shows that out of the 22 respondents surveyed 
in the study, 36 per cent of them had access to irrigation. In agriculture, especially in 
semi-arid conditions, access to irrigation is crucial and yields are drastically 
influenced by water stress. Table 5.5 shows that average yield per acre were 
sometimes four times higher in some households than others. Additionally, access to 
irrigation also determined the kind of crops that were grown by farmers. Almost all 
members of the groups grew cotton because of the support given by the federation 
and also due to its drought resistant quality. Horticulture crops, paddy, onions and 
chilli were also grown by farmers who had access to irrigation. Therefore, the 
resource heterogeneity of members and their farming practices in the group was high 
determined by their access to irrigation and the type of crops they grew.  
Table 5.4: Irrigation sources for farmers (n=22) 
Source  Number of respondents Percentage 
Well  7 31.82 
Bore wells 1 4.55 
Rain fed  12 63.64 
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Table 5.5: Size of landholdings in the Group (n=22) 
 Max Min Difference Average Median Std. 
Dev 
Size of 
Landholdings  
6.00 0.75 5.25 3.65 4.00 1.39 
 
Fertilizers and 
pesticides 
(Expenditure in 
Rupees)  
425 0 485.71 144.67 117.50 488.23 
 
 
Yield per acre 
Cotton (Quintals)   
5 1.2 3.80 2.02 1.50 1.30 
Similar to other initiatives, the goods made available to the group were non-rivalrous 
and non-excludable within the group, and therefore, no member was excluded from 
benefiting from the goods once they were made available. However, members had 
varied utility to the goods and services provided by the initiative, and households 
with access to irrigation had more surplus and therefore higher surpluses from the 
initiative.  In terms of incentive structures, members had solidarity incentives as well 
as material incentives to participate in collective action. Homogeneous caste and 
exclusion of other castes brought with it caste-based solidarity from pre-existing 
norms and networks. The presence of women’s group was also a solidary incentive 
for female-headed households to participate in collective action. The material 
incentives to cooperate were high for both irrigated farming households and non-
irrigated farming households. The main reasons for adopting organic farming have 
been to reduce the cost of production and manage resources better under non- 
irrigated conditions. Organic farming often utilized biofertilizers and pesticides that 
were often made from resources available at the farm level, and this has helped 
reduce the cost of production. Organic farming was also knowledge and management 
intensive as most fertilisers and pesticides needed to be prepared at the farm level, 
and integrated pest management and nutrition management procedures needed to be 
followed. This form of intensive management followed in organic farming also 
helped crops handle water stress better64 .  
                                         
64 Interview Tachinamurthy 
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For irrigated farming households, the main changes brought about by the company 
were from marketing of produce and value addition incentives. Small farmers and 
women were especially vulnerable when undertaking marketing activities. Direct 
procurement from farms by the federation has helped reduce losses resulting from 
poor marketing practices of intermediaries by over 20 per cent according to officials 
at the federation. Interviews with famers also revealed that there has been a 
substantial reduction in marketing costs. This is a result of reduced transportation 
costs (4-5 trips to the market every harvest for different picks). Standard grade-based 
price reduced moral hazard problems through proper weighing, assured sales and 
immediate payment (Table 5.7). However, hindrances in production resulting from 
electricity shortages, the company has not been able to purchase all the produce from 
its members65.  Although cotton was purchased by the company from 77 per cent of 
the respondents, 23 per cent of its members had to sell their produce in the open 
market and could not avail the benefits of marketing (Table 5.8). Therefore, some 
members were de facto exculded from accessing a good that was stated to be non-
excludable.  
Table 5.7: Benefits of collective action  
Particulars  Perceived Percentage change 
Cost of production  -10% 
Marketing cost  -20% 
Table 5.8: Methods of sale by member (n=22) 
Marketing  Number of respondents Percentage 
Federation  17 77 
Traders, APMC 5 23 
Table 5.9 depicts the average and median net profit, the changes in profit resulting 
from collective action calculated from 22 respondents surveyed for this case study. 
The highest (max) and the lowest level of benefit (min) individuals attained are also 
presented along with the average and median returns in different landholdings sizes. 
This is to determine the extent to which changes have occurred in each of the land 
holding categories. The results show that marginal farmers gained most on an 
                                         
65As mentioned in footnote 62, powercuts lasting 12 hours a day in 2012 led to the spinning mill running under its capacity by 60 per 
cent. Due to this the company could not procure all of its members cotton. 
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average, as many of them who were making losses began making a slight profit. The 
high variation between the maximum and minimum was due to the farmers’ access to 
irrigation. As the region is semi-arid with poor access to irrigation, the levels of yield 
were not as high as other cases such as Savayava Krushikara Sangha which will be 
discussed in the next section. Larger landholding sizes did not mean better yields as 
output in rain-fed agriculture was low compared to irrigated lands due to water stress. 
The average net profit of producers was not high enough to sustain a livelihood only 
through farming, and additional incomes had to be gained from remittances from 
members working in various towns and manual labour.  
Table 5.9 Changes from collective action in Aharam Producer Company* 
    Max Min Average Median 
1-3 acres 
 
Net Profit (π) 17,250.00 -310.00 4,989.29 2,690.00 
Change in Profit (δπ) 10,912.50 2,737.20 4,435.61 4,365.00 
 
 
3-5 acres 
   
Change in net profit (%) 17.75 162.27 
 
Net Profit 136,750 6,700 40,027.14 2,6405 
Change in Profit  13,785.33 1,586.25 7,103.8 7,764.2 
 
 
> 5 acres 
  
Change in net profit (%) 17.75 29.40 
 
Net Profit 16,000    
Change in Profit  7,200    
   Change in net profit (%) 45    
* The profit function used to compute this is given in appendix VI 
A majority of the respondents stated that the general economic benefits or material 
incentives for joining the Aharam Producer Company were the reasons why they 
stayed in the company (86 per cent), while 18 per cent suggested that solidarity to 
their neighbours and friends was also a reason to remain in the group (Table 5.10). 
Women members stated that the support of the federation has made production and 
marketing easier for them. This shows that economic necessity also played an 
important role in predisposing individuals to act collectively.  
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Table 5.10: Reasons for staying in the group (n=22) 
 Number of respondents Percentage 
General economic benefits 19 86 
Marketing  8 36 
Women’s Group 4 18 
Price realisation  3 14 
Solidarity  4 18 
In the Aharam Producer Company, the main organisational features were external 
support, group size and previous experience. Support from Covenant Centre for 
Development and the linkages it had with international donor agencies and other 
international bodies has helped in the coordination of the initiative. The 
implementation of Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) protocol and the experiences of 
coordinating it were important for the formation of the producer company. The group 
size in the initiative was larger than other cases as the need for peer monitoring and 
sanctions was lower. However, the initiative still used federated groups of 18-20 
individuals. In terms of its social features, Aharam Producer Company was an 
exclusive group comprised of Other Backward Caste (OBC) producers. The pre-
existing rigid caste dynamic in the region hindered the formation of inclusive groups. 
Religious symbolism and caste identities provided the structural and cognitive social 
capital for the coordination of collective action, and the distinctive economic feature 
of the group was the absence of credit as a collective good. This was largely due to 
the higher risks associated with rain fed agriculture, which a majority of the members 
of Aharam Producer Company practiced. Other collective goods acquired were 
research and extension services (public goods), marketing services, and value 
addition (private goods). Nevertheless, the returns from farming in this initiative were 
the lowest among the four cases largely due to the drought prone nature of the 
location. The average net profit on marginal farms in Shri Kshethra Dharmastala 
Rural Development and Savayava Krushikara Sangha were 39,905 and 23,437 rupees 
respectively. 
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5.4 Case II: Savayava Krushikara Sangha Farmers’ 
Federation 
The Savayava Krushikara Sangha (SKS) is a farmers’ federation located in HD Kote 
taluk of Mysore district in the state of Karnataka. Although this region has rich 
biodiversity and natural resources, it is among the most underdeveloped taluks in the 
state. Savayava Krushikara Sangha was formed in February 2006, and as of 2012 it 
had 244 members in 11 villages cultivating 318 hectares of land (785 acres). A 
majority of its members were small and marginal farmers, with an average 
landholding size of 3.2 acres per member. Certified organic cotton was the main crop 
grown by farmers in the federation and the collective goods that the group accessed 
for its members were inputs, information, specific growing technologies, extension 
services, marketing benefits and group organic certification. This has helped  to 
reduce the cost of production and attain higher price margins in the market, while 
reducing environmental externalities resulting from declining soil fertility.  
This case is an example of how marketing contracts through corporate support were 
enabled through collective initiatives. As there were no premiums for organic cotton 
in agricultural markets in India, the federation formed forward linkages with a textile 
manufacturer, Appachi Cotton Company66 that extended support to certify organic 
produce and procures cotton at an organic premium, higher than the market price. 
Forty-four primary producers were surveyed for the study, which helped acquire 
information regarding the organisational, social and economic features of the 
initiative. Unlike other producer organisations of this study, Savayava Krushikara 
Sangha kept production cost records of its members, which was used to analyse 
changes in production costs and marketing costs brought about through collective 
action. The sample size of the production data used in this analysis was 59 farmer 
households and data was acquired for the fourty four pimary producers surveyed in 
the study in addition to 15 househould not surveyed for their organisational, social 
and economic features. 
 
                                         
66 Appachi Cotton Company is an establishment involved in Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives like promoting Organic 
Farming and responsible farm management since the early 2000s. It has established a Non-Governmental Organization called CARE, 
which works with small and marginal cotton growing farmers in the states of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. 
Appachi Cotton exited the program in 2011. 
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Table 5.11: Features of the organisation 
Strength of the initiative 
 
244 members, 318 hectares (785 acres) 
Group structure  
 
Federated groups of 7-10 members  
Collective goods obtained  Seeds, growing technology, extension 
services, organic certification, extension, 
joint marketing  
5.4.1 History and context of the group 
HD Kote is located in the catchment area of the Kabini reservoir in Mysore district. It 
is a bio- sensitive region where the major crops grown were cotton, tobacco, finger 
millet, maize, oilseeds, and pulses under rain-fed conditions and paddy, sugarcane, 
vegetables and flowers under irrigated conditions. Over the years, agricultural 
distress resulting from drought conditions and depleting ground water levels due to 
changing cropping patterns has led to productive family labour migration to adjoining 
districts and cities in search of employment. State intervention and support through 
‘Myrada’ (or MYKAPS as it was later called), an NGO, introduced development 
activities such as hybrid cotton cultivation, watershed management programs and 
land development  to mitigate these risks and prevent seasonal migration of family 
labour from farms.  
In order to deepen the impact of these interventions and address more specific 
problems in agricultural production, including access to inputs, information and 
extension activities, a group of large landowning, environmentally conscious farmers 
or ‘lead farmers’ formed an organic farming association to replicate the results that 
they observed on their farms through better land management practices. This resulted 
in the formation of the Kakana Kote Savayava Kutumba Sangha (the Kakana Kote 
Organic Farming Families’ Association). This association soon disbanded due to 
organisational and management difficulties. The group was formed under the 
guidelines of the Organic Farmers Association of India (OAFI), a pan-India 
organisation of farmers that promoted and certified organic farming. All members of 
the association were required to strictly adhere to its standardised growing protocol.  
However, variations in ecology, resource endowment of farmers and levels of 
awareness among farmers made it difficult for the group to conform to many of its 
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requirements. Having mobilized people and resources to start a group, members 
decided to leave OAFI and form an independent organic famers association under the 
name Savayava Krishikara Sangha in 2006. The group was formally registered under 
the Societies Act that same year. 
The federation began under the patronage of the MYKAPS, who provided it with 
office space and personnel with developmental experience to launch the initiative. 
The federation initially used the reputation of the NGO and its traditional goodwill to 
establish itself in the community.  The NGO was also instrumental in liaising with 
the government, agricultural universities and other centres of research to form 
linkages for information and extension activities to be made available.  
5.4.2 Organisational features 
The governance structure of Savayava Krushikara Sangha was hierarchical and 
individual groups of 7 to 10 members67 formed the basic unit of the group. Again, as 
in the case of Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project and Aharam 
Producer Company, the members’ geographical proximity was a major criterion in 
the formation of the group. One member from each group is represented in the village 
committees and different villages’ elected one member from the village level 
committee to the executive committee at the federation level, which in turn elected a 
chairperson (figure 5.2). One representative from Appachi Cotton and one from 
MYKAPS, the supporting NGO, were also present in the executive committee. All 
members of the committee were participating members of the group. The chairperson 
and the executive committee were responsible for all decisions made in the federation 
concerning collective goods and benefits supplied to individual groups through the 
village committee.  This formed a bottom-up form of organising as cooperation rather 
coordination. 
The federation had a strict internal control system which set the norms of 
membership along with procedures for sanctions of violations. Among the strict 
norms was the banning of genetically modified seeds, chemical fertilizers and 
cultivation of tobacco. The farmers were mandated to attend meetings and training 
sessions regularly and to keep records of their expenditures and farm level activities. 
                                         
67 In order for a group to form, there were to be at least five interested farmers in the village. If there was a village level committee in 
that village, it would assess the group and determine whether there was enough motivation within the group to join the federation.  
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Failure to comply with these requirements in cases of serious offences (like the use of 
GMOs, or chemicals) could lead to expulsion from the groups, or suspension or 
review for less serious offences. Although the organic protocols were strictly 
followed, the farmers often defaulted on regularity of bookkeeping68 and attendance 
of meetings. 
Figure 5.2: Structure of Savayava Krushikara Sangha federation 
Internal audits were conducted twice a year along with one external audit by the 
Institute of Marketecology (IMO), the Swiss based certifying body. For a farmer to 
become a member of a federation, his village had to have a minimum of five 
interested farmers who were willing to become organic farmers, adhere to the internal 
control system and follow organic protocol for three years, after which they became 
certified organic growers. Failure to comply with the requirements potentially 
demoted the farmer along with his group from their ‘certification’ status that could 
lower the final price of their produce69. Therefore, in Savayava Krushikara Sangha, 
there was a high level of monitoring required within the groups to prevent social 
dilemmas, such as moral hazard problems, that may have emerged due to non-
                                         
68 20 members in the survey of 44 member farmers said they were illiterate. Although this was a challenge, defaulting on regular 
bookkeeping was more widespread.   
69 Full organic certification requires 3 years to attain. Serious cases of non-compliance would lead to revoking of organic status of the 
farmer. 
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compliance to certification requirements. As a result, strict rules and sanctions along 
with the peer monitoring was important in the groups. Small federated groups were 
crucial in enabling peer monitoring by members of the groups. Rules and regulations 
or rational controls in the group were very strong compared to the Aharam Producer 
Company due to the organic certification that was undertaken by the initiative. 
Many farmer members of Savayava Krushikara Sangha had prior experience of being 
involved in collective activities under various watershed management programs run 
by Myrada in this region. The watershed program was a government program aimed 
at collectively managing common pool resource through watershed development 
associations, watershed committees, and Community Managed Resource Centres 
(CMRCs) in order to increase availability of water for agriculture. The activities of 
the user groups were supplemented with the formation of savings groups through 
Self-Help Groups. The formation of new groups in Savayava Krushikara Sangha 
benefited from the existing organisational experience participants had gained from 
these programs. The other purposive measures to increase group based activities were 
regular meetings to plan activities of the groups at the village and federation levels. 
Weekly meetings were especially frequent during the sowing and the harvest seasons 
where information dissemination activities were most needed. Monthly income and 
expenditure patterns of the federation were also shared in the meetings to create 
financial transparency. 
The main organisational features of Savayava Krushikara Sangha were its external 
support by privileged group and the NGO, previous experience of members, and the 
size of the primary groups.  External support for the formation of the groups came 
from a privileged group of ‘lead farmers’ and the NGO. The formation of groups and 
the initial coordination of groups were made possible by NGO support provided by 
MYKAPS. The lead farmers and the NGO were also responsible for enabling the 
formation of linkages to Appachi Cotton Company. Therefore, the lead farmers and 
the NGO played an important coordinating role in enabling cooperation. Members of 
the groups had previous experience of participating in group-based watershed 
management activities and the NGO had experience coordinating such group 
activities and this complemented the new initiatives. The size of the groups in the 
initiative was between 7-10 members. As Savayava Krushikara Sangha undertook 
certified organic cotton cultivation, adherence to organic protocol was crucial. Strict 
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rational controls and the small size of the groups enabled peer monitoring which were 
crucial to prevent social dilemmas arising from non-compliance of protocol.  
5.4.3 Social features 
Organic farming is knowledge and management intensive and organic certification 
has high non-compliance consequences. Certified organic cotton production required 
the formation of internal control systems to manage inclusion and exclusion, 
violations and sanction, extension services, training, and reporting. Networks, norms 
and trust played a vital role in the organisation and management of collective action. 
The groups’ involvement in collective watershed management activities had given 
most of the members’ previous experience in collective action. When the new 
initiative to grow organic cotton was introduced, the older groups were maintained 
and new groups were formed only in areas where watershed management groups did 
not exist. This enabled the use of existing networks and norms to promote and 
coordinate group-based activities. This helped to increase cohesion and reduce social 
dilemmas within the newly formed groups. Furthermore, the entry qualifications to 
the federation were strict and not determined by resource conditions alone, but rather 
on the levels of interest to adopt organic farming. The applicant had to be approved 
by the group and the village committee before they could join the initiative.  
A survey of 44 farmers in the federation revealed that 80 percent of them belonged to 
the Other Backward Castes category (Gowda, Naika and Lingayat), 16 per cent were 
scheduled castes (Scheduled Caste) and four per cent to the upper castes (Brahmin 
and Shetty)  (Table 5.12). A majority of members in the federation belonged to the 
upper or middle castes as these groups traditionally owned land, and, unlike Aharam 
Producer Company, there was no evidence of overt caste-based discrimination in 
group formations. A criterion for membership in the federation was that members 
should own the land they cultivate, and, therefore, only a few individuals belonging 
to scheduled castes were present in the group. This may have been due to the lower 
number of scheduled castes owning land in this region.  
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Table 5.12: Caste composition of respondents of the case study (n=44) 
Caste Number of Respondents Percentage 
SC 7 16 
Gowda 17 39 
Naika  16 36 
Lingayat 2 5 
Brahmin  1 2 
Shetty  1 2 
Groups at the village levels were formed by involving influential ‘elders’ of the 
village. This was an important step as existing institutions of interaction at the village 
level were woven into its social fabric. For example, the traditional method of selling 
cotton involved traders coming to particular villages, taking into confidence an 
influential person of the village (often incentivised by monetary gifts or bribes70), 
who in turn gave his support allowing the trader to influence transactions, often on 
adverse terms. The groups, therefore, further required the support of the local elite as 
a means of negating the influence of these traditional practices. 
Purposive measures to build and maintain social capital mandated regular group 
meetings and the distribution of inputs and marketing through groups. This helped 
build structural social capital within the groups. Extension activities related to better 
growing practices and technology adoption were often given at the village level and 
this required an increased interaction and cooperation among members. In federated 
groups, peer monitoring was used to check social dilemmas relating to non-
compliance. However, there were still tendencies for a group or groups in a particular 
village to jointly default. The village level social elites often determined the 
propensity of local groups in a region to default or adhere. If lead farmers or 
dominant farmers in villages were highly motivated, others in the group or village 
remain motivated71. If the dominant farmers wilfully defaulted, there were instances 
where the group or the entire village followed.  
                                         
70The bribe according to one respondent was close to 10,000 rupees to the village partner for nothing more than support and space to 
conduct transactions in the village. The local partner ensured that there would be no opposition to the traders pricing.  
71Interview with L N Rama Rao, a farmer in the group. 
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Social capital in the form of solidarity and loyalty to the group prevented free riding, 
while at the same time increased the possibility of joint defaulting. The level of 
attrition in groups was low as there were tangible benefits in the form of inputs, 
reduced cost of production (through better access to quality seeds, technology, and 
information) and low marketing costs. The average time members spent in the group 
was four and a half years (Table 5.13). The benefits of collective action and previous 
experience of organising that contributed to the shared values and attitudes in the 
groups contributed to its cognitive social capital predisposing individuals to 
cooperate. Therefore, the role of social capital as a social control, similar to other 
groups explored in this thesis, played an important role in preventing the emergence 
of social dilemmas. Therefore, social controls along with rational controls helped in 
the enforcement of organic protocol and procedures required by the certifying 
organisation.   
Table 5.13: Number of year’s spent in groups by members 
 Maximum Minimum Average Median Std.Dev 
Time in Group  6 0,8 4,40 5,00 1,86 
There were women members in different groups of the initiative although they were 
not active participants in group-based activities such as extension services and 
marketing. The reason they were registered in groups was because property rights 
were in their name and the federation mandates the registration of individuals 
possessing title deeds to the land. Group-based activities and marketing were 
attended by male members of the family (sons or sons-in-law). The federation did not 
take up any gender sensitive or gender focused activities to aid or support women-led 
households in the initiative. 
Members of Savayava Krushikara Sangha primary groups belonged to different 
social groups as caste-based identities were not as rigid as in the regions where 
Aharam Producer Company operated. Formation of groups based on geographical 
proximity of households helped mobilise existing social capital in the form of social 
networks. The initiative also mandated that members participate in group-based 
activities such as group meetings and group information dissemination activities. 
These purposive measures helped build structural social capital within the groups. 
Social capital in groups was crucial to ensure adherence to organic protocol and 
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prevent non-conformity that affected all members of the group. However, in some 
cases social capital also led to group defaults and joint non-compliance.  
5.4.4 Economic features 
Cotton was the major crop that was grown by the members of the federation. Crops 
like finger millets and pulses were often grown as intercrops along with cotton. The 
collective goods made available to members of the group were seeds, information, 
extension services and marketing, and these were largely focused on cotton and 
cotton growing. Similar to other groups in this study, the collective goods were non-
rivalrous and non-excludable to members within the group. This enabled a reduction 
in the cost of production and price realisation through improved market practices and 
improved soil health on farms.  Supply of organic cottonseeds was essential for 
certified organic production as per the IMO standards. The federation provided its 
members with certified organic seeds each season. The certified quality of the seeds 
assured a higher germination rate than conventional seeds purchased from the ‘black’ 
market or ginners72. According to Mani Chinnaswamy, Managing Partner and 
Proprietor, Appachi Cotton, the procuring partner of Savayava Krushikara Sangha: 
The base input is the right seed, because half the problem is solved when they sow the right quality 
seed… right quality of seed… even if it gives one quintal extra yield… one quintal is like 4000 rupees,  is 
almost 50% of his cultivation cost. 
At the marketing level, organic premiums were given to the certified produce (10 per 
cent above market price). Since there is no established organic premium in the 
markets, prices were determined by the legitimacy of organic certification. Often 
textile companies such as Appachi Cotton Company adhered to international textile 
standards needed certified organic cotton that could not be sourced from the open 
market. The Appachi Cotton-SKS agreement was a legal yet non-binding contract, 
which meant that there were no judicial implications for not adhering to the contract. 
The federation had a price-fixing committee consisting of five members: two 
federation members, 2 people from Appachi Cotton and a local farmer with cotton 
selling experience. They fixed the procurement price of cotton annually, and this 
became the procurement price. Farm gate purchase and the use of electronic 
                                         
72 Traditionally seeds for the sowing season are purchased from the local ginner, who sells it as a by-product of his activity. Here the 
seeds are not sorted or certified and could contain different varieties of seed cotton with differing quality.  
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weighing during procurement has helped reduce transaction and transportation costs 
resulting from poor buying ans selling practices in the market73. Informants for this 
study revealed that there has been a 15 per cent increase in profits as a result of better 
marketing practices and price realisation. 
Although Appachi Cotton purchases cotton only from the farmers, all produce grown 
on the farm was organically certified. Intercropping was an essential part of 
Integrated Pest Management practices, and often pulses and vegetables were used for 
this. The other farm organic products were sold to niche buyers in the neighbouring 
cities of Calicut and in Bangalore. Although they do not fetch premiums as high as 
cotton, there was a 2 - 4 per cent premium depending on the produce and the demand 
in the market. Savayava Krushikara Sangha did not provide credit to its farmers, and 
Table 5.14 shows the different sources of credit for farmers in the federation. Thirty 
eight per cent of the respondents in the study stated that they still used the service of 
moneylenders. 
Table 5.14: Nature of credit to members of the federation (n=44) 
Nature of Credit  Number of respondents Percentage 
Formal  13 29.55 
Informal  17 38.64 
No Credit/non response  14 31.82 
Cotton was the major crop grown by the members of Savayava Krushikara Sangha 
and many of the collective goods made available to members such as seeds, extension 
services, information and organic premium price were targeted toward cotton 
growers. Therefore, in effect, this encouraged most members of the initiative to grow 
cotton. The other major collective good of the initiative was organic certification. 
Similar to Aharam Producer Company, credit was not made available to members as 
the organisation did not have linkages with NABARD or corpus funds from which it 
could lend to its members. It was unlikely they would have initiated such an initiative 
as the risk of crop failure was high in this drought prone area.  
                                         
73 Interviews with traders revealed that their methods of pricing and procurement were to counter the poor practices taken up by the 
farmers. Farmers in order increase weight of cotton added stones in their sacks and drenched portions of the cotton etc. The trader in 
order to account for these practices, delibrately lowered procurment prices. Poor prices according to them were a result of years of 
poor practice and mistrust from both sides.  
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The average landholding size among in the group (from a sample size of 59) was 3.2 
acres (1.2 hectares) and therefore could be considered an initiative of small and 
marginal farmers. However, there were also some large and middle farmers in the 
group, and the largest land holding size was 25 acres. Similar to Aharam Producer 
Company, access to irrigation determined the economic advantage rather than size of 
landholding. Forty-one per cent of farmers in the survey had access to bore wells, 
which gave them an advantage for diversification of crops like paddy, ginger, 
turmeric, sugarcane and horticultural crops (Table 5.15). There the resource structure 
in the groups was heterogeneous.  
Table 5.15: Source of irrigation for respondents (n=44) 
Irrigation source  Number of Respondents Percentage 
Rainfed  27 61.36 
Bore well/well 17 40.91 
The goods that were made available were non-rivalrous and non-excludable within 
the group, and therefore all members were able to access and use the collective 
goods. The utility of the collective goods access varied as households with access to 
more land and access to irrigation could gain more from the marketing services 
provided by the initiative. Members with more utility were also the privileged group 
of the initiative. The solidary incentive to participate in collective action came 
through pre-existing networks and norms created from previous experiences of 
jointly participating in watershed management programs. Also, as members were 
friends and neighbours, the initiative used already existing social capital to coordinate 
the collective action.  
The material incentives of the initiative were high as marketing services and premium 
prices helped reduce costs and increase farm surpluses. According to an internal 
Farmers Field School study conducted in 2008, cost of cultivation compared to 
cultivating Bt cotton74 in the initiative was grossly less (table 5.16). Organic 
                                         
74 Bacillus thuringiensis or Bt is a bacterium commonly found in the soil. Bt has natural insecticidal qualities and isa major 
component in insecticides. In genetically modified crops (GMO) such as Bt cotton, corn, soya, potato,bringal, the bt gene is inserted 
into the seeds, making them naturally resistant to certain types of pests. 93% of the cottonseeds sown in India have Bt technology. In 
2011-12, according to the Ministry of Textiles, Government of India, 12.18 million hectares in India was under cotton cultivation and 
according to the Ministry of Agriculture, 11.3 million hectares was under Bt Cotton cultivation. 
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cultivation, the study stated, reduced the cost of cultivation by 59 per cent and 
increase profit by 68 per cent at a cost benefit ratio of 1:3. The major reduction in 
cost of cultivation was due to the use of organic fertilizers and pesticides which are 
often prepared on the farm using local materials. Information and effective farm 
management practices through extension services were critical inputs that enabled 
better production. Farmers Field School75 and Integrated Pest Management (IPM)76 
training were periodically carried out with the support from the state agriculture 
department. Informants for this study also revealed that there has been a 15 per cent 
decrease in costs as a result of better marketing practices and price realisation. 
Table 5.16: Comparison of production cost changes through collective action (in 
rupees) 
Particulars  Conventional (Bt 
Cotton) 
Collective action Percentage 
Difference 
Seed  1900 1140 40 
Cost of 
Cultivation 
7450 3070 58.79 
Earnings  14500 15950 10 
Profit  6960 11740 68.67 
Using the production data maintained by Savayava Krushikara Sangha, the profit 
made by different farmer households was calculated, and the changes in profit 
resulting from collective action were assessed for different groups based on 
landholding size (< 1 acre, 1-3 acres and >3 acres). Table 5.18 reports the highest 
(Max) and the lowest (Min) along with the average and then median level of profits 
for three different landholding size categories. Reduction in production cost, 
increased market price realisation and reduction in marketing costs were seen as 
major reasons for changes in profits. The percentage change in profits resulting from 
collective action interventions were higher with lower land sizes as smaller farmers 
were most affected by poor input and information access, lower price realisation due 
to poor bargaining power and higher marketing costs resulting from poor marketing 
                                         
75 Farmer Field Schools are a community-based, practically oriented, season long field study program involving farmers facilitated 
by extension staff or other farmers to educate them on effective, progressive and sustainable farm practices.  
76 Integrated Pest Management: (IPM) is a pest control strategy using a combination of complementary methods like mechanical and 
physical devices along with genetic, biological and chemical management.  
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practices such as improper weighing and under-pricing. As collective action 
addresses some of these issues that may not concern larger farmers (due to better 
bargaining power and access to inputs), the percentage change in profits were higher 
in smaller farms. Similar to the other initiatives, marginal farms and some small 
farms still did not generate enough surplus and agricultural income for households to 
depend solely on agriculture despite the changes brought about through collective 
action (Table 5.17). This agricultural income had to be supported by additional 
income through manual labour.  
Table 5.17: Changes from collective action in Savayava Krushikara Sangha* 
(n=59) 
  Max Min Average Median 
<1 acre Net Profit  27,601.46 12,127.29 23,437.28 26,154.58 
Change in Profit  13,304.8 6,228.096 11,697.22 12,964.08 
Change in net profit (%) 49.91 49.57 
 
1-3 acres Net Profit  67,320.64 29,980.85 48,234.33 53,856.51 
Change in Profit  31,140.48 13,868.23 22,390.32 24,912.38 
Change in net profit (%) 46.42 46.26 
 
> 3 acres Net Profit 213,181 79,942.87 111,027.6 106,590.5 
Change in Profit  76,197.49 28,574.06 39,684.69 38,098.74 
Change in net profit (%) 35.74 35.74 
* The profit function used to compute this is given in appendix VI 
In Savayava Krushikara Sangha the main organisational features that enabled 
collective action were external support, previous experience and small group size. 
External support from MYKAPS and the privileged group helped in the formation 
and coordination of the initiative. Previous experience of participating in group-based 
activities by members and experience of coordinating group-based activities by the 
NGO were crucial to the group. The small federated group also helped in peer 
monitoring and identifying non-compliance. The main social feature of the initiative 
was how it mobilised existing social capital in coordinating group activities. 
Formation of groups based on geographical proximity helped the use of existing 
networks. As caste dynamics were not very strong, mixed groups could be formed. 
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However, gender-based initiatives within the organisation were missing. The main 
economic feature of the group was that the groups produced certified organic cotton, 
which was sold at a premium price. Savayava Krushikara Sangha is an example of 
how the nature of collective goods made available can determine how the initiative is 
organised. Adherence to organic protocol and the consequence of non-conformity 
determines the strictness of rules and regulations and systems of sanctions. This in 
turn determined the main organisational features of group size in the initiative. The 
other collective goods that were made available to producers were organic cotton 
seeds, information and extension services and marketing services where cotton was 
purchased at the farm gate. These collective goods helped increase profit among 
members, although similar to other initiatives, marginal farms could not produce 
sufficient surplus.  
5.5 Discussion   
The cases of Aharam Producer Company and Savayava Krushikara Sangha can be 
seen as examples of how initiatives promoting collective actions can increase access 
to inputs, information and extension services, enable farm gate purchases, increase 
price realisation, and in the case of Aharam Producer Company enable integration of 
the value chain. One key difference between these cases and the cases assessed in the 
previous chapter is that Aharam Producer Company and Savayava Krushikara 
Sangha were non-credit providing organisations. However, unlike the earlier cases 
there were interventions in the downstream markets such as farm gate purchases, 
marketing interventions (organic premium) and value addition. A key similarity 
between the two sets of cases were that the role of NGOs and privileged groups (in 
the case of Savayava Krushikara Sangha) was crucial in the formation of the groups 
and in enabling linkages with the state to provide collective goods such as extension 
services.  In this section, the similarities and differences of the two initiatives 
discussed in this chapter are compared to highlight the factors that influence the 
structure of these initiatives coordinating collective actions. Table 5.18 highlights the 
similarities and differences from the two cases.  
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Table 5.18: Similarities and differences of Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural 
Development Project and Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society  
Features  Similarity  Differences 
Organisational - Hierarchically organised 
- Cooperation and 
coordination 
- Federated groups  
- Centralised decision 
making  
- Larger primary group 
size than JLGs 
- Prior experience in 
collective action  
- NGO support in group 
formation and 
functioning  
- Small initiatives 
 APC was a Producer Company 
while SKS was a Farmers 
Federation  
 APC was governed by an NGO 
support while SKS had 
representational governance 
 APC had lenient rules and 
regulations while SKS had strict 
rules and regulations in line with  
organic protocols 
 SKS had a high entry cost which 
required adherence to organic 
protocols 
Social  - Geographical 
considerations in group 
formation  
- Social capital from 
previous organisational 
experience  
- Social controls  
- Sensitization of rural 
elites 
- Purposive measures to 
maintain social capital   
 APC had homogeneous caste 
groups, while SKS had mixed caste 
groups  
 Religious symbolism was used to 
maintain social capital in APC 
 APC had women-specific groups to 
tackle gender-based disadvantages 
in farming 
 High levels of peer monitoring  was 
required in SKS 
Economic  - Majority small and 
marginal landholders 
- Non-credit groups  
- Organic cotton growing  
- Emphasis on extension 
services  
 APC had an integrated supply 
chain, while SKS had established 
market contracts 
 SKS had organic certification, while 
APC produced uncertified organic 
cotton 
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- Farm gate procurement  SKS acquired a premium price for 
organic cotton  
 APC increased returns to farmers 
through value addition 
Resource 
allocation  
- Heterogeneous resource 
endowment  
- Non-rivalrous and non-
excludable collective 
goods within the group. 
- Variable utility  
 
Incentive 
alignment  
- High material incentives 
- High solidarity 
incentives 
- Variable utility providing 
privileged group 
incentives  
 
5.5.1 Organisational similarities and difference  
Aharam Producer Company and Savayava Krushikara Sangha are hierarchically 
organised hybrid institutional arrangements. The decision-making structures in these 
organisations were highly centralised. With regard to these features, they are similar 
to Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project and Sridevi Farmers 
Welfare Society. The size of the groups was small in Savayava Krushikara Sangha 
compared to Aharam Producer Company. In this regard it shared similarity with the 
Joint Liability Group based collective actions that required high levels of monitoring 
to prevent defaults. In Savayava Krushikara Sangha, the primary groups were small 
to enable monitoring for non-compliance. Similar to Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala 
Rural Development Project, the two cases assessed in this chapter had prior collective 
action experience which made the formation and coordination of activities easier. The 
role of the NGO (Covenant Centre for Development and MYKAPS) in supporting 
group formation was also instrumental in the emergence of the group. It enabled the 
coordination of collective action by forming linkages with the state and the markets. 
It also helped in enabling cooperation through the formation of groups and promoting 
group based activities.  Unlike Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development 
Project, Aharam Producer Company and Savayava Krushikara Sangha were smaller 
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initiatives with strength of around 250 members. Although both these groups had the 
potential to expand this was limited by the inability to find funds to incorporate and 
form more groups. In the case of Savayava Krushikara Sangha, the option to expand 
was limited due to the lack of potential to identify organic cotton markets and form 
contracts.  
The primary organisational difference between Aharam Producer Company and 
Savayava Krushikara Sangha is that the former is a producer company and the latter 
is a farmers’ federation. This difference, however, did not contribute to any variation 
in the performance of these two organisations. This point to the fact that rather than 
organisational form, the type of collective goods (certified organic, extension 
services, marketing and value addition interventions) influenced how collective 
action is governed. The production of certified organic cotton that required adherence 
to strict certification protocol characterised the rules and regulations or rational 
controls that governed Savayava Krushikara Sangha. There was great emphasis in 
adhering to rules and regulations, and there were also systems of sanctions to prevent 
noncompliance. In this respect, Savayava Krushikara Sangha was similar to credit-
providing organisations that required strict adherence to repayment schedules. 
Therefore, screening of members before being admitted into the organisation was 
given importance in Savayava Krushikara Sangha. Although Aharam Producer 
Company was an organic cotton growing initiative, with the lack of organic 
certification and premium prices paid for cotton, there was flexibility in dealing with 
non-compliance, and in comparison to Savayava Krushikara Sangha rational controls 
were not strictly enforced.   
5.5.2 Social similarities and differences 
Social capital from networks, norms and trust was integral in the functioning of both 
the Aharam Producer Company and Savayava Krushikara Sangha. Prior 
organisational experience of the members and the NGOs helped support the 
formation of these initiatives.. The experience of members in collective action was 
useful as these members understood the expectations and importance of group-based 
activities such as meetings, joint training and dissemination of information through 
groups. This previous experienced shaped the structural social capital in both the 
groups that facilitated collective action. In order to maintain the structural social 
capital gained, both these organisations enforced purposive measures such as group 
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meetings and the sharing of information. Sensitization of the rural elites (dominant 
caste and landed individuals) to the importance and aims of the initiatives was also an 
important measure that was taken by the organisations to prevent interference and 
muster support for the organisation. 
The primary difference between Aharam Producer Company and Savayava 
Krushikara Sangha was that the groups formed by the former were homogeneous 
groups comprising of OBC members. Traditional caste dynamics and rigidities of the 
region were mainly responsible for this homogeneity, and such initiatives of 
collective action do not have the ability to reconcile these social structures. 
Therefore, Aharam Producer Company was an exclusive group similar to Sridevi 
Farmers Welfare Society, and caste identities were a source of cognitive social 
capital predisposing or preventing individuals from cooperating. In these cases, social 
controls had an exclusionary effect in collective action. Aharam Producer Company 
also had women’s-only groups similar to Pragithi Bandhu groups that addressed 
gender specific concerns such as poor access to information, extension services and 
markets. Aharam Producer Company also used religious symbols in naming its 
organisational units and groups to legitimise their activities and functions as an 
organisation. This was another source of cognitive social capital. Savayava 
Krushikara Sangha had mixed groups where members were from different castes, and 
through observations in the field it was apparent that caste differences did not 
influence the working of groups. The influence of dominant caste and economically 
better off individuals was, however, substantial. Defaulting or compliance of 
influential members sometimes determined whether other members at some localities 
conformed or defaulted. As Savayava Krushikara Sangha required high levels of peer 
monitoring, structural social capital generated from purposive measures such as 
group meetings and geographical considerations in group formations were 
instrumental in the formation of social controls. Social controls in the case of all 
groups were instrumental in complementing rational controls in governing the 
activities of the groups. 
5.5.3 Economic similarities and differences 
Both cases presented in this chapter were formed to improve production and 
marketing conditions of small and marginal agricultural producers. As the regions in 
which they were formed came under substantial water stress, and the availability of 
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canal irrigation was absent, organic farming was promoted to reduce the cost of 
production. Credit as a collective good was not provided due to higher risks of 
climatic uncertainties in the region, and also because there were no linkages to 
institutions such as NABARD. Therefore, the main economic similarities between the 
two groups were that they were non-credit providing famer initiatives that promoted 
organic farming. Organic farming is knowledge intensive and required training in 
input and land management (manuring, organic pesticide preparation) and integrated 
pest management, and therefore, extension services through collaborations with state 
agricultural universities and the agricultural department of the different states were 
essential services the two organisations provided its members. Similar to the Shri 
Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project and Sridevi Farmers Welfare 
Society, the collective goods that were provided to members of the groups were both 
non-excludable and non-rivalrous, and this meant that all the collective goods that 
were created or accessed by the organisation were made available to all members of 
the group indiscriminately.  
The primary difference between the two groups was that Savayava Krushikara 
Sangha produced certified organic cotton, and while Aharam Producer Company 
followed an internal organic standard, the cotton produced was not certified. 
Certification required strict adherence to protocols of organic standards, and this 
characterised many of the rules, regulations and sanctioning systems of Savayava 
Krushikara Sangha. The advantage of certification over non certification was that 
members were able to get an organic premium price when they sold their cotton on 
contract to the Appachi Cotton Company. The main intervention in the downstream 
market attempted by Aharam Producer Company was the integration of the supply 
chain by spinning the cotton produced from producers and selling it as yarn. 
Although the benefits in previous years have been passed on to primary producers, 
the challenges of the mills running under capacity and infrastructural problems of 
power outages are challenges beyond the capacity of the two organisations to deal 
with. Through interventions at the farm and marketing levels, both the organisations 
have been successful in bringing about changes in the cost of production, reduced 
marketing costs and higher price realisation. However, despite these interventions, 
marginal farms did not make enough surpluses to solely depend on agricultural 
income, and thus needed to add supplemental income through wages from manual 
labour. When comparing the cases in the two different states of Karnataka and Tamil 
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Nadu in terms of their organisational, social and economic features, there was no 
observable influence of institutional environment or institutional arrangements 
resulting from difference in these states. Challenges of agricultural production and 
marketing were similar in both the cases.  
5.5.4 Similarities and differences in resource allocation and 
incentive alignment 
 With respect to resource allocation and incentive alignment, both the cases of non-
credit providing producer organisations explored in this chapter were similar. They 
differed quite drastically from credit providing collective action explored in chapter 
four in terms of their resource allocation, but were similar in their resource alignment 
structures. In both Aharam Producer Company and Savayava Krushikara Sangha the 
resource endowment of producers were heterogeneous with respect to access to 
irrigation. Although on an average the land sizes were largely small and marginal, 
members with access to irrigation were able to attain higher yields and reduce 
drought risks in production. Compared to the credit providing cases where there was 
access to irrigation or higher rainfall reducing the risks of crop failure, credit was not 
provided. Another major difference between the two set of producer organisations 
was the nature of resource distribution among members. Unlike credit dissemination, 
utility from marketing services was conditioned based on the yield of the farmers. 
Therefore farmers with larger landholdings or access to irrigation gained more from 
the collective goods. In this way, this is similar to the access to mechanisation 
services in Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society, where members with property rights and 
larger landholdings were able to reduce labour costs. If credit were provided to 
farmers in Aharam Producer Company and Savayava Krushikara Sangha, 
conditioned on access to irrigation, variable utility may have discouraged arid and 
semi-arid cultivators from participating.  
Similar to the Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project and Sridevi 
Farmers Welfare Society, the material incentives were also high in the two cases. 
Despite the surplus not being sufficient for households to depend solely on 
agriculture for livelihood, the higher surpluses generated through collective action 
was an incentive for small and marginal farmers to participate. The variable utility of 
the collective good (marketing services) incentivised more resource-endowed farmers 
to participate in collective action. The benefit of this was that they helped support the 
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initiative at the village level and helped reconcile traditional power influences that 
could have hindered the functioning of the initiative. Similar to the cases in chapter 
four, solidary incentives were also high in the groups. Social capital and previous 
experience of participating in collective action encouraged members to remain in 
groups and undertake group based activities.  
5.6 Conclusion  
This chapter looked at two cases of producer organisations in the state of Karnataka 
and Tamil Nadu to understand how these initiatives were structured in organisational, 
social and economic terms. Unlike the cases of Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural 
Development Project and Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society  assessed in chapter four 
these initiatives were non-credit providing collective action initiatives that provided 
information and extension services for organic farming, inputs for the premium price 
for cotton (Savayava Krushikara Sangha)  and value addition (Aharam producer 
Company) as the main collective goods. In assessing how Aharam Producer 
Company and Savayava Krushikara Sangha were similar and differed from each 
other, the main observation in this chapter was that the type of collective good that 
was provided determined how the initiative was organised. Savayava Krushikara 
Sangha which produced certified organic cotton had a higher risk of social dilemmas 
resulting from non-conformity, and, therefore, required stricter rules, regulations and 
sanctions than Aharam Producer Company where social dilemmas did not have high 
consequences. In this respect, Savayava Krushikara Sangha was similar to credit 
providing initiatives in chapter four. The other main difference between the groups 
was that in Aharam Producer Company, caste identities were strong and rigid making 
the group an exclusive group, while Savayava Krushikara Sangha had mixed groups 
with members belonging to different castes. The organisation or the interventions did 
not have the scope or the power to address the influences of traditional social 
influences, but had to work within these in order to make the initiative work.  
Aharam Producer Company and Savayava Krushikara Sangha also had many 
similarities in the ways they were structured. These initiatives like Shri Kshethra 
Dharmasthala Rural Development Project and Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society were 
hierarchically organised with federated groups and a centralised decision-making 
system. Social capital from pervious collective action experiences were instrumental 
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in the formation of the latter initiatives and economically similar to the other cases in 
that they provided goods that were non-excludable and non-rivalrous once they were 
made available to their members. These similarities and differences point to the 
influences of social context, resource structures (availability or irrigation and 
associated risk) and the aim and purpose of the groups (organic and non-organic, 
credit and non-credit) in the functioning of collective action and how organisations 
coordinating them are structured. The next chapter concludes the thesis by summing 
up the main findings of this thesis and assessing their implications on policy and 
future research.  
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction  
Agricultural production in India is predominantly carried out by small and marginal 
farmers. Small producer agriculture faces a number of challenges in relation to access 
to markets, institutional credit, research and extension services and lumpy inputs such 
as management and mechanisation.  Due to the size of the population dependent on 
agriculture in India, addressing these problems are central to the growth and 
development of the agricultural sector and poverty reduction. In many countries, 
especially Japan, South Korea and Taiwan which have agricultural sectors based on 
small farms, cooperatives have played an important role in neutralising disadvantages 
through state-provisioned extension services, key inputs, irrigation and market 
intervention operations. In India, however, cooperatives have faced many challenges. 
They have often had limited impact due to poor organisation and management, 
political interference, financial irregularities and corruption within the organisation.  
Along with cooperatives, other community-centred programmes based on collective 
action such as Self Help Groups (SHGs) providing microcredit, extension services 
and management of natural resources through watershed management programs have 
also met with challenges. Various academic works have shown that within these 
initiatives the non-cooperation of members, mismanagement of funds, vested 
interests of the bureaucracy or various stakeholders and improper functioning have 
been inhibiting factors. Hierarchical social structures based on strong caste identities 
in India have also been additional factors that have limited the impact of these 
initiatives and collective action in general. Despite these challenges, government 
plans, policy reports and research have cited the need to develop collective producer 
organisations to address small producer disadvantages.  
Collective action is a complex phenomenon with a large number of organisational, 
social and economic features influencing how they are structured. Research on 
collective action in common pool resources have show how initiatives in one location 
may succeed while a similar initiative in another region or context may not lead to 
similar results. Owing to this complexity, although there has been a policy focus to 
support producer organisations in the agricultural sector, limited undertanding of the 
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functioning, inpact and potential of these organisations has prevented the adoption of 
concrete support measures and subsidies to promote such schemes more widely. The 
importance of collective action initiatives in the agricultural sector and the limited 
understanding of how these are stuctured to address challenges that small agricultural 
producers face has motivated this research on emerging producer organisations in 
India. The aim of this research has been to bring a deeper understanding of how 
agricultural producer organisational formats are structured and to explore how 
resources might be better allocated and incentives aligned in these initiatives. This 
understanding is crucial for determining the potential that  producer organisations 
have in addressing the challenges faced by small producer agriculture and to promote 
them more widely in India.  
This study of new cooperativism identified three formats of producer organisations 
prevalent in India to understand their structure and potential. Joint Liability Groups 
(JLGs), Producer Companies (PCs) and Farmers’ Federations (FFs) were the three 
Producer Organisational Formats analyzed in this thesis. Four organisations in the 
states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu were purposively sampled to carry out a 
comparative case study analysis. Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society (SFWS), Shri 
Kshethra Dharmastala Rural Development Project (SKDRDP), Aharam Producer 
Company (APC) and Savayava Krushikara Sangha (SKS) were the four cases chosen 
for this study. The central research questions of this thesis were:  
a) How are SFWS, SKDRDP, APC and SKS in the states of Karnataka and 
Tamil Nadu structured in organisational, social and economic terms? 
b) How are resources allocated and incentives aligned in these producer 
organizations? 
How these producer organisation were structured, and how the resources were 
allocated and incentives aligned in order to enable collective action is crucial to 
increase an understanding of how challenges of coordinating interests of participants, 
reconciling social differences, accessing inputs and markets are undertaken, and how 
issues of non-cooperation that hinder collective action are reconciled. These factors 
that influence how collective action is coordinated also attempt to address issues of 
external economies that put samll farms at a disadvantage. At a policy level, the 
understanding of how organisations coordinating collective actions are structured will 
help to support and promote such initiatives more widely. Table 6.1 summarises the 
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findings of this study of how credit-providing and non-credit producer organisations 
are structured on organisational, social and economic terms, and identify the main 
features that influence resource allocation and incentive alignment. In the following 
parts of this chapter the key findings of this study, implications for future research 
and policy implications of the study are highlighted. 
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6.2 The structure of producer organisations 
The emergence, organisation and sustenance of collective action is a complex 
phenomenon. Attempts to develop an all-encompassing theory to explain the 
dynamics of collective action in the past have been futile (Ostrom, 2003). Various 
studies have shown that collective action in one context initiated to address a 
particular phenomenon may not be successful in another context addressing similar 
issues (Agrawal, 2001b; Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1998a). Due to this 
complexity of studying collective action, case studies are often employed to 
understand the various factors that influence it. Using theoretically informed works 
on collective action and institutional theory, this thesis developed a nested framework 
to understand how Producer Organisational Formats (POFs) are structured in 
organisational, social and economic terms. The framework of collective action is 
relevant as POFs are collective action initiatives influenced by the institutional 
environment and embedded in the social context. This section assesses this study’s 
main findings regarding factors that influenced the structure of collective action.  
6.2.1 Organisational Features 
Producer Organisational Formats are hybrid institutional arrangements that have 
emerged to increase the economic viability of their small and marginal agricultural 
producer members. As institutional arrangements their main aim was to enable 
cooperation and also to coordinate access to upstream markets (e.g. credit, inputs and 
research and extension services) and downstream markets (e.g. commodity markets) 
to achieve its economic goals. To enable cooperation, interest of their members 
needed to be identified and their commitments to participate needed to be obtained.  
Potential social dilemmas needed to be identified, and processes to prevent or address 
them needed to be in place. These were important issues of governance in the 
initiation and coordination of collective action. The organisational features of a group 
determined and influenced how they were governed. As various institutional 
arrangements governing collective action vary according to their goals and purposes 
they have incredible diversity in rules and enforcement structures designed to change 
social dilemma situations (Ostrom, 1998).  The governance of such initiatives entails 
the regulation and control depending on external support, group size, rules and 
regulations, past experiences, interest heterogeneity of participants and leadership.   
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Despite their differences in format as Producer Companies, Joint Liability Groups 
and Farmers’ Federations, the four cases explored in this thesis were organised in a 
similar fashion, with the goal of improving viability of small and marginal farmer 
members. Producer Companies formal organisations (as registered companies with 
regluations and structured mandated by law); Joint Liability Groups emerged through 
provisions made available through financial linkages with NABARD; while Farmers 
Federations were established as a result of privileged group action (Table 6.1). 
Although the number of PCs and JLGs are rising in India, the instances where they 
undertake collective action and jointly access inputs, extension services and markets 
were few. This study found that the impetus for the emergence of POFs varied 
drastically between cases, and in this way their emergence was unique.  
 
Table 6.1: Impetus for emergence of collective action  
Producer Organisational Format Impetus for Formation  
Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society 
(SFWS) 
 
Leadership and support from NABARD 
SKDRDP – Pragithi Bandhu Joint 
Liability Group  
 
NGO-initiated support  
Aharam Producer Company 
 
International project orientation, NGO 
support 
The Savayava Krushikara Sangha 
(SKS) Farmers’ Federation 
Privileged group, NGO support, 
corporate support  
What was common in the emergence of all these POFs was that they were initiated 
and supported by able leadership or NGO intervention. The NGOs were large 
organisations of repute in the local community with previous experience in 
organising group-based activities and had strong linkages with the state. In the case 
of Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society, leadership of an influential individual played a 
similar role in the formation of the group. Linkages with the state were also crucial 
for their emergence. The NGOs or leadership of the initiatives had close working 
linkages the state and this was crucial for the groups to be able to provide goods such 
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as credit, inputs and extension services to its members. The state played an important 
role in determining the economic and policy environment (price policy, agricultural 
investment, functioning of markets, subsidies) in which agricultural production takes 
place. The role of the state was also important and central to the creation of public 
goods such as infrastructure, research and development. POFs cannot influence the 
creation of these public goods and are rather dependent on the state to enable their 
supply. NGOs also played an important role in linking primary producers to 
downstream markets and enable the formation of contracts with corporate entities (in 
the case of Savayava Krushikara Sangha) and also enable value addition (in the case 
of Aharam Producer Company).  

 


The size of a group determined the capacity of the group to provide goods to all its 
members and monitor the activities of the group (Oliver et al., 1985; Olson, 1965). 
Various studies have shown how smaller group sizes are more efficient, especially in 
initiatives that are vulnerable to social dilemmas such as free rider problems (Baland 
& Platteau, 1996; Olson, 1965; Wade, 1994). This was largely due to the rivalrous 
nature of common pool resources, where one person’s use of the good reduces its 
availability for another. In this study, initiatives used federated group structures (with 
smaller groups ranging from 5 to 20) to manage groups. Smaller groups facilitated 
peer monitoring to control wilful defaulting on credit and non-compliance in certified 
organic farming. The factor that determined the size of the initiatives was their ability 
to access collective goods for its members. The Pragithi Bandhu scheme was the 
largest initiative and this organisation had the resources to extend credit to all its 
members and personnel to manage and coordinate this initiative. In the Aharam 
Producer Company and Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society which were socially 
homogeneous organisations, the size of the initiative was limited by the size of 
interested participants. In Savayava Krushikara Sangha the organisations ability to 
expand was limited by their management resources and ability to access sufficient 
credit, inputs, and marketing opportunities.  
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This study found all cases of POFs to have a hierarchical structure with federated 
groups as the basic unit. The goods that the POFs provided its members determined 
the social dilemmas that potentially arose in the groups. The social dilemmas of 
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credit providing organisations were wilful defaulting on repayment, while non-
compliance to organic farming protocol was the major risk in certified organic 
cultivation. Rules, regulations and sanctioning or rational controls were important in 
the management of these institutions in order to prevent the emergence of social 
dilemmas. Rational controls were strictly enforced in groups with a higher risk of 
social dilemmas (SKS, SFWS and SKDRDP). In Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society, 
there was evidence of coercion being used to ensure repayment by members. These 
groups with high risks of social dilemmas had smaller group sizes (5-10 members) as 
it enabled peer monitoring.  Rational controls were not so strict in the Aharam 
Producer Company where the consequences of social dilemmas were insignificant.  
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Experimental studies using laboratory set games such as prisoner’s dilemma games 
have helped establish that previous experiences of cooperation and non-cooperation 
influences how individuals behave in a group (Axelrod, 2006; R. Hardin, 1982; 
Taylor, 1987). These studies find that past actions builds trust, helps solve social 
dilemmas and may also weaken the motivation to cooperate collectively if 
individuals have had poor experiences of cooperation. With the exception of Sridevi 
Farmers Welfare Society, all other initiatives had previous experience of organising 
group-based activities such as SHG initiatives that predisposed them to take part in 
collective action initiatives. The organisations used this social capital from previous 
experiences to initiate new collective activities, thus reducing the cost of mobilization 
and organising. The previous experience of taking part in group-based activities 
helped these experienced members to better adapt to the requirements of the new 
initiatives. This previous experience of organising collective action also helped the 
NGOs in coordinating the producer organisation.  
A review of the main organisational features that influenced the structure of the POFs 
explored in this study showed: 
1. External support from NGOs or individual leadership with linkages with the 
state to the POFs was crucial for its emergence and coordination.  
2. NGOs or individual leadership was also crucial in enabling cooperation by 
obtaining commitments from different members and enabling and supporting 
the formation of groups. 
3. The size of these initiatives was determined by the management of resources 
allocated to the groups (personnel and expertise) and their ability to coordinate 
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collective action by accessing goods such as credit, inputs, marketing and 
extension services-  
4. The nature of social dilemmas (freerider problems, moral hazards of 
defaulting) determined the strictness of rules, regulations and sanctions or 
rational controls in groups. Therefore groups providing credit and certifications 
had stricter rules and enforcement structures  
5. Privileged members or influential member participation in groups helped 
legitimise the group’s activities in the larger community in which the producer 
organisation functioned.  Although they gained more from participating in 
some cases, their participation was crucial to the group.  
6. Three of the four groups had previous experience in organising group-based 
activities, and this helped in the mobilisation and organisation of POFs as 
collective actions. 
6.2.2 Social Features  
Social features of caste, class and gender have influenced agricultural production in 
India as they determine access to essential input such as land, credit and social 
services (Thorat & Newman, 2007; Thorat, 2009). Caste, class and gender 
traditionally determined an individual’s right to own property. Also, these social 
features have the potential to determine the social relations between members in a 
collective action initiative. The poor implementation of land reforms in India has led 
to distribution of land being skewed in favour of the dominant castes in rural areas. In 
Karnataka, however, relatively better implementation of land reforms compared to 
Tamil Nadu (Deshpande & Torgal, 2003) saw the inclusion of lower castes (SC & 
ST) with access to property rights in producer organisations. Savayava Krushikara 
Sangha and the Pragithi Bandhu scheme in Karnataka were organisations with 
participation of members from different castes making them inclusive groups. In 
Aharam Producer Company and Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society, caste status and 
cultural identity, respectively, played an important role in member participation in the 
producer organisations which made them exclusive groups. Social features of caste, 
class, gender and social capital that comprises of networks, norms and trust crucially 
determined how collective action was coordinated.  
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In Indian society stratified by caste, class and gender lines, the propensity of 
collective action to emerge and sustain would depend on the reconciliation of power 
relations. Pessimism in relation to the potential for collective action initiatives to 
emerge and become effective in India has been evident owing to the hierarchical and 
stratified nature of rural society (Bardhan, 1996; Platteau, 2000).The two forms of 
social capital important for collective action are structural social capital and cognitive 
social capital; the former helps facilitate collective action, while the latter predisposes 
individuals to act collectively. Table 6.2 lists the different forms of social capital that 
helped the effective organisation of the four POFs in this study.  
Table 6.2 Different forms of social capital in POFs 
Cognitive Social Capital Structural Social Capital 
 Religious affiliations of members  
 Previous organisational experience  
 Community based solidarity  
 Group-based activities (meetings, 
labour sharing)  
 Networks  
 Savings groups  
 Joint management of resources 
This study found that religious affiliation (Pragithi Bandhu scheme, Aharam 
Producer Company), pervious experience of organising (Savayava Krushikara 
Sangha; Aharam Producer Company, Pragithi Bandhu scheme) and community-
based identity (in Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society) were the main forms of cognitive 
social capital that predisposed individuals to participate in collective action in the 
four cases. Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project was an NGO-
based project associated with a temple that has held historic social and spiritual 
significance to individuals in the host region. This religious significance of the 
organisation predisposed many individuals in the region to join the Pragithi Bandhu 
scheme. Previous experience in organising groups for natural resources management 
(Savayava Krushikara Sangha) or savings and microfinance schemes (Pragithi 
Bandhu scheme, Aharam Producer Company) also motivated past members to 
participate in the newer POF initiatives. In some initiatives, previously formed 
groups were revived and reactivated with newer aims. In the case of SFWS, although 
the organisation did not have previous experience in organising tenant farmers, their 
strong cultural homogeneity and shared economic plight in tenant farming motivated 
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collective action. From these observations, this study found that various forms of 
cognitive social capital crucially influenced the formation of these POFs.  
The structural social capital that facilitated collective action included networks of 
social relationship, norms and trust within the groups. Norms and members’ trust in 
groups from past community organising experiences were revived when SHG groups 
were re-formulated as SKS and Aharam Producer Company. This study found that 
most groups took purposive measures to build structural social capital within the 
groups. In many groups, regular group meetings and group-based labour sharing were 
mandatory. Group-based extension services and group-based saving activities were 
also carried out to strengthen network linkages and trust among members. The NGOs 
were aware of the importance of social capital, especially in groups where social 
dilemmas were high. Therefore, they carefully formed groups considering the 
geographical proximity of members and the self-selection of group members, and 
utilized existing social networks to ensure cohesion. Social capital in groups was 
furthermore used to enable social control in groups. In informal groups such as these 
producer organisations, there were no legal enforcement or rules through formal 
contracts; thus, social controls complimented rational controls in the form of rules, 
regulations and sanctions developed at the organisational level.  
The main social features observed in the four case studies were: 
a) POFs did not have the agency to address traditionally rigid caste dynamics in 
exclusive groups due to existing opposition norms. 
b) Religion and cultural identity were sources of cognitive social capital 
predisposing individuals to act collectively.  
c) Previous experience of organising was a crucial source of structural social 
capital to facilitate collective action through networks, norms and trust. 
d) Social controls complemented rational controls in monitoring and preventing 
social dilemmas from emerging in groups.  
6.2.3 Economic features  
Agricultural production in India is predominantly carried out by small and marginal 
producers as 67 per cent of agricultural producers own less than one hectare of land. 
Markets, institutional credit and research and extension services are the main 
institutional arrangement essential to support and enable agricultural production in an 
economy of small and marginal agricultural producers. However, due to their small 
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size of landholdings, external economies of scale, economic disadvantages and social 
status conditioned by caste, class and gender, many agricultural producers cannot 
access the institutional arrangements of the goods and services they provide. The 
primary role of POFs, thus, was to enable access by addressing some of these 
structural disadvantages. POFs are organisations that aim to collectively access 
essential goods and services for its members to improve agricultural production. 
POFs, moreover, play a significant role because primary producers individually do 
not have the agency and power to access these goods and services without collective 
action.  
The POFs examined in this thesis mainly enabled access to public goods (R&D, 
information, subsidies and market services) and private goods (inputs, credit). This 
study found POFs to differ fundamentally from Common Pool Resource-based 
collective actions as the former provides public and private goods and not common 
goods. Since common goods are rivalrous, excluding them in the POFs’ provision 
fundamentally changes the type of social dilemmas that emerge within the 
organizations. The goods and services accessed and made available to the members 
of the POFs are collective goods, and once accessed they become non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous to all members. The four POFs in this study provided a combination of 
different goods and services to its members which are delineated below in Table 6.3.  
Table 6.3: Collective goods and services accessed by different POFs 
Collective Goods  SKS SKDRDP APC SFWS 
Institutional credit      
Seeds     
Fertilizers and pesticides (organic 
and  
non-organic) 
    
Information     
Extension services     
Farm gate purchase      
Premium price      
Value addition     
Mechanisation      
Labour      
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Agricultural markets in India are complex with multiple forms of exchange 
relationships and highly differentiated goods and services (Harriss-White, 1995a). 
Exchange relations are not uniform, equal or on price terms (Bharadwaj, 1985), and 
social discrimination and traditional power structures based on class, caste and 
gender are pervasive in these markets. Agricultural markets comprise of upstream 
and downstream markets, and from the upstream markets agricultural producers’ 
source mainly credit and inputs. When the state fails to provide these goods, informal 
sources cater them, often on unfair terms. The downstream markets where primary 
producers sell their produce are highly fragmented with a large number of 
intermediaries between sellers and final users of the produce. Transaction practices in 
these markets are characterised by poor practices such as fraudulent weighing and the 
lack of grades and standards-based transactions.  
This study showed that POFs were able to provide a combination of goods and 
services to primary producers. Inputs such as seeds (in Savayava Krushikara Sangha) 
helped ensure better yields and reduce the risk of poor germination rates. Credit on 
fair terms was provided without collateral to some POFs (Sridevi Farmers Welfare 
Society and Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project) with risks 
borne by the initiatives.  Marketing services in Savayava Krushikara Sangha and 
Aharam Producer Company in the form of farm gate purchases, organic premium and 
value addition helped reduce transportation and search costs, increase price 
realisation and reduce losses from poor market practices for producers. Non-price 
social factors that affected bargaining power were also neutralised through these 
initiatives as marketing was done collectively.  
These initiatives with regards to market access had their limitations. The provision of 
goods and services was conditioned on the ability of the enabling organisations 
(NGOs or leadership) to form linkages with the state and (or) markets. Therefore, not 
all initiatives in this study were able to access credit and marketing services 
uniformly. The inability of organisations to absorb risks of default especially in 
groups dependent on rain-fed agriculture led to credit services not being provided to 
these groups. Producers in Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society had access to irrigation 
facilities and therefore had lower risks of crop failure which led to the organisation 
extending credit to their members. SKDRDP being located on the windward side of 
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the Western Ghats mountain ranges and growing perennial crops as the main crops 
reduced the risks of crop failure. These findings show that the enabling organisations 
ability to manage risk and the linkages they have with the state and markets were 
important in determining viability of collective action.  
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Research and development and technological extension in agriculture are crucial in 
increasing food production to meet the need of increasing population, improve farm-
level practices to make small agricultural producers viable and reduce environmental 
externalities that are inevitably caused by intense agricultural production. 
Agricultural research and policy in many developing countries such as India are 
largely in the domain of the state. However, due to the scale and complexity of the 
agricultural sector and the lack of sufficient operational budgets to carry out 
extension services, state delivery of extension services has been strained.  
The four case studies examined in this thesis have showed that all the POFs with the 
exception of Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society have been able to provide its members 
with crop and region-specific extension services through linkages with state research 
institutions.  Initiatives under rain-fed conditions (Savayava Krushikara Sangha and 
Aharam Producer Company) where input-intensive agriculture was not feasible 
adopted organic production practices to help members reduce the cost of production. 
In Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society where extension services were not provided to its 
members, the yields were low despite undertaking input intensive agriculture under 
irrigated conditions, affecting returns to investment. All POFs studied in this thesis, 
except the Pragithi Bandhu scheme, focused on the production of one major crop 
(either rice or cotton). Although farmers grew a combination of crops, the main 
benefits (inputs, seed, extension service and marketing) were provided for the major 
crop. The Pragithi Bandhu scheme, which is a larger organisation with members in 
multiple geographical locations growing perennial and seasonal crops, provided 
mainly credit, labour-sharing and selective extension benefits. This study found that 
smaller initiatives with uniform geography and single crop focus were able to provide 
a wider range of specific goods and services and to set specific performance targets, 
which was less likely for the larger and internally varied organisation.  
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Collective interventions by POFs have helped bring about changes in profits for small 
and marginal producers. The analysis of profits in the various cases, however, show 
that the surpluses created with the help of collective action were still insufficient for 
households to rely solely on agriculture for livelihood. These households often 
complemented their farm income by selling their labour. The main reason for this, 
apart from heterogeneities in land fertility and access to irrigation, was that many of 
these farms were too small. Land tenure systems through fixed or sharecropping 
contracts have been cited by few scholars to remedy the problem of insufficient 
access to land for cultivation (Bell, 1990; Melmed-Sanjak, 1998; Sadoulet et al., 
1998; Ballabh & Walker, 1992; Vaidyanathan, 1994; GOI, 2013). A counter 
argument to this has been that this may lead to reverse tenancy in which informal 
contracts formed on adverse terms due to low bargaining power of marginal 
producers cannot be regulated. It is also deemed problematic that tenants still will not 
be able to access credit (due to the credit supply effect) and may not have sufficient 
incentive to cultivate (due to low security effect) (T Besley, 1995).  
The case of Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society shows that collective actions do have 
the potential to negotiate leases on fair terms, enable access to institutional credit and 
subsidise inputs to enable fixed contract tenure. However, in this study, long term 
leases that gave security of tenure and incentivised land development were absent, 
and extension services and land improvement measures were not adopted in the 
initiative. As a result, yields were poor despite irrigated, input-intensive agriculture. 
Tenant farming in most Indian states is not legally recognised, but 15-35 per cent of 
land in India is cultivated under tenure. Tenure reforms are therefore necessary to 
mitigate the security effect of land tenure and allow for long term leases.   
This section has highlighted the relevance of POFs as collective action in addressing 
specific challenges small and marginal producer face in agricultural production. The 
benefits of POFs as collective actions include their ability to access upstream and 
downstream markets and public goods such as extension services, and also to 
mitigate the effects of socially influenced non-price factors hindering such access. 
Table 6.4 summarises the findings of this study with regard to economic strengths 
and limitations of POFs.  
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Table 6.4 Economic changes and limitations of POFs  
Particulars  Strengths Limitations  
Social factors of access - Potential to mitigate 
access problems 
associated with caste, 
class and gender 
- Potential for improved 
access to women  
- Access to land is 
important  
- Oppositional norms and 
strong caste identities 
can derail POFs 
- Explicit gender-related 
activities are needed to 
be gender inclusive  
Credit and commodity 
market access  
- Improve access to 
multiple goods and 
services  
- Ability to prevent 
market interlocking  
- Quality inputs  
- Farm gate purchase, 
helping reduce 
marketing costs 
- Mitigate non-price 
factors affecting 
bargaining  
- Benefits conditioned on 
NGOs’ ability to form 
market and state linkages 
- Different combination of 
benefits  
- Absence of credit 
provisioning that is 
conditioned on risk  
- Problems of finding 
markets for organic 
produce and also 
forming long term 
supply contracts 
Extension services  - Provisions of extension 
services through 
linkages with the state 
- Adoption of alternative 
systems such as organic 
farming in regions with 
climatic disadvantages  
- No extension services on 
leased land  
- Can largely provide 
research and information 
of what state research 
institutions provide- this 
may not be region 
specific 
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Property right and 
marginal production  
- Address concerns of 
external economies 
relating to small land 
size 
- Improve access to credit  
- Potential to improve 
access to land for tenant 
farming  
- Cannot increase surplus 
for marginal producers 
to solely depend on 
agriculture 
- Limited potential to form 
long-term leases, 
resulting in poor land 
development  
6.2.4 Resource allocation and incentive alignment 
In order to improve production practices and access to essential inputs and markets of 
its members, the collective goods accessed by the groups should be effectively 
distributed to all members of the group. Sufficient incentives should also be provided 
to individuals to continue participating in the collective action.  Existing studies on 
collective action point out that initial resource endowment, right to usage of 
collective goods and nature of usage crucially affects resource allocation in collective 
action initiatives. In terms of initial resource endowment, the majority of participants 
in all the four cases were either landless farmers or small and marginal 
farmers,although in Savayava Krushikara Sangha and Sridevi Farmers Welfare 
Society there was a minority that had larger resource endowment. Savayava 
Krushikara Sangha and Aharam Producer Company were two initiatives where 
members did not have uniform access to irrigation, and in these cases it was not the 
size of land holdings but access to irrigation that made resource endowments 
heterogeneous. Households with access to irrigation were able to achieve higher yield 
and reduce drought risks.  
The right to usage of collective goods was determined by the non-rivalrous and non-
excludable nature of goods within the group. Non-rivalrous meant that the use of a 
good by one member did not reduce its availability for another member, and non-
excludability meant that once the good was made available an individual could not be 
prevented from using it. In all the initiatives, the collective good was accessible for 
all members of the group, and, therefore, it was non-rivalrous. At the same time, in 
most groups collective goods were non-excludable as well. This meant that 
irrespective of caste and class, members of inclusive initiatives (Savayava Krushikara 
Sangha, Pragithi Bandhu scheme) could benefit from the collective goods that were 
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made available as the goods were non-excludable. In the Aharam Producer Company 
and Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society, strong caste-based identities limited the 
participation of lower castes in the initiative. However, this was an exclusion that 
took place outside the group.   
Shri Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project and Aharam Producer 
Company were two groups that had women’s only groups to address gender specific 
challenges of agricultural production. In both groups, women-led households could 
access inputs and extension services, as well as marketing services in the case of 
Aharam Producer Company. These services were provided by the POFs to help 
women mitigate some gender-specific challenges of access in agricultural production 
and marketing.   In other groups, there was no evidence of women’s participation in 
decision-making processes or the provision of gender specific goods and services; 
there were registered women members largely because property rights were under 
their names. Therefore, this study found that the need for explicit gender-specific 
services and aims in the organisation are needed for POFs to be gender inclusive. 
Overall, the study found that POFs as collective action have the potential to mitigate 
gender related access problems and caste and class based exclusion in some cases.  
Furthermore, the potential use of a collective good to a particular household was 
determined by whether the good had fixed or variable utility among members. Fixed 
utility meant that, irrespective of the size of resources an individual possessed, the 
collective goods they were entitled to remained the same. Variable utility meant that 
the level of entitlement was conditioned on the size of resources an individual 
possessed. In the credit-providing initiatives of Pragithi Bandhu scheme and Sridevi 
Farmers Welfare Society, the utility of collective goods was fixed. This meant that 
different members had access to a fixed amount of resources (in this case credit and 
inputs) irrespective of their resource endowment. In Sridevi Farmers Welfare Society 
access to farm machinery (transplanter) had variable utility as members with larger 
land could gain more from reduced labour cost.  
In the non-credit producer organisations (Savayava Krushikara Sangha and Aharam 
Producer Company) the major collective good was value addition and marketing 
services. These goods had variable utility as members with access to larger 
landholdings or irrigation facilities gained more from marketing and value addition 
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services through higher yields. These members formed the privileged groups and 
stood to gain more from the initiative.  These members often had important positions 
in the groups and also had the incentive to ensure the success of the initiative. The 
main incentive to organise in these cases was the material incentives that were 
provided to its members. As goods were non-rivalrous and non-excludable, caste, 
class and gender-based exclusion to goods and services were addressed. Although in 
many cases the changes brought about by collective action was not sufficient for 
households to solely depend on agriculture, the changes were greater than in the 
absence of collective action. This was a powerful incentive in most groups for 
members to continue in collective action.  
The other forms of incentives to participate in collective action were solidary 
incentive and purposive incentives. Solidary incentives were the non-monetary 
incentives such as social capital and solidarity from group activities that incentivised 
participation among members. In all the case studies except Sridevi Farmers Welfare 
Society that had previous experience of organising, social capital of networks, norms 
and trust played an important role in enabling the formation of groups. In Sridevi 
Farmers Welfare Society, the homogeneous cultural identity and similar economic 
plight of members help to form the solidary incentive for cooperation. In Shri 
Kshethra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project, a sense of religious obligation 
was an important incentive for members in the region close to the temple to 
participate in collective action which formed the purposive incentive in this group.  
The main observations in the cases with regard to resource allocation and incentive 
alignment were: 
a) Inclusive producer organisations enabled better access to inputs, credit, 
markets and extension services irrespective of caste and class as these goods 
were non-excludable. 
b) Groups with explicit gender-specific services and aims mitigated gender-
related access problems in agricultural production.  
c) Resource heterogeneity and variable utility in some groups included resource 
rich participants in the initiative, and they helped in legitimising collective 
action initiatives and helped counter traditional power structures in rural areas.  
d) Material incentives were the most powerful incentives that enabled the 
formation of groups.  
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e) Solidary incentives from existing social capital and previous experiences of 
organising also influenced participation.  
6.3 Implications of future research  
The theoretical framework used in this study helped to identify important 
organisational, social and economic features that influence how POFs coordinating 
collective action are structured. In this analysis, the influence of the history of these 
producer organisations and their emergence is understudied. In the current 
framework, the ‘previous experience’ of various initiatives was seen to have helped 
organise and build social capital essential in sustaining the present collective action 
initiatives. However, unpacking how collective action institutions ‘emerged’ would 
be crucial for understanding producer organisations and collective action in general 
on a deeper level. New Institutional Economics (NIE) theorists have assumed that 
institutions emerge from an “institution-free state of nature” (Williamson, 1985, pg  
1430; , 1975, pg  20) which has been widely criticised. Scholars like Hodgson (2002, 
2003) have argued that the fundamental structures within which institutions are 
studied are in themselves institutions defining the circumstances of individual 
interaction.  Therefore, the study of the emergence of institutions in a historical 
context would help shed light on the circumstances and role played by pre-existing 
institutions on producer organisations and the collective actions they coordinate. A 
re-specified analytical framework would thus help to theorise the emergence and 
historical context in the ‘institutional environment’ level, helping to bring a more 
specific understanding of the initiatives coordinating collective action.  
The exploratory case study design of this thesis helped to examine the influence that 
organisational, social and economic features had on the way that POFs in Karnataka 
and Tamil Nadu were structured. Confirmatory case studies on similar initiatives in 
other regions of India and in other countries where agricultural sectors are also 
dominated by small and marginal productions will help determine the falsifiability 
and generalisability of the findings of this study. Variations in external support, social 
features and the nature of goods and services accessed may also help to further 
understand the complexities of collective action in the agricultural sector. Altogether, 
this multi-dimensional inquiry will help expand the theoretical understanding of how 
collective action is emerged, organised and sustained in small producer agricultural 
production.  
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The POFs explored in this study predominantly formed linkages with upstream 
markets to access inputs such as seeds and fertilizers and credit. The linkages with 
the downstream commodity markets for most of the initiatives were limited or poor 
(with the exception of Savayava Krushikara Sangha). Linking POFs with 
downstream markets is essential to improve market access and price realisation for 
primary producers. POFs may be effective platforms to form linkages such as NGO-
corporates initiatives to implement CSR activities or effectively integrate the supply 
chain. However, within the scope of their present activities, initiatives organized as 
multi-service providing POFs have the potential to bring widespread economic 
change in the rural economy. Increase in bargaining power will help in improving 
access and development. POFs may emerge to be institutions through which welfare 
and aid can be disbursed to specific target groups and activities, promoting 
participatory development and development planning.  However, more research is 
required in this area.   
6.4 Implications for Policy  
Growth in the agricultural sector is essential to achieve overall economic 
development through increased food security, transfer of surpluses and reduced 
poverty in India. However, agricultural production is constrained by poor access to 
inputs and markets and high exposure to climatic and market risks. Small and 
marginal producers (less than 2 hectares of land) are most vulnerable to the adverse 
production and market conditions affecting their capabilities or the freedom to 
achieve wellbeing.  The role of POFs and their potential to mitigate some of these 
risks and access problems are widely cited in literature and in policy briefs and plans. 
However, limited understand of the functioning, impact and potential of these 
organisation have inhibited the progress of supporting or promoting these 
organisations.  
This study has shown that the ability of POFs to bring about changes to agricultural 
production of small and marginal producers are fundamentally determined by how 
they are structured and access various goods and services. In order to bring broader 
implementation into the rural sector, policy interventions are necessary to enable the 
emergence of community-based collective actions and form effective linkages with 
the markets. Issues relevant for policy found in this study include: 
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 The poor performance of collective action initiatives was largely due to social 
differences, vested interests, mismanagement of resources within the groups 
along with a high level of state intervention and non-cooperation among 
members. POFs in this study were able to successfully mobilise social capital 
of pre-existing network ties, religious affiliations and trust to address these 
social dilemmas hindering collective action. Centralised and top-down 
interventions may not be able to address these concerns as effectively as 
decentralised grassroots initiatives, thus making a case for supporting 
decentralised, region-specific initiatives. These POFs are often small, 
decentralised, grassroots initiatives coordinated by NGOs or individual 
leadership. Their size and regional focus help to identify community-specific 
and ecology-specific challenges and address them.  
 NGOs and individual leadership were crucial in the formation and coordination 
of these collective actions. However, their agency to improve access to 
collective goods decisively depended on linkages with the state. Therefore, 
state support of POFs through NGOs is critical. Extension services, credit 
institutions, input markets and subsidies should thus be provided by the state to 
these institutional arrangements.  
 POFs provided multiple goods and services to their members unlike single 
goods or service-providing cooperatives (credit, marketing, inputs). This 
helped bring more widespread changes and helped address multiple challenges. 
Therefore, enabling POFs to provide multiple goods and services is highly 
relevant.  Apart from credit to JLGs by NABARD, there are no provisions by 
the state to extend these services specifically to POFs. The ability to access 
these depends on the agency of the NGO. 
 With 87.3 per cent of the working women population in agriculture, women 
make a significant contribution to the agricultural sector. However, they face 
considerable disadvantages and challenges in accessing institutions and 
resources. This is especially true for women- led households. POFs that had 
women-specific agendas could address some of these challenges, while 
initiatives without them did not address these challenges. The promotion of 
collective initiatives targeting gender-specific challenges in agricultural 
production is therefore crucial, as this study has shown their potential to bring 
about change.   
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 Private sector interventions in the agricultural sector are also important in 
extension services and marketing. Organisation of small and marginal 
producers is seen to enable contracts, certifications and implement grades and 
standards. POFs have the potential to enable group certification and produce 
grade specific commodities.  
 
The creation of public goods and infrastructure is the mandate of the state, and POFs 
or NGOs coordinating small or marginal agricultural producers cannot undertake 
these activities.  The absence of infrastructure facilities such as irrigation systems has 
hindered the access of goods such as credit and fertilisers due to high risks. Lack of 
public capital formation in rural areas thus limited the potential of POFs to provide 
certain forms of goods and services. Therefore, interventions and the support of the 
state is critical without which producer organisations will have little real impact on 
agricultural growth and development.  
 
The increase of production cost in Indian agriculture in the years following 
liberalisation due to increased input costs without corresponding increase in subsidies 
and the relatively slow rise in the market prices of major agricultural products have 
had adverse effects on small and marginal production. The global rise in food prices 
from 2004-2008 changed the terms of trade in favour of agriculture, however, small 
and marginal producers did not benefit much as their marketable surplus has been 
low.  This makes small and marginal producers and the non-farmer rural population 
net consumers rather than producers of food. Therefore, food price increase has 
resulted in welfare loss rather than benefit for the rural population (de Janvry & 
Sadoulet, 2009).  
Increase in agricultural surplus is essential in this regard in order to increase the 
profitability of farming and increased rural incomes.  In this regard, POFs as 
organisational innovations are necessary in order for producers to adapt to these 
changing conditions and to decrease costs of production through better access of 
inputs and credit, improved farm and resource managements, adoption of technology 
and improved price realisation in the market. In the absence of collective action, this 
may not be possible due to low bargaining power and high fixed costs in information 
and technology access. Promotion of POFs as new cooperative structures 
coordinating collective action may help small and marginal agricultural producers 
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cope with the external economies of scale challenges. However, it is crucial to note 
that the social and economic context in which collective action is coordinated 
influences their structure and how they are coordinated would determine their 
propensity to succeed or fail. Understanding how POFs are structured in 
organisational, social and economic terms, how resources are distributed among 
members and how collaboration is incentivised will help better coordinate collective 
action.  
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Appendix  
Appendix I 
Location of Various case studies  
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Appendix II  
Timeline of Fieldwork (January – May, 2012) 
Month Location From until 
January    
 Wayanad 9th 14th 
 Bangalore 19th 5th 
February    
 Raichur/Koppal 6th 15th 
 Bangalore 16th 20th 
 Dharmastala 21st 26th 
March    
 Madurai 11th 23rd 
April    
 HD Kote 6th 13th 
 HD Kote 28th 29th 
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Appendix III 
 List of informants interviewed for the Study 
N
o. 
Informants Position  Organisation  Date of 
Interview  
1 Dr. Gopal 
Naik 
 Professor Indian Institute 
of Management 
Bangalore  
21st January 
2012 
2 Mani 
Chinnaswamy 
Appachi Cotton 
Company 
 Pollachi , Tamil 
Nadu  
8th January 2012 
3 P.K. Joey  Executive Officer and 
Inspector of Primary 
Service Societies 
(cooperative banks) 
Wayanad  10th January 
2012 
4 Shaji  Farmer member Shreyas, 
Wayanad 
12th January 
2012 
5 P.M. Pathros  Coordinator Shreyas, 
Wayanad 
10th January 
2012 
6 K.M. Saji  Kudumbashree District 
coordinator 
Wayanad  14th January 
2012 
7 Narayan Raju  District Development 
Officer 
NABARD, 
Raichur District  
6th February 
2012 
8 Nagaraju  Coordinator  SFWF, Koppal  12th February 
2012 
9  Prasad Rao District Development 
Officer 
Nabard , 
Dakshina 
Kannada District 
18th February 
2012 
10 Dr. 
Manjunath  
Executive Director  SKDRDP, 
Dharmastala  
21st and 23rd 
February 2012  
11 A. Anand  Former MYKAPS 
coordinator 
SPRED, Raichur  8th February 
2012 
12 Manorama 
Bhatt 
Training and Induction 
Office 
SKDRDP, 
Dharmastala  
21st February  
13 Vinutha Field Officer SKDRDP, 
Dharmastala  
25th February 
2012 
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14 Parthasarathy  Project Manager  CCD, Madurai, 
Nagapattnam  
17th March 2012 
15 C. Kumeresh  Administrative Office  CCD, Madurai  12th March 2012 
16 Suresh 
Mammen 
Thomas 
General Manager of 
Operations, Kalasam 
Foods 
CCD, Madurai  14th March 2012 
17 Muthu 
Velayutham  
Founding Secretary  CCD, Madurai  14th March 2012 
18 Tachinamurth
y  
Coordinator, Cotton 
Project  
CCD, Madurai  11th March 2012 
19 Mohanraj  Field Officer  CCD, Madurai 17th March 2012 
20 Channappa Coordinator, CEO Kabini Organics, 
HD Kote 
9th April 2012 
21 Chandra 
Shekar  
Coordinator, SKS, HD Kote  7th April 2012 
22 William 
D'souza  
Executive Director  MYKAPS, 
Mysore  
12th April 2012 
23 Nagaraj Aras Ex-secretary  SKS, HD Kote  7th April 2012 
24 Stine Jersie 
Olsen 
Senior Investment 
Manager, CSR Capital  
Copenhagen, 
Denmark  
14th February 
2013 
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Appendix IV 
Informant Interview Guide  
Informants Interview Guide  
Profile of the Organisation 
1. Background of the Organisation  
2. The programs the Organisation Runs  
3. Structure of the Organisation  
Collective Action Initiative  
1. What is the Nature of the Collective Action Initiative  
a. How was it conceived? 
b. How was the model adapted  
c. What was the motivation behind the development of this collective 
action   
2. What is the Developmental goal of the collective action  
3. How many years has this initiative been running  
4. Who are the major stakeholders of the initiative 
5. Profile of the primary producers  
a. Large medium or small  
6. What is the strength of the initiative  
a. How many people  
b. How many groups 
7. Is there an ideological motivation for this collective action  
a. Organic  
b. Environmental consciousness  
c. Fair trade  
d. Others  
Structure of Collective Action  
1. Nature of Contract  
2. Formal or Informal contract  
3. What is the role of the major stakeholders 
4. How do various stakeholders converge? 
5. What is the decision making structure  
Collective Action  
1. How were the groups formed? 
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2. What is the basis of group selective  
a. Self selected  
b. Grouped  
3. What is the size of the groups  
4. How and why was this group size determined  
5. Perceived Collective action problems and how are they dealt with 
6. Nature of Collective action  
a. Initial capital jointly borrowed and is the liability shared? 
b. Is the land leased or owned by stakeholders  
c. Is there a difference in size of contribution  
d. If yes, how is this variation accounted for 
e. Is production undertaken jointly? 
f. Profile of the division of labour  
7. What is the Exit strategy  
a. how does a member leave the group  
b. can a member be expelled from the group  
c. how are his/her assets liquidated and re- distributed  
8. Outreach and Linkages 
a. How is the problem of access dealt with  
Credit 
b. What kind of credit linkages are given to the primary producer  
c. Is the amount larger than normal agricultural loans given by the bank  
d. Is the state policies been conducive in aiding this – is NABARD playing 
a role  
Inputs 
e. Can any government subsidies and programs be availed under this 
project  
f. What kind of production support is given to primary producers  
i. Seeds  
ii. Fertilizers and pesticides  
iii. Other inputs  
g. Can you see a decrease in production cost through collective action  
Information 
h. Is there any kind of technological dissemination 
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i. Information systems  
i. Production decisions  
ii. Frontline demonstration of good production practices 
iii. Market information  
Marketing support  
iv. Is the produce sold by contract obligations  
v.  If yes, what are the incentives  
vi. If no, has collective action contributed to better bargaining power  
vii. How has bargaining power increased  
viii. What other market access benefits has collective action brought.  
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Appendix V 
Survey 
 
Primary Producers Survey 
Basic Information  
Name: 
Age: 
Educational qualification: 
Number of members in Household: 
Size of Landholding: 
Number of family members working in the land: 
Additional income to family (specify) 
Cropping Pattern  
 Mono 
 Multi  
Types of crop(s) grown  
 Food crops (list) 
 Cash Crops (list) 
Irrigation facilities 
 Rain fed 
 Bore well  
 Tank irrigation  
 Canal irrigation  
 Well irrigation 
Collective Action  
How many years have you been part of this collective action  
How did you join the group?  
 Self-selection  
 Assigned  
 Applied and accepted 
Why did you join the group?  
 Heard about the benefits  
 Friends or family was part of the group 
 Ideological reasons 
What is the size of your group? 
 
ACCESS 
Credit  
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Have you availed any credit arrangement before Collective Action?   
 Formal bank loans 
 Informal sources  
Formal credit  
 Name of the Bank  
 Principle amount  
 Rate of interest  
 What is the nature of the collateral  
Informal Credit (before) 
 Why from an informal source  
 Principle amount  
 Kind 
 Period of loan  
 Rate of interest  
 What is the nature of the collateral  
Do you have any debt?  
 Yes – how much 
 No  
Do you have any savings  
 Yes – how much? 
 No   
 
Under collective action 
How much credit do you get under this collective action? 
 
What is the interest rate? 
 
This is a fair rate 
9. Strongly agree  
10. Agree  
11. Neither agree or disagree 
12. Disagree  
13. Strongly disagree  
 
Inputs 
Do you use HYV – what variety? 
 Yes  
 No  
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Where do you source your seeds?  
 Accredited sources  
 Informal Sources  
What is the price of seeds  
 
Fertilizers and Pesticides  
 Where do you source them-  
 What is the average cost  
Nature of other inputs  
 Machinery  
 Hired labour  
 
Under collective action 
 
Does collective action help in sourcing inputs? 
 Yes  
 No  
What are these inputs?  
 seeds  
 fertilizers  
 pesticides  
 water 
 electricity 
 others  
What is the nature of this support 
 they provide the inputs at a price  
 they put you in touch with a favoured dealer  
 they just inform us about the nature of input that needs to be used 
 others  
What are the major changes brought about in production practices and how has it 
affected production? 
 reduced cost of production  
 higher yield 
 better access to technology  
 better access to credit 
 others 
The government has helped in bring about better access to inputs  
14. Strongly agree  
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15. Agree  
16. Neither agree or disagree 
17. Disagree  
18. Strongly disagree  
 
Information  
What is your main source of information regarding crops, inputs and prices?  
 Panchayats 
 NGO’s 
 Agricultural universities  
 Krishi Bhavan 
 Market middlemen 
 No information  
 Others  
What is the kind of information that you get?  
 Information about prices  
 Information about good growing practices  
 Information about the environment  
 Others  
Have there been any initiatives to introduce new technology  
 Farming technology  
 Water management  
 Energy saving  
 Reduce environmental risks  
 Others  
Under collective action 
There been efforts to bring about essential information that will help in production  
19. Strongly agree  
20. Agree  
21. Neither agree or disagree 
22. Disagree  
23. Strongly disagree  
What kind of information has this been?  
 Production practices  
 Environment concerns  
 Farm management  
 Market information  
Have you got any training from state or other institutions? 
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 Yes  
 No  
If yes what is the nature of this training? 
 Production practices  
 Marketing practices  
 General information about organizing  
 The dynamics of collective action  
 Marketing support  
24. Where do you sell your produce? Where did you sell your products  
a. APMC 
b. Middle men at farm gate  
c. Traders  
d. Others 
25. Do you think it is a fair price? 
a. Yes  
b. No  
 Is the produce sold by contract obligations  
o Yes  
o No  
 
26. If yes, what is the nature of the contract and what are the incentive 
 
 
 
Under collective action 
27. Has there been any marketing help under collective action? 
a. Yes  
b. No  
28. Do you have more control of marketing your produce than before  
a. Strongly agree  
b. Agree  
c. Neither agree or disagree 
d. Disagree  
e. Strongly disagree  
29. Do you get a better market price now for your produce 
a. Strongly agree  
b. Agree  
c. Neither agree or disagree 
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d. Disagree  
e. Strongly disagree  
30. You have been able to bring down marketing costs  
a. Strongly agree  
b. Agree  
c. Neither agree or disagree 
d. Disagree  
e. Strongly disagree  
31. What are the changes in marketing prices  
a. Transportation costs  
b. Packaging  
c. Storage  
d. Other opportunity costs  
 
32. What are the changes in marketing practices  
 
 
Organizational Aspects of Collective Action 
Decision Structure  
33. How are decisions made in the group 
a. Meeting to develop general consensus 
b. Voting  
c. Some make the decisions and others follow 
34. What is required for one to join this initiative  
 
 
35. What is the main motivation to stay in the group? 
a. Friends and neighbours  
b. Believe in the cause  
c. Economic benefits 
d. Ideology  
e. Other motivations  
36. How do you negotiate with the support organization  
a. voting 
b. Appointed bearers bargain 
37. Do you have any grievances? 
a. Yes 
b. No  
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38. Organizing has brought about benefits  
a. Strongly agree  
b. Agree  
c. Neither agree or disagree 
d. Disagree  
e. Strongly disagree  
 
Social Aspects of Collective Action 
Group Dynamics  
39. I know most people in the group personally  
a. Strongly agree  
b. Agree  
c. Neither agree or disagree 
d. Disagree  
e. Strongly disagree  
40. Are most people from your social group  
a. Yes  
b. No  
41. If yes  
a. Same caste  
b. Same religion 
c. Same linguistic group  
42. People from your economic group 
a. Strongly agree  
b. Agree  
c. Neither agree or disagree 
d. Disagree  
e. Strongly disagree  
43. It makes a difference that people of different backgrounds 
i. Strongly agree  
ii. Agree  
iii. Neither agree or disagree 
iv. Disagree  
v. Strongly disagree  
vi. If yes, what do you think the difference is? 
44. Do you have preferences when it comes to who should be in the group  
i. Yes  
ii. No  
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45. If yes what are your preferences  
 
 
Production Data  
46. What is your total yield   
 
47. Price of yield  
 
48. Total input cost  
a. Seeds  
b. Fertilizers  
c. Pesticides  
d. Labour 
49. Marketing cost 
a. Packaging  
b. Transportation  
50. Other costs  
 
51. What was you seasonal Yield before collective action 
 
 
I will be part of this initiative in 3 years  
a. Strongly agree  
b. Agree  
c. Neither agree or disagree 
d. Disagree  
e. Strongly disagree  
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Appendix VI 
 Code List  
Code List – codes and sub-codes  
Origins and Emergence  
• Region- REG  
• Impetus of origin – year and reason: IMPETUS  
• Institutional conditions: INST CON 
• Role of the state: STATE  
• Role of civil society or civil society creation: CIVSOC 
• Geographical factors – GEOG 
• History and historical influence – HIST 
 
Features of the organisation- Structural factors | 
• Nature of collective action: NAT_CA 
• Type of collective goods produced: CA_GOODS 
• Structure of the groups –philosophy of groups: GRP_STR  
• Distribution of goods: DISTRI  
• Ideological influence: IDEO 
• Interest heterogeneity: INT_HETERO  
• Organisational advantage: ORG_ADV  
• Collaboration with government- COLL_GOVT 
• Collaboration with Corporate- COLL_CORP 
• Potential to Evolve: EVOLVE  
 
Institutional feature of collective action- Social Factors  
• Social structure of the groups: SOC_STR 
• Caste and class dynamics : CC_DYN 
• Previous experience of organising : ORG_EXP 
• Social capital : SOC_CAP  
• Mechanisms of cohesion : COH  
• Social advantages: SOC_ADV 
• Freeriding problems : FREE_RIDE  
• Privileged Groups : PREV_GR 
 
Resource structures and benefits- economic factors  
• Levels of asset fixity: ASSET_FIX  
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• Information access : INFO_ACCESS 
• Technology : TECH  
• Credit and input provision : CRE AND INP 
• Resource heterogeneity : REC_HETERO 
• Marketing practices and value creation  : MKT_VALUE  
• Perceived economic advantages : ECO_ADV  
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Appendix VII 
In order for institutional arrangements of collective action such as POFs to be 
effective, they should be able to increase returns on investment in small-scale 
production. Increase returns to investment or profit is a proxy or surplus creation. The 
increased return on investment or changes in profit is potentially the outcome of 
better price realisation and lower marketing costs through changes in the upstream 
markets, gains from lower costs of production and increased yields through improved 
access to credit, inputs and extension services. Based on the literature review done in 
chapter three, This appendix first specifies the relation between unit cost of 
production and marketing and size of landholdings to depict the problem of viability 
of small producers. It then depicts the hypothetical changes collective action can 
bring about on the returns to agricultural production, increasing the economic 
viability of small producers.  Based on this, the profit function to determine the 
changes brought about through collective action is specified.  
Figure (a) depicts the relationship between size of land holding (x axis) and the unit 
cost of production and marketing and unit price realised in the market (y axis). Tm 
depicts the cost of marketing and transaction through monopsonistic intermediaries, 
who purchase the produce at the village level directly from the farmer. To depicts the 
cost of transaction by the primary producer if he wishes to market the produce 
directly in existing market conditions. The role of the intermediary is relevant in the 
rural economy because the cost of marketing, when done by the primary producers 
themselves is still higher due to high search and logistic costs. For average farmers 
when quantity of produce is small, the price offered at the farm gate is a non-
competitive price due to the local monopsony held by the intermediary. To increase 
margins when selling in the open market, the intermediary will squeeze the lowest 
price possible for the produce. The real costs faced by the farmer (Tm) due to scale 
effects and local monopsony of traders, which is severe for the small farmer, since his 
own cost of marketing (To) is much higher than what the existing system would offer 
him. On the other hand the gap between To and Tm, for the farmer with larger 
landholding is small and therefore, faces far less monopsonistic power.  
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Figure (a) Price realisation in the absence of collective action   
Figure (b) Cost responses to collective action  
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Pc is the production cost, which is theoretically scale neutral (Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig 1986), but shows a higher cost at lower sizes of landholdings due to poor 
technical knowledge, information asymmetry and lower access to resources like 
irrigation, credit and extension services. MPc, the market price realised for the 
produce, is constant across scale.  Pc+Tm and Pc+To depicts the total cost incurred to 
producer depending on the channel of marketing taken. Sc1 and So1 are the sizes of 
land holding at which the producer becomes profitable (generates profit) under:  1) 
the assumption that the competitive cost of transactions are accessible by all farmers, 
2) the realistic situation that smaller farmers face monopsony power of the trading 
system  and 3) the assumption that every farmers makes his own marketing 
arrangements.  
The three responses of collective action brings about reduction in marketing costs Tm 
and lowering of production costs Pc and increase of price realised MPc. Figure (b) 
depicts the price realised as a result of the three responses to collective action.Tc 
depicts the cost of marketing under market conditions where goods are purchased at 
farm gate bypassing the markets and intermediaries. This presumes that competitive 
trading sector is able to offer farm gate prices for outputs that are in keeping with 
central place (mandi) prices. This when efficient should be scale neutral on a unit 
basis to all farmers barely rising as output delivered falls to very small quantities. 
Ideal market condition here is where the transaction costs are minimised through 
better marketing practices like proper weighing of farm produces, minimised logistic 
pricing and absence of moral hazard problems like ambiguous quality determination. 
Since farmers under collective action may be able to sell according to contract with a 
buyer or aggregate, schedule efficient transportation and coordinate among 
themselves to increase access at the efficient cost, Tc is the asymptote unit cost of the 
efficient trading system. Production cost Pc flattens in figure (b) as a result of lower 
costs of production from adoption of extension services, access to quality inputs and 
access to credit on reasonable terms. Under collective action Pc+Tc is the overall cost 
and Sc2 is the land holding size under cooperation at which returns are higher than 
production cost.  In figure (b) cost improvements brought about through better 
production and market practices through collective action makes land holding sizes 
between Sc1 and Sc1 profitable, which were not the case earlier.  
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The added effect of the demand side due to collective action is also depicted in figure 
(b) Produce at the market can bring better prices if the quality of the produce can be 
improved through better growing, pre- harvest and post-harvest practices, 
certification and increased yield. Contract with buyers can also help producers get a 
higher price MPA at the marketing stage. In a condition where MPA is realised, the 
potentially profitable size shifts from Sc1 to Sm1 without monopolistic intermediary 
marketing, making small farms more profitable. than under conditions where the 
changes were just supply side responses. Thus, the added impact is that farms earlier 
unprofitable between Sc2 and Sm1 have now additionally become profitable.  
Hypothetically, collective action is important in the Indian agricultural sector where 
access failures and transaction failures make small and marginal agricultural 
production unviable. Transaction failures lead to high marketing and transaction 
costs, while access failures lead to high production costs, eroding the levels of 
surplus (if any) of small producers. The supply side response of collective action 
should help access credit and provide support to reduce production costs and increase 
yields. This needs to be done by making region specific information, research and 
technology available to producers, reducing marketing and transaction costs by 
enabling market contracts and ensuring good marketing practices. The demand side 
responses brought about by collective action is through better price realisation for 
produce sold by its members. This may be enabled through supply chain integration 
and advance contracts that fix prices of commodities produced.  
 
Computing the profit function  
The preliminary assumption of this study is that POFs are collective actions that are 
formed to increase the economic viability of its members. Economic viability would 
mean that there is a creation of marketable surplus in agricultural production. Surplus 
creation is indistinguishable from its proxies, which are returns to investments, profit 
and total returns (Harriss-White, 1995). Increased return to investment or profit 
essentially are changes in cost of cultivation, changes in yields, changes in price of 
the commodity sold and also reduced transaction costs during the marketing process. 
This can be depicted in the following way 
 
 
π = P.Q – (C+Tc) Q 
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Where π is the profit function, P is the price, Q the quantity, C the cost of production 
and Tc the cost of transaction. The change in profit or δπ resulting from collective 
action can be depicted in the following way 
 
δπ =  δP.Q + δQ.P – δC.Q – δTc.Q – C.δQ –Tc.δQ 
 
Where δP.Q is the price increase response, δTc.Q is the transaction cost/marketing 
cost reduction response, δQ. (P-C-Tc) is the quantity (yield) response due to 
improved farm management, resulting in intrinsic rise in production efficiency. δC.Q 
is the gain due to lower cost of production, which could arise out of cooperation. The 
profit function will help evaluate the marginal benefits individuals in POF may 
acquire through provisions such as better access, better information, technology 
adoption and higher bargaining power that are brought about through institutional 
arrangements of collective action.  
 
Economic Changes of collective action  
Production effeciency  
responses (δC.Q) 
Marketing cost 
reduction responses 
(δTc.Q) 
Price Increase responses 
(δP.Q) 
 Institutional Credit 
and reduced interest 
payment  
 Quality Input 
Access  
 Improvement in 
production 
practices through 
information 
dissemination and 
extension services 
 Farm gate purchase 
of produce reducing 
search cost  
 Proper weighing  
 Joint transportation  
 Grade based 
transaction 
reducing 
ambiguous pricing  
 Premium price 
realisation in the 
case of certified 
organic production  
 Benefits of delayed 
marketing  
 Potential of 
increased returns 
through value 
addition.  
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